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Subject: Re: [dm-crypt] (OT) Secure data wipe
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To: dm-crypt@saout.de

On 09/12/12 15:48, Karol Babioch wrote:

> this basically is a myth. Overwriting the whole drive just one time
> will make any recovery practically impossible, see [1].

Just to link the DoD Standard, DoD recommended 3 cycles, and in US
DoD-5220.22-M ECE 7 cycles:

I don't think that one person who wants assure to destroy their secret
data would want to take the risk of these 0,97%

www.usaid.gov/pubs/ads/500/d522022m.pdf