From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 From: Qin Chuanyu Subject: =?UTF-8?B?UmU6IElzIGZhbGxiYWNrