All of lore.kernel.org
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Eric Sandeen <sandeen@redhat.com>
To: Peter Moody <pmoody@google.com>
Cc: linux-ext4@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: Oops with ext(3|4) and audit and Xen
Date: Mon, 08 Oct 2012 16:41:51 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <5073489F.3010401@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CALnj_=7kcNKox0qEO+n74KDEHBfz74pAmg-KOp+TRakNNCoW5Q@mail.gmail.com>

On 10/8/12 4:03 PM, Peter Moody wrote:
> On Mon, Oct 8, 2012 at 12:08 PM, Eric Sandeen <sandeen@redhat.com> wrote:
>> On 10/8/12 1:19 PM, Peter Moody wrote:
>>> Hey folks,
>>>
>>> I'm trying to track down a BUG() that seems to strike a particular
>>> system configuration (unfortunately, an increasingly common
>>> configuration), but does so with 100% reliability.
>>>
>>> The system in question is a Xen instance (6 vcpus, 32G memory) running
>>> 3.2 on essentially stock ubuntu (10.04) system.
>>>
>>> if I run the attached program with the crash dir set to any ext3 or
>>> ext4 file system with any audit rules installed, I get an oops on the
>>> second time through the while loop:
>>>
>>> kernel BUG at fs/buffer.c:1267!
>>> invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP
>>> CPU 1
>>> Pid: 4146, comm: a.out Not tainted 3.2.5-will-break-2-ganetixenu #4
>>> RIP: e030:[<ffffffff81696a6c>]  [<ffffffff81696a6c>] check_irqs_on.part
>>> .10+0x17/0x19
>>> RSP: e02b:ffff8807c7339bf8  EFLAGS: 00010096
>>> RAX: 000000000000001e RBX: ffff8807970840b0 RCX: 00000000000000e7
>>> RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000004
>>> RBP: ffff8807c7339bf8 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000018
>>> R10: 0000000000006a5d R11: 0000000000000001 R12: 0000000000000400
>>> R13: ffff8807dee05040 R14: ffff8807c7339dc0 R15: 0000000000000124
>>> FS:  00007fe7cde057c0(0000) GS:ffff8807fff44000(0063) knlGS:00000000000
>>> 00000
>>> CS:  e033 DS: 002b ES: 002b CR0: 000000008005003b
>>> CR2: 00000000f76dc4b0 CR3: 00000007a769a000 CR4: 0000000000002660
>>> DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
>>> DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000ffff0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
>>> Process a.out (pid: 4146, threadinfo ffff8807c7338000, task ffff8807ab3
>>> 496b0)
>>> Stack:
>>>  ffff8807c7339c68 ffffffff81161dc9 ffff8807c7339c90 ffff8807b6b909f0
>>>  ffff8807ab23901a ffff8807c7339d60 ffff880700000000 ffff8807c7339d30
>>>  ffff8807c7339d60 ffff8807c7339e78 ffff8807970840b0 0000000000000400
>>> Call Trace:
>>>  [<ffffffff81161dc9>] __find_get_block+0x1f9/0x200
>>>  [<ffffffff81164c8f>] __getblk+0x1f/0x280
>>>  [<ffffffff811f35bb>] __ext4_get_inode_loc+0x10b/0x410
>>>  [<ffffffff81124935>] ? kmem_cache_alloc+0xa5/0x150
>>>  [<ffffffff811f9857>] ? ext4_evict_inode+0x177/0x450
>>>  [<ffffffff811f4cc7>] ext4_get_inode_loc+0x17/0x20
