All of lore.kernel.org
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
To: Andy Ruch <adruch2002@yahoo.com>
Cc: SELinux ML <selinux@tycho.nsa.gov>
Subject: Re: AVC for unlabeled_t on cgroup
Date: Thu, 11 Jul 2013 15:06:34 -0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <51DF023A.3020101@tycho.nsa.gov> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1373567937.10428.YahooMailNeo@web163406.mail.gq1.yahoo.com>

On 07/11/2013 02:38 PM, Andy Ruch wrote:
> Hello,
>
> I'm implementing a restrictive policy for RHEL 6.3 based on CLIP. I've enabled the cgroup module but I'm still seeing the AVC below. This is just one of a dozen similar AVC's for different inodes. When I look at the /cgroup after the system boots, everything has a cgroup_t label. Where would the unlabeled_t be coming from?
>
>
>
> type=SYSCALL msg=audit(07/11/2013 17:25:38.885:7) : arch=x86_64 syscall=mount success=yes exit=0 a0=7f57846ac4c1 a1=7f57848b03c0 a2=7f57846ac4c1 a3=0 items=0 ppid=1177 pid=1178 auid=unset uid=root gid=root euid=root suid=root fsuid=root egid=root sgid=root fsgid=root tty=(none) ses=unset comm=cgconfigparser exe=/sbin/cgconfigparser subj=system_u:system_r:cgconfig_t:s0 key=(null)
>
> type=AVC msg=audit(07/11/2013 17:25:38.885:7) : avc:  denied  { search } for  pid=1178 comm=cgconfigparser name=/ dev=cgroup ino=12518 scontext=system_u:system_r:kernel_t:s0 tcontext=system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t:s0 tclass=dir

That's likely a kernel-internal lookup during creation of a cgroup 
inode.  cgroup has some code to switch to the kernel credential when 
performing such lookups to avoid permission denials IIRC, which presumes 
then that you allow this in your policy. Doesn't show up in typical 
policies as they allow kernel_t all access since it can do anything it 
wants anyway.



--
This message was distributed to subscribers of the selinux mailing list.
If you no longer wish to subscribe, send mail to majordomo@tycho.nsa.gov with
the words "unsubscribe selinux" without quotes as the message.

  reply	other threads:[~2013-07-11 19:06 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 6+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2013-07-11 18:38 AVC for unlabeled_t on cgroup Andy Ruch
2013-07-11 19:06 ` Stephen Smalley [this message]
2013-07-11 19:24   ` Andy Ruch
2013-07-11 19:38     ` Stephen Smalley
2013-07-13 17:48 ` Sven Vermeulen
2013-07-15 13:07   ` Stephen Smalley

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=51DF023A.3020101@tycho.nsa.gov \
    --to=sds@tycho.nsa.gov \
    --cc=adruch2002@yahoo.com \
    --cc=selinux@tycho.nsa.gov \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is an external index of several public inboxes,
see mirroring instructions on how to clone and mirror
all data and code used by this external index.