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From: Kurt Seifried <kseifried-H+wXaHxf7aLQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>
To: oss-security-ZwoEplunGu1jrUoiu81ncdBPR1lH4CV8@public.gmane.org
Cc: "Xen.org security team" <security-LM2mM/qkH7s@public.gmane.org>,
	xen-announce-GuqFBffKawuULHF6PoxzQEEOCMrvLtNR@public.gmane.org,
	xen-devel-GuqFBffKawuULHF6PoxzQEEOCMrvLtNR@public.gmane.org,
	xen-users-GuqFBffKawuULHF6PoxzQEEOCMrvLtNR@public.gmane.org
Subject: Re: Xen Security Advisory 10 - HVM guest user mode MMIO emulation DoS
Date: Fri, 27 Jul 2012 02:10:04 -0600	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <50124CDC.70401@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20497.25251.118584.533875-msK/Ju9w1zmnROeE8kUsYhEHtJm+Wo+I@public.gmane.org>

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Hash: SHA1

On 07/26/2012 09:30 AM, Xen.org security team wrote:
> 
> Xen Security Advisory XSA-10
> 
> HVM guest user mode MMIO emulation DoS vulnerability
> 
> ISSUE DESCRIPTION =================
> 
> Internal data of the emulator for MMIO operations may, under 
> certain rare conditions, at the end of one emulation cycle be left 
> in a state affecting a subsequent emulation such that this second 
> emulation would fail, causing an exception to be reported to the 
> guest kernel where none is expected.
> 
> IMPACT ======
> 
> Guest mode unprivileged (user) code, which has been granted the
> privilege to access MMIO regions, may leverage that access to crash
> the whole guest.
> 
> VULNERABLE SYSTEMS ==================
> 
> All HVM guests exposing MMIO ranges to unprivileged (user) mode.
> 
> All versions of Xen which support HVM guests are vulnerable to this
> issue.
> 
> MITIGATION ==========
> 
> This issue can be mitigated by running PV (para-virtualised) guests
> only, or by ensuring (inside the guest) that MMIO regions can be
> accessed only by trustworthy processes.
> 
> RESOLUTION ==========
> 
> Applying the appropriate attached patch will resolve the issue.
> 
> NOTE REGARDING CVE ==================
> 
> We do not yet have a CVE Candidate number for this vulnerability.
> 
> PATCH INFORMATION =================
> 
> The attached patches resolve this issue
> 
> $ sha256sum xsa10-*.patch 
> f96b7849194901d7f663895f88c2ca4f4721559f1c1fe13bba515336437ab912
> xsa10-4.x.patch 
> fb9dead017dfea99ad3e8d928582e67160c76518b7fe207d9a3324811baf06dd
> xsa10-unstable.patch

Please use CVE-2012-3432 for this issue.


- -- 
Kurt Seifried Red Hat Security Response Team (SRT)
PGP: 0x5E267993 A90B F995 7350 148F 66BF 7554 160D 4553 5E26 7993

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      parent reply	other threads:[~2012-07-27  8:10 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 2+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2012-07-26 15:30 Xen Security Advisory 10 - HVM guest user mode MMIO emulation DoS Xen.org security team
     [not found] ` <20497.25251.118584.533875-msK/Ju9w1zmnROeE8kUsYhEHtJm+Wo+I@public.gmane.org>
2012-07-27  8:10   ` Kurt Seifried [this message]

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