>>>  [<ffffffff811f75a8>] ext4_reserve_inode_write+0x28/0xa0
>>>  [<ffffffff811f9815>] ? ext4_evict_inode+0x135/0x450
>>>  [<ffffffff811f7673>] ext4_mark_inode_dirty+0x53/0x200
>>>  [<ffffffff811f9857>] ext4_evict_inode+0x177/0x450
>>>  [<ffffffff8114bfb1>] evict+0xa1/0x1a0
>>>  [<ffffffff8114cc61>] iput+0x101/0x210
>>>  [<ffffffff81148040>] d_kill+0xf0/0x130
>>>  [<ffffffff81148bd2>] dput+0xd2/0x1b0
>>>  [<ffffffff8113eb85>] path_put+0x15/0x30
>>>  [<ffffffff81693e39>] audit_free_names+0x96/0xb5
>>>  [<ffffffff810ac629>] audit_syscall_exit+0x139/0x1e0
>>>  [<ffffffff816a076a>] sysexit_audit+0x21/0x5f
>>> Code: 5c 48 89 df e8 b6 20 ab ff 5b 41 5c 5d c3 55 48 89 e5 0f 0b 55 be
>>>  08 00 00 00 48 c7 c7 c4 fe a0 81 31 c0 48 89 e5 e8 91 cb ff ff <0f>
>>> 0b 55 48 89 e5 0f
>>>  0b 55 48 89 e5 0f 0b 55 48 89 e5 0f 0b 55
>>> RIP  [<ffffffff81696a6c>] check_irqs_on.part.10+0x17/0x19
>>>  RSP <ffff8807c7339bf8>
>>>
>>> line 1267 of fs/buffer.c is
>>>
>>> static inline void check_irqs_on(void)
>>> {
>>> #ifdef irqs_disabled
>>>       BUG_ON(irqs_disabled());
>>> #endif
>>> }
>>>
>>> If I run the same code on the same system with the same audit rule(s)
>>> on an ext2 filesystem, I get no such oops.
>>>
>>> So it seems like something either in the ext3/ext4 or Xen codepath is
>>> disabling interrupts. I'm getting an updated test Xen instance to test
>>> on, but I while I'm waiting on that, I wanted to see if anyone one
>>> here might have an idea of the ext3/4 codepath. whether something
>>> there is doing the interrupt disabling or if there might be some other
>>> race condition going on. I haven't had a chance to test with the large
>>> "ext4 updates for v3.7" tytso recently posted, but I'll be doing that
>>> later today in case something there fixes this.
>>>
>>> So, does any one have any thoughts and/or pointers which might help me
>>> get to the bottom of this?
>>
>> I had suggested this on the other list, but will put it here too, though it
>> might be a long shot.  If threadinfo gets corrupted, the irqs_enabled()
>> test might give the wrong answer.
>>
>> Peter also mentioned that he had tried putting WARN_ON(irqs_disabled()) at
>> various places along the stack above and never got it to trip; until after
>> the BUG_ON() had fired; this makes me think corruption might be a possibility
>> after all.
>>
>> I suggested building with CONFIG_DEBUG_STACK_USAGE and watching
>> for stack messages, and building with CONFIG_STACK_TRACER on, and then:
>>
>> # mount -t debugfs none /sys/kernel/debug
>> # echo 1 > /proc/sys/kernel/stack_tracer_enabled
>> # <run your test w/o the panic, get the BUG_ON>
>> # cat /sys/kernel/debug/tracing/stack_trace
>>
>> to try to rule that out.
> 
> This is what I get. I'm not sure how to interpret this output:
> 
>         Depth    Size   Location    (31 entries)
>         -----    ----   --------
>   0)     3792     272   load_balance+0xaf/0x890

