Re: [PATCH 1/1 V5] x86/AMD: Fix nested svm crash due to assertion in __virt_to_maddr

[Suravee Suthikulpanit <suravee.suthikulpanit@amd.com>]

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On 8/12/2013 8:18 AM, Jan Beulich wrote:
>>>> On 12.08.13 at 13:13, "Egger, Christoph" <chegger@amazon.de> wrote:
>> On 12.08.13 11:01, Jan Beulich wrote:
>>>>>> On 12.08.13 at 10:57, "Egger, Christoph" <chegger@amazon.de> wrote:
>>>> On 08.08.13 08:47, Jan Beulich wrote:
>>>>> In any case - explaining how nestedhvm_enabled() could end up
>>>>> returning a value different from hvm_svm_enabled() would help
>>>>> my understanding.
>>>> nestedhvm_enabled() returns true when 'nestedhvm=1' in the
>>>> guest config file.
>>>>
>>>> hvm_svm_enabled() returns true when the hvm guest enabled SVM
>>>> in EFER.
>>> And the guest should certainly be disallowed to enable SVM in
>>> EFER when nestedhvm was not 1 in the config file.
>> That's correct. The guest should also never see SVM available via
>> cpuid.
>> Analogous same regarding VMX on Intel.
> So Suravee, bottom line from this is: Replace the prior checks
> instead of adding the new ones.
>
> Jan
>
>
Ok... I will replace the hvm_svm_enabled() to check the EFER.SVME bit 
instead.
I sent out the V6 on Friday which I haveseparated the patch into two.
Would you mind taking one last quick look.

Thank you,

Suravee

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