[refpolicy] [PATCH 5/8] Dontaudit getsched on all domains

[cpebenito@tresys.com (Christopher J. PeBenito)]

On 12/21/12 15:17, Sven Vermeulen wrote:
> On Mon, Dec 17, 2012 at 11:26:04AM +0100, Sven Vermeulen wrote:
>>>> --- a/policy/modules/system/userdomain.if
>>>> +++ b/policy/modules/system/userdomain.if
>>>> @@ -523,6 +523,8 @@ template(`userdom_common_user_template',`
>>>>  	dev_read_sound_mixer($1_t)
>>>>  	dev_write_sound_mixer($1_t)
>>>>  
>>>> +	domain_dontaudit_getsched_all_domains($1_t)
>>>
>>> That is too coarse in my view.
>>>
>>> This will also dontaudit legitimate access for processes needing this
>>> running in the user domain.
>>>
>>> Lets say i have this app that depends on this permission for itself:
>>>
>>> allow staff_t self:process { signal getsched };
>>>
>>> Then this rule will silently hide that access
>>
>> I understand that, but the other method would be to create
>> *_dontaudit_getsched for each and every possible module, and add it in the
>> user domain definition fully loaded with optional_policy() statements.
>>
>> And if the user domain doesn't need getsched itself, then running htop will
>> generate denials anyhow for self (i.e. in your above example, you'll get
>> denials for staff_t getsched on itself) so eventually you'll add in a
>> staff_dontaudit_getsched() for that too?
>>
>> Another alternative could be to run htop in its own domain, but that doesn't
>> make sense imo...
> 
> Chris, what is your take on this?

While I'm typically conservative on permissions, I'm not as concerned about this.  True, it can cover up legitimate denials, but the dontaudits can always do that.  Since this is due to a specific app, add a comment so we can remove the rule if/when htop gets fixed for all these superfluous getscheds.

-- 
Chris PeBenito
Tresys Technology, LLC
www.tresys.com | oss.tresys.com