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From: Saul Wold <sgw@linux.intel.com>
To: "yanjun.zhu" <yanjun.zhu@windriver.com>
Cc: openembedded-core@lists.openembedded.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/1] Python: Fix for CVE-2012-2135 (for denzil)
Date: Fri, 30 Nov 2012 10:54:17 -0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <50B900D9.6000403@linux.intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1354274968-7181-1-git-send-email-yanjun.zhu@windriver.com>

On 11/30/2012 03:29 AM, yanjun.zhu wrote:
> From: "yanjun.zhu" <yanjun.zhu@windriver.com>
>
> Reference:http://bugs.python.org/issue14579
>
> The utf-16 decoder in Python 3.1 through 3.3 does not update the
> aligned_end variable after calling the unicode_decode_call_errorhandler
> function, which allows remote attackers to obtain sensitive information
> (process memory) or cause a denial of service (memory corruption and crash)
> via unspecified vectors.
>
> http://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/detail?vulnId=CVE-2012-2135
>
> [YOCTO #3450]
>
Is this for Denzil or is there a 2.7.3 patch for this CVE?  Both Danny 
(1.3) and master are using Python 2.7.3, which does not seem to have 
this CVE fixed yet.

Please rebase this for master.

Sau!

> Signed-off-by: yanjun.zhu <yanjun.zhu@windriver.com>
> ---
>   .../python/python/python-2.7.2-CVE-2012-2135.patch | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++++
>   meta/recipes-devtools/python/python_2.7.2.bb       |  1 +
>   2 files changed, 25 insertions(+)
>   create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/python/python/python-2.7.2-CVE-2012-2135.patch
>
> diff --git a/meta/recipes-devtools/python/python/python-2.7.2-CVE-2012-2135.patch b/meta/recipes-devtools/python/python/python-2.7.2-CVE-2012-2135.patch
> new file mode 100644
> index 0000000..ad118b0
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/meta/recipes-devtools/python/python/python-2.7.2-CVE-2012-2135.patch
> @@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
> +Upstream-Status: Backport
> +
> +Reference:http://bugs.python.org/issue14579
> +
> +The utf-16 decoder in Python 3.1 through 3.3 does not update the
> +aligned_end variable after calling the unicode_decode_call_errorhandler
> +function, which allows remote attackers to obtain sensitive information
> +(process memory) or cause a denial of service (memory corruption and crash)
> +via unspecified vectors.
> +
> +http://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/detail?vulnId=CVE-2012-2135
> +Signed-off-by: yanjun.zhu <yanjun.zhu@windriver.com>
> +diff -urpN a/Objects/unicodeobject.c b/Objects/unicodeobject.c
> +--- a/Objects/unicodeobject.c	2012-11-12 16:25:33.000000000 +0800
> ++++ b/Objects/unicodeobject.c	2012-11-12 16:26:22.000000000 +0800
> +@@ -2568,7 +2568,7 @@ PyUnicode_DecodeUTF16Stateful(const char
> +         }
> +
> +         /* UTF-16 code pair: */
> +-        if (q >= e) {
> ++        if (e - q < 2) {
> +             errmsg = "unexpected end of data";
> +             startinpos = (((const char *)q)-2)-starts;
> +             endinpos = ((const char *)e)-starts;
> diff --git a/meta/recipes-devtools/python/python_2.7.2.bb b/meta/recipes-devtools/python/python_2.7.2.bb
> index 2adb4e4..9dabfb7 100644
> --- a/meta/recipes-devtools/python/python_2.7.2.bb
> +++ b/meta/recipes-devtools/python/python_2.7.2.bb
> @@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ SRC_URI += "\
>     file://setuptweaks.patch \
>     file://check-if-target-is-64b-not-host.patch \
>     file://search_db_h_in_inc_dirs_and_avoid_warning.patch \
> +  file://python-2.7.2-CVE-2012-2135.patch \
>   "
>
>   S = "${WORKDIR}/Python-${PV}"
>



  reply	other threads:[~2012-11-30 19:08 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 12+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
     [not found] <3450>
2012-11-30  4:30 ` [PATCH 1/1] Python: Fix for CVE-2012-2135 yanjun.zhu
2012-11-30  8:05   ` Saul Wold
2012-12-06 13:01   ` Burton, Ross
2012-12-07  1:45     ` yzhu1
2012-11-30 10:47 ` yanjun.zhu
2012-11-30 11:02 ` yanjun.zhu
2012-11-30 11:23 ` yanjun.zhu
2012-11-30 11:29 ` yanjun.zhu
2012-11-30 18:54   ` Saul Wold [this message]
2012-11-30 23:21     ` [PATCH 1/1] Python: Fix for CVE-2012-2135 (for denzil) Scott Garman
2013-03-04  4:35 ` [PATCH 1/1] Python: Fix for CVE-2012-2135 yanjun.zhu
2013-03-04 10:46   ` Burton, Ross

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