From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from mail.saout.de ([127.0.0.1]) by localhost (mail.saout.de [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id KWpKA0-onY1A for ; Wed, 6 Feb 2013 15:08:09 +0100 (CET) Received: from mail-we0-x233.google.com (mail-we0-x233.google.com [IPv6:2a00:1450:400c:c03::233]) (using TLSv1 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-RC4-SHA (128/128 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mail.saout.de (Postfix) with ESMTPS for ; Wed, 6 Feb 2013 15:08:09 +0100 (CET) Received: by mail-we0-f179.google.com with SMTP id x43so1131634wey.38 for ; Wed, 06 Feb 2013 06:08:07 -0800 (PST) Message-ID: <511263C0.9040700@gmail.com> Date: Wed, 06 Feb 2013 15:08:00 +0100 From: Milan Broz MIME-Version: 1.0 References: , <51124EBC.50207@gmail.com> In-Reply-To: Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Subject: Re: [dm-crypt] Cryptographic issues with SSD-technology and wide-block encryption modes List-Id: List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , To: dm-crypt@saout.de Cc: Stavros Kousidis On 02/06/2013 02:34 PM, Stavros Kousidis wrote: >> But that said, yes I'm very well aware of this problem and I would >> like to have at least some analysis what's really going on in todays >> flash storage devices and how it is related to disk encryption security. >> So let's try to gather some data first. > > That clarifies some things to me, and yes, I would also like to know what's happening inside those things. Especially since I have seen: > http://static.usenix.org/events/fast11/tech/full_papers/Wei.pdf yes, this is nice paper! Please if anyone here have more such pointers, please post it here! I am quite interested in research here and there are several interesting interactions which surely need more coverage. >> But do not forget one thing - while cryptsetup is always open to support >> wide range of algorithms, a huge user base is bound by standards which do not >> allow them to use anything else. That's why XTS is so widely used. > > Ok that sounds reasonable (doable???). What exactly do you mean by a huge user base being bound by standards and to XTS? I mean users which are required to comply (at least to some extent) to FIPS standards for example. (Usually government & public sector etc.) Here, AFAIK, you can use AES and CBC or XTS modes only. And I am trying to keep default cryptsetup/LUKS modes compatible with these, but really, that was just note that many people will (or will have to) prefer standard modes (which get more analysis as well). Milan