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From: Daniel De Graaf <dgdegra@tycho.nsa.gov>
To: Ross Philipson <ross.philipson@citrix.com>
Cc: xen-devel@lists.xen.org
Subject: Re: XSM dummy policy blocking event channel creation
Date: Wed, 01 May 2013 18:02:20 -0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <518190EC.2030104@tycho.nsa.gov> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <51818498.9040708@citrix.com>

On 05/01/2013 05:09 PM, Ross Philipson wrote:
> On 05/01/2013 04:50 PM, Daniel De Graaf wrote:
>> On 05/01/2013 03:40 PM, Ross Philipson wrote:
>>> I am working on the next set of V4V patches to post to the list. I
>>> have pulled the very latest staging branch of Xen and I quickly ran
>>> into a new problem. We are basically trying to create an event channel
>>> during the creation of dom0. We have split up the
>>> evtchn_alloc_unbound() function into two functions but the basic
>>> problem is the same. The call to xsm_evtchn_unbound() is returning
>>> -EPERM from the new code in xsm/dummy.h. This patch set added this
>>> functionality:
>>>
>>> http://lists.xen.org/archives/html/xen-devel/2012-11/msg01920.html
>>>
>>> Specifically we are failing this part of the test return -EPERM:
>>>
>>> static always_inline int xsm_default_action(
>>> xsm_default_t action, struct domain *src, struct domain *target)
>>> {
>>> ...
>>> case XSM_TARGET:
>>> if ( src != target && !IS_PRIV_FOR(src, target) )
>>> return -EPERM;
>>>
>>> The src domain is the current->domain which is idle_domain and target
>>> is dom0 which is in the process of being created. Neither of them is
>>> privileged (dom0 is not set to privileged yet). And I have not gotten
>>> past dom0 creation yet so I don't know what will happen when V4V tries
>>> to initialize for domU's.
>>>
>>> I need some advice on how to proceed here. I am not terribly
>>> conversant in the working of XSM and do not have a clear idea how to
>>> proceed.
>>>
>>> Thanks,
>>> Ross Philipson
>>
>> The answer for domUs is actually easier: the domain builder (dom0) will
>> satisfy IS_PRIV_FOR(dom0, newdomU) and so the creation will be allowed.
>> With FLASK, the remote domain will also be considered, so I presume you
>> have set something valid there (it needs to have a struct domain* that
>> rcu_lock_domain_by_any_id can be used to fetch).
>>
>> Event channels created by the hypervisor are normally allocated using
>> alloc_unbound_xen_event_channel instead of evtchn_alloc_unbound; the
>> former will not fail the creation of the event channel if the XSM hook
>> denies, but will instead change the remote domain ID to DOMID_INVALID.
>> Depending on what you intend the remote domid to be in this newly
>> allocated event channel, this may or may not be useful behavior; the
>> semantics of alloc_unbound_xen_event_channel are also different, so
>> you would need to change your calling code with this in mind.
>>
>> If you want to use evtchn_alloc_unbound directly, you probably need to
>> add logic to omit the XSM check during the creation of dom0 - and this
>> likely belongs in the evtchn_alloc_unbound function rather than the
>> dummy XSM hook. The XSM changes you referenced don't actually introduce
>> this, since before the call to rcu_lock_target_domain_by_id would have
>> failed because the idle domain does not satisfy IS_PRIV_FOR on dom0.
>>
> Thank you for getting back to me so quickly.
>
> Perhaps I should share the new split up evtchn_alloc* functions since the way they are done is relevant to your answer. I attached a snippet with the split functions. We are directly calling evtchn_alloc_unbound_domain() which does not call rcu_lock_domain_by_any_id(). So the permissions block is related only to the changes in dummy.c I believe.

Well, the way you have it written happens to avoid the permission check,
presumably because the hypervisor is doing the creation. I can't tell if
this is still correct in the new function since I can't see who calls it;
if this is only called during domain creation and remote_domid is always
something special (DOMID_SELF, perhaps?) then completely removing the XSM
check would be justified for internal callers.

The goal of the XSM check here is to control the creation of event channels:
we don't want a domain creating event channels for another unless it controls
that domain (the check between current->domain and d that you have hit here),
and with FLASK we also want to control what domains can communicate with each
other (which is the reason remote_domid is passed to the XSM hook). V4V will
require its own XSM hooks to satisfy the second goal, and the first does not
apply when the hypervisor is the entity creating the event channel.

> I am still digging through the history of the posts and responses to see how they settled on that configuration of the evtchn_alloc* functions but this might explain things for you a bit better (e.g. why it worked prior to the dummy.c changes).
>
> Thanks,
> Ross

What is this event channel being used for - is it similar to the HVM ioreq
event channel created on a domain that someone else can bind and send to, or
a VIRQ implemented as an unbound event channel, or something else?  What are
you passing as remote_domid here?

The V4V-like code that I am currently using uses a VIRQ for this purpose, as
does the last V4V patch RFC that I checked (dated 2012-05-31).

-- 
Daniel De Graaf
National Security Agency

  reply	other threads:[~2013-05-01 22:02 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 9+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2013-05-01 19:40 XSM dummy policy blocking event channel creation Ross Philipson
2013-05-01 20:50 ` Daniel De Graaf
2013-05-01 21:09   ` Ross Philipson
2013-05-01 22:02     ` Daniel De Graaf [this message]
2013-05-02 14:23       ` Ross Philipson
2013-05-02 15:10         ` Daniel De Graaf
2013-05-02 15:37           ` Ross Philipson
2013-05-02 16:03             ` Daniel De Graaf
2013-05-03 13:14               ` Ross Philipson

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