All of lore.kernel.org
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Jeff Liu <jeff.liu@oracle.com>
To: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: akpm@linux-foundation.org, aedilger@gmail.com,
	alan@linux.intel.com, arnn@arndb.de, gregkh@linuxfoundation.org,
	jakub@redhat.com, james.l.morris@oracle.com,
	john.sobecki@oracle.com, tytso@mit.edu, viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk,
	LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: + binfmt_elfc-use-get_random_int-to-fix-entropy-depleting.patch added to -mm tree
Date: Wed, 07 Nov 2012 12:42:12 +0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <5099E6A4.7050802@oracle.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAGXu5j+fLM4YV==xjTsS4qU+CZY_ohL2cdAcEcXBjmS2WHa6Sw@mail.gmail.com>

On 11/07/2012 12:29 PM, Kees Cook wrote:
> On Tue, Nov 6, 2012 at 8:21 PM, Jeff Liu <jeff.liu@oracle.com> wrote:
>> Hi Andrew and Kees,
>>
>> Great thanks for both your comments!
>>
>> On 11/07/2012 09:11 AM, Kees Cook wrote:
>>> Hrm, I don't like this. get_random_int() specifically says: "Get a
>>> random word for internal kernel use only." The intent of AT_RANDOM is
>>> for userspace pRNG seeding (though glibc currently uses it directly
>>> for stack protector and pointer mangling), which is not "internal
>>> kernel use only". :) Though I suppose this is already being used for
>>> the randomize_stack_top(), but I think it'd still be better to use
>>> higher quality bits.
>> Btw Kees, does it sounds make sense if we just return the 16 bytes
>> uninitialized stack array if the user disable the stack randomize via
>> "/proc/sys/kernel/randomize_va_space = 0" or via the related sysctl, or
>> even specified norandmaps on boot?
> 
> No, I feel that ASLR (randomize_va_space) is distinctly separate from
> how glibc uses AT_RANDOM (stack protector and pointer mangling).
> AT_RANDOM should remain active even if randomize_va_space is 0.
Ok, I was confused about the semantics of ASLR, thanks for your
clarification, will post another patch soon according to your feedback.

-Jeff


  reply	other threads:[~2012-11-07  4:42 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 9+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2012-11-07  0:16 + binfmt_elfc-use-get_random_int-to-fix-entropy-depleting.patch added to -mm tree akpm
2012-11-07  1:11 ` Kees Cook
2012-11-07  4:21   ` Jeff Liu
2012-11-07  4:29     ` Kees Cook
2012-11-07  4:42       ` Jeff Liu [this message]
2012-11-07  9:32   ` Theodore Ts'o
2012-11-07 15:10     ` Kees Cook
2012-11-08  6:21       ` Jeff Liu
  -- strict thread matches above, loose matches on Subject: below --
2012-11-16 22:04 akpm

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=5099E6A4.7050802@oracle.com \
    --to=jeff.liu@oracle.com \
    --cc=aedilger@gmail.com \
    --cc=akpm@linux-foundation.org \
    --cc=alan@linux.intel.com \
    --cc=arnn@arndb.de \
    --cc=gregkh@linuxfoundation.org \
    --cc=jakub@redhat.com \
    --cc=james.l.morris@oracle.com \
    --cc=john.sobecki@oracle.com \
    --cc=keescook@chromium.org \
    --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=tytso@mit.edu \
    --cc=viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is an external index of several public inboxes,
see mirroring instructions on how to clone and mirror
all data and code used by this external index.