From: Thomas Hellstrom <thellstrom@vmware.com>
To: David Herrmann <dh.herrmann@gmail.com>
Cc: Dave Airlie <airlied@redhat.com>,
linux-graphics-maintainer@vmware.com,
"dri-devel@lists.freedesktop.org"
<dri-devel@lists.freedesktop.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 08/16] drm/vmwgfx: implement mmap access managament
Date: Fri, 16 Aug 2013 17:33:31 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <520E464B.8070601@vmware.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CANq1E4QYVeZairUfPDLP2Q=TBipy5+L=+HBReqVwwZ34HdPS4g@mail.gmail.com>
On 08/16/2013 03:19 PM, David Herrmann wrote:
> Hi
>
> On Wed, Aug 14, 2013 at 7:35 PM, Thomas Hellstrom <thellstrom@vmware.com> wrote:
>> (CC'ing the proper people since I'm still on parental leave).
>>
>> On 08/13/2013 11:44 PM, David Herrmann wrote:
>>
>> Please see inline comments.
>>
>>
>>> Hi
>>>
>>> On Tue, Aug 13, 2013 at 9:38 PM, David Herrmann <dh.herrmann@gmail.com>
>>> wrote:
>>>> Correctly allow and revoke buffer access on each open/close via the new
>>>> VMA offset manager.
>>
>> I haven't yet had time to check the access policies of the new VMA offset
>> manager, but anything that is identical or stricter than the current vmwgfx
>> verify_access() would be fine. If it's stricter however, we need to
>> double-check backwards user-space compatibility.
> My patches make vmw_dmabuf_alloc_ioctl() add the caller's open-file
> (file*) to the list of allowed users of the new bo.
> vmw_dmabuf_unref_ioctl() removes it again. I haven't seen any way to
> pass a user-dmabuf to another user so there is currently at most one
> user for a vmw_dmabuf. vmw_user_dmabuf_reference() looks like it is
> intended exactly for this case so it would have to add the file* of
> the caller to the list of allowed users. I will change that in v2.
> This means every user who gets a handle for the buffer (like gem_open)
> will be added to the allowed users. For TTM-object currently only a
> single user is allowed.
>
> So I replace vmw_user_bo->base.tfile with a list (actually rbtree) of
> allowed files. So more than one user can have access. This, however,
> breaks the "shareable" attribute which I wasn't aware of. As far as I
> can see, "shareable" is only used by vmwgfx_surface.c and can be set
> by userspace to allow arbitrary processes to map this buffer (sounds
> like a security issue similar to gem flink).
> I actually think we can replace the "shareable" attribute with proper
> access-management in the vma-manager. But first I'd need to know
> whether "shareable = true" is actually used by vmwgfx user-space and
> how buffers are shared? Do you simply pass the mmap offset between
> processes? Or do you pass some handle?
Buffer- and surface sharing is done by passing an opaque (not mmap) handle.
A process intending to map the shared buffer must obtain the map offset
through a
vmw_user_dmabuf_reference() call, and that only works if the buffer is
"shareable".
mmap offsets are never passed between processes, but valid only if
obtained directly
from the kernel driver.
This means that currently buffer mapping should have the same access
restriction as the
X server imposes on DRI clients; If a process is allowed to open the drm
device, it also has
map access to all "shareable" objects, which is a security hole in the
sense that verify_access() should
really check that the caller, if not the buffer owner, is also
authenticated.
The reason verify_access() is there is to make the TTM buffer object
transparent to how it is exported
to user space (GEM or TTM objects). Apparently the GEM TTM drivers have
ignored this hook for some unknown
reason.
Some ideas:
1) Rather than having a list of allowable files on each buffer object,
perhaps we should have a user and a group and
a set of permissions (for user, group and system) more like how files
are handled?
2) Rather than imposing a security policy in the vma manager, could we
perhaps have a set a utility functions that
are called through verify_access(). Each driver could then have a
wrapper to gather the needed information and
hand it over to the VMA manager?
>
> If you really pass mmap offsets in user-space and rely on this, I
> guess there is no way I can make vmwgfx use the vma-manager access
> management. I will have to find a way to work around it or move the
> "shareable" flag to ttm_bo.
>
>>>> We also need to make vmw_user_dmabuf_reference()
>>>> correctly increase the vma-allow counter, but it is unused so remove it
>>>> instead.
>> IIRC this function or a derivative thereof is used heavily in an upcoming
>> version driver, so if possible, please add a corrected version rather than
>> remove the (currently) unused code. This will trigger a merge error and the
>> upcoming code can be more easily corrected.
> I will do so.
>
>>>> Cc: Thomas Hellstrom <thellstrom@vmware.com>
>>>> Signed-off-by: David Herrmann <dh.herrmann@gmail.com>
>>> Just as a hint, this patch would allow to remove the
>>> "->access_verify()" callback in vmwgfx. No other driver uses it,
>>> afaik. I will try to add this in v2.
