Re: [dm-crypt] SSDs & flash... and secure keyslot erase

["Thomas Bächler" <thomas@archlinux.org>]

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Am 24.08.2012 17:54, schrieb Arno Wagner:
> On Fri, Aug 24, 2012 at 05:23:05PM +0200, Thomas B?chler wrote:
>> Am 24.08.2012 17:06, schrieb Milan Broz:
> [...]
>>> But there is no perfect solution.
>>
>> Interesting write-up. If you are really paranoid, it seems you must back
>> up all data, perform ATA security erase and put the data back on the
>> disk (and then perform ATA security erase on the backup).
> 
> That may not be enough, see Section 3.2 of 
> 
>   http://cseweb.ucsd.edu/users/swanson/papers/Fast2011SecErase.pdf
> 
> Unfortunately, no manufacturer names given.
> 
> My current take is that the only reliable thing is to have LUKS
> key-slots individually larger than the spare area and then overwrite
> all free space with random data after a key-slot change. That way
> the SSD would be unable to hold an old key-slot. For a 240G
> SSD that may mean key-slots > 16GB each. Also, you cannot be
> sure how much Flash capacity an SSD actually has without 
> opening it. 

Okay then. If you are paranoid, burn the entire SSD if your passphrase
is corrupted.



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