[refpolicy] [PATCH 2/3] user access to DOS files

[dwalsh@redhat.com (Daniel J Walsh)]

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On 09/05/2012 04:41 AM, Guido Trentalancia wrote:
> On 05/09/2012 09:00, Dominick Grift wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> On Wed, 2012-09-05 at 01:45 +0200, Guido Trentalancia wrote:
>>> On 04/09/2012 23:21, Laurent Bigonville wrote:
>>>> From: Mika Pfl?ger <debian@mikapflueger.de>
>>>> 
>>>> Add a new boolean to grant users access to dosfs_t. --- 
>>>> policy/global_tunables              |    7 +++++++ 
>>>> policy/modules/system/userdomain.if |    6 ++++++ 2 files changed, 13
>>>> insertions(+)
>>>> 
>>>> diff --git a/policy/global_tunables b/policy/global_tunables index
>>>> 4705ab6..43cc19a 100644 --- a/policy/global_tunables +++
>>>> b/policy/global_tunables @@ -111,3 +111,10 @@
>>>> gen_tunable(use_samba_home_dirs,false) ## </p> ## </desc> 
>>>> gen_tunable(user_tcp_server,false) + +## <desc> +## <p> +## Allow
>>>> users to manage files on dosfs_t devices, usually removable media +##
>>>> </p> +## </desc> +gen_tunable(user_manage_dos_files,true)
>>> 
>>> In my opinion is good to have this as on option, but in a secure 
>>> environment the default should be false for removable media.
>> 
>> i would prefer the boolean to be fprefix userdom or userdomain instead of
>> user, because that it the module that declares this boolean.
>> 
>> Since the user is also allowed to manage dos dirs i would probably call 
>> it: userdomain_manage_dos_content
>> 
>> as description i would use:
>> 
>> "Determine whether users can manage dosfs content."
> 
> I agree. And, in particular it's not "dos files" which can be confusing, 
> but dos filesystems which is already perfectioned in Dominick's
> amendments.
> 
>>>> diff --git a/policy/modules/system/userdomain.if
>>>> b/policy/modules/system/userdomain.if index e720dcd..0c96b65 100644 
>>>> --- a/policy/modules/system/userdomain.if +++
>>>> b/policy/modules/system/userdomain.if @@ -117,6 +117,12 @@
>>>> template(`userdom_base_user_template',` # Allow making the stack
>>>> executable via mprotect. allow $1_t self:process execstack; ') + +
>>>> tunable_policy(`user_manage_dos_files',` +		fs_manage_dos_dirs($1_t) 
>>>> +		fs_manage_dos_files($1_t) +	') + ')
>>>> 
>>>> #######################################
> 
> _______________________________________________ refpolicy mailing list 
> refpolicy at oss.tresys.com http://oss.tresys.com/mailman/listinfo/refpolicy
> 
I think all booleans should be off by default and then the distributions can
decide which booleans to turn on using the booleans.conf file.  This would
allow us one file to look at to see what is enabled.


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