>>>
>>> Regards
>>> David
>>>
>>>> ---
>>>> drivers/gpu/drm/vmwgfx/vmwgfx_resource.c | 29
>>>> +++++++++++++++++------------
>>>> 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
>>>>
>>>> diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/vmwgfx/vmwgfx_resource.c
>>>> b/drivers/gpu/drm/vmwgfx/vmwgfx_resource.c
>>>> index 0e67cf4..4d3f0ae 100644
>>>> --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/vmwgfx/vmwgfx_resource.c
>>>> +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/vmwgfx/vmwgfx_resource.c
>>>> @@ -499,6 +499,12 @@ int vmw_dmabuf_alloc_ioctl(struct drm_device *dev,
>>>> void *data,
>>>> if (unlikely(ret != 0))
>>>> goto out_no_dmabuf;
>>>>
>>>> + ret = drm_vma_node_allow(&dma_buf->base.vma_node,
>>>> file_priv->filp);
>>>> + if (ret) {
>>>> + vmw_dmabuf_unreference(&dma_buf);
>>>> + goto out_no_dmabuf;
>>>> + }
>>>> +
>>>> rep->handle = handle;
>>>> rep->map_handle =
>>>> drm_vma_node_offset_addr(&dma_buf->base.vma_node);
>>>> rep->cur_gmr_id = handle;
>>>> @@ -517,7 +523,18 @@ int vmw_dmabuf_unref_ioctl(struct drm_device *dev,
>>>> void *data,
>>>> {
>>>> struct drm_vmw_unref_dmabuf_arg *arg =
>>>> (struct drm_vmw_unref_dmabuf_arg *)data;
>>>> + struct ttm_object_file *tfile = vmw_fpriv(file_priv)->tfile;
>>>> + struct vmw_dma_buffer *dma_buf;
>>>> + int ret;
>>>> +
>>>> + ret = vmw_user_dmabuf_lookup(tfile, arg->handle, &dma_buf);
>>>> + if (ret)
>>>> + return -EINVAL;
>>>>
>>>> + drm_vma_node_revoke(&dma_buf->base.vma_node, file_priv->filp);
>>>> + vmw_dmabuf_unreference(&dma_buf);
>>>> +
>>>> + /* FIXME: is this equivalent to vmw_dmabuf_unreference(dma_buf)?
>>>> */
>>
>> No. A ttm ref object is rather similar to a generic GEM object, only that
>> it's generic in the sense that it is not restricted to buffers, and can make
>> any desired object visible to user-space. So translated the below code
>> removes a reference that the arg->handle holds on the "gem" object,
>> potentially destroying the whole object in which the "gem" object is
>> embedded.
> So I actually need both lookups, vmw_user_dmabuf_lookup() and the
> lookup in ttm_ref_object_base_unref()? Ugh.. but ok, I will leave the
> function then as it is now but remove the comment.
Yes. This seems odd, but IIRC the lookups are from different hash
tables. The unref() call
makes a lookup in a hash table private to the file.
>
>>>> return ttm_ref_object_base_unref(vmw_fpriv(file_priv)->tfile,
>>>> arg->handle,
>>>> TTM_REF_USAGE);
>>>> @@ -551,18 +568,6 @@ int vmw_user_dmabuf_lookup(struct ttm_object_file
>>>> *tfile,
>>>> return 0;
>>>> }
>>>>
>>>> -int vmw_user_dmabuf_reference(struct ttm_object_file *tfile,
>>>> - struct vmw_dma_buffer *dma_buf)
>>>> -{
>>>> - struct vmw_user_dma_buffer *user_bo;
>>>> -
>>>> - if (dma_buf->base.destroy != vmw_user_dmabuf_destroy)
>>>> - return -EINVAL;
>>>> -
>>>> - user_bo = container_of(dma_buf, struct vmw_user_dma_buffer, dma);
>>>> - return ttm_ref_object_add(tfile, &user_bo->base, TTM_REF_USAGE,
>>>> NULL);
>>>> -}
>>>> -
>>>> /*
>>>> * Stream management
>>>> */
>>>> --
>>>> 1.8.3.4
>>>>
>> Otherwise looks OK to me.
> Thanks!
> David
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2013-08-16 15:33 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 26+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2013-08-13 19:38 [PATCH 00/16] DRM VMA Access Management David Herrmann
2013-08-13 19:38 ` [PATCH 01/16] drm/vma: add access management helpers David Herrmann
2013-08-13 19:38 ` [PATCH 02/16] drm/ast: implement mmap access managament David Herrmann
2013-08-13 19:38 ` [PATCH 03/16] drm/cirrus: " David Herrmann
2013-08-13 19:38 ` [PATCH 04/16] drm/mgag200: " David Herrmann
2013-08-13 19:38 ` [PATCH 05/16] drm/nouveau: " David Herrmann
2013-08-13 19:38 ` [PATCH 06/16] drm/radeon: " David Herrmann
2013-08-13 19:38 ` [PATCH 07/16] drm/qxl: " David Herrmann
2013-08-13 19:38 ` [PATCH 08/16] drm/vmwgfx: " David Herrmann
2013-08-13 21:44 ` David Herrmann
2013-08-14 17:35 ` Thomas Hellstrom
2013-08-16 13:19 ` David Herrmann
2013-08-16 15:33 ` Thomas Hellstrom [this message]
2013-08-16 17:01 ` David Herrmann
2013-08-16 17:27 ` Thomas Hellstrom
2013-08-13 19:38 ` [PATCH 09/16] drm/ttm: prevent mmap access to unauthorized users David Herrmann
2013-08-13 19:38 ` [PATCH 10/16] drm/gem: implement mmap access management David Herrmann
2013-08-13 21:05 ` Daniel Vetter
2013-08-23 11:14 ` David Herrmann
2013-08-13 19:38 ` [PATCH 11/16] drm/i915: enable GEM " David Herrmann
2013-08-13 19:38 ` [PATCH 12/16] drm/exynos: " David Herrmann
2013-08-13 19:38 ` [PATCH 13/16] drm/gma500: " David Herrmann
2013-08-13 19:38 ` [PATCH 14/16] drm/omap: " David Herrmann
2013-08-13 19:46 ` Rob Clark
2013-08-13 19:38 ` [PATCH 15/16] drm/udl: " David Herrmann
2013-08-13 19:38 ` [PATCH 16/16] drm/host1x: " David Herrmann
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