so it only got 3792 bytes into the (8k) stack, not bad at all I guess.
More than one way to corrupt a threadinfo but I guess this wasn't it.

-Eric

>   1)     3520     144   __schedule+0x7ee/0x870
>   2)     3376      16   schedule+0x3f/0x60
>   3)     3360      32   io_schedule+0x8f/0xd0
>   4)     3328      16   sleep_on_buffer+0xe/0x20
>   5)     3312      80   __wait_on_bit+0x5f/0x90
>   6)     3232     112   out_of_line_wait_on_bit+0x7c/0x90
>   7)     3120      16   __wait_on_buffer+0x2e/0x30
>   8)     3104      32   __bread+0x71/0xb0
>   9)     3072      96   ext3_get_branch+0x8b/0x150
>  10)     2976     384   ext3_get_blocks_handle+0xd2/0xe00
>  11)     2592      80   ext3_get_block+0xc4/0x120
>  12)     2512     208   do_mpage_readpage+0x3a2/0x5a0
>  13)     2304     272   mpage_readpages+0xee/0x140
>  14)     2032      16   ext3_readpages+0x1d/0x20
>  15)     2016     192   __do_page_cache_readahead+0x1af/0x250
>  16)     1824      16   ra_submit+0x21/0x30
>  17)     1808     112   filemap_fault+0x261/0x4a0
>  18)     1696     160   __do_fault+0x6f/0x500
>  19)     1536     208   handle_pte_fault+0xf7/0xac0
>  20)     1328      80   handle_mm_fault+0x164/0x260
>  21)     1248     272   do_page_fault+0x144/0x460
>  22)      976     208   page_fault+0x25/0x30
>  23)      768      16   clear_user+0x36/0x40
>  24)      752      16   padzero+0x2d/0x40
>  25)      736     304   load_elf_binary+0xa7f/0x1a10
>  26)      432      80   search_binary_handler+0xc8/0x1b0
>  27)      352     112   do_execve_common.isra.25+0x2b1/0x350
>  28)      240      16   do_execve+0x1b/0x20
>  29)      224      48   sys_execve+0x47/0x70
>  30)      176     176   stub_execve+0x6c/0xc0
> 
> and for good measure, here's the BUG() notice.
> 
> kernel BUG at fs/buffer.c:1265!
> invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP
> CPU 1
> Pid: 3810, comm: a.out Not tainted 3.2.5-at20-ganetixenu #7
> RIP: e030:[<ffffffff816bd776>]  [<ffffffff816bd776>]
> check_irqs_on.part.9+0x9/0xb
> RSP: e02b:ffff8807aca81bf8  EFLAGS: 00010096
> RAX: ffff8807c7400000 RBX: ffff8807acf1c420 RCX: 0000000000000123
> RDX: 0000000000000400 RSI: 0000000000000124 RDI: ffff8807c9dec000
> RBP: ffff8807aca81bf8 R08: ffff8807c7401000 R09: 0000000000000000
> R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: 0000000000000400
> R13: ffff8807c9dec000 R14: ffff8807aca81dc0 R15: 0000000000000124
> FS:  00007f528f9df700(0000) GS:ffff8807fff44000(0063) knlGS:0000000000000000
> CS:  e033 DS: 002b ES: 002b CR0: 000000008005003b
> CR2: 00000000f76c14b0 CR3: 00000007a96d9000 CR4: 0000000000002660
> DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
> DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000ffff0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
> Process a.out (pid: 3810, threadinfo ffff8807aca80000, task ffff8807acb42da0)
> Stack:
>  ffff8807aca81c68 ffffffff81170ed9 ffff8807acf1c420 ffff8807acf1c420
>  ffff8807c7402000 ffff8807aca81dc0 ffff8807aca81cc8 ffffffff816c5316
>  ffff8807c7401000 0000000000000123 ffff8807acf1c420 0000000000000400
> Call Trace:
>  [<ffffffff81170ed9>] __find_get_block+0x209/0x210
>  [<ffffffff816c5316>] ? ftrace_call+0x5/0x2b
>  [<ffffffff81173e64>] __getblk+0x24/0x280
>  [<ffffffff816c5316>] ? ftrace_call+0x5/0x2b
>  [<ffffffff81204b63>] __ext4_get_inode_loc+0x113/0x420
>  [<ffffffff8120af4f>] ? ext4_evict_inode+0x17f/0x450
>  [<ffffffff812062ac>] ext4_get_inode_loc+0x1c/0x20
>  [<ffffffff81208c5d>] ext4_reserve_inode_write+0x2d/0xa0
>  [<ffffffff81208d28>] ext4_mark_inode_dirty+0x58/0x210
>  [<ffffffff8120af4f>] ext4_evict_inode+0x17f/0x450
>  [<ffffffff8115a826>] evict+0xa6/0x1b0
>  [<ffffffff8115b521>] iput+0x101/0x210
>  [<ffffffff81156768>] d_kill+0xf8/0x130
>  [<ffffffff816baa34>] ? audit_free_names+0x6a/0xba
>  [<ffffffff8115732a>] dput+0xda/0x1b0
>  [<ffffffff8114d15a>] path_put+0x1a/0x30
>  [<ffffffff816baa65>] audit_free_names+0x9b/0xba
>  [<ffffffff810b09be>] audit_syscall_exit+0x13e/0x1e0
>  [<ffffffff816c7aea>] sysexit_audit+0x21/0x5f
> Code: ff ff 48 85 db 74 0b fe 43 5c 48 89 df e8 f3 9a a9 ff 5b 41 5c
> 5d c3 55 48 89 e5 e8 65 7b 00
> 00 0f 0b 55 48 89 e5 e8 5a 7b 00 00 <0f> 0b 55 48 89 e5 e8 4f 7b 00 00
> 0f 0b 55 48 89 e5 e8 44 7b 00
> RIP  [<ffffffff816bd776>] check_irqs_on.part.9+0x9/0xb
>  RSP <ffff8807aca81bf8>
> 
>> -Eric
>>
>>> Cheers,
>>> peter
>>>
>>
> 
> 
> 


  reply	other threads:[~2012-10-08 21:41 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 9+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2012-10-08 18:19 Oops with ext(3|4) and audit and Xen Peter Moody
2012-10-08 19:08 ` Eric Sandeen
2012-10-08 21:03   ` Peter Moody
2012-10-08 21:41     ` Eric Sandeen [this message]
2012-10-08 21:39   ` Theodore Ts'o
2012-10-08 21:40     ` Eric Sandeen
2012-10-08 21:45       ` Peter Moody
2012-10-08 21:15 ` Theodore Ts'o
2012-10-08 21:19   ` Peter Moody

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=5073489F.3010401@redhat.com \
    --to=sandeen@redhat.com \
    --cc=linux-ext4@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=pmoody@google.com \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is an external index of several public inboxes,
see mirroring instructions on how to clone and mirror
all data and code used by this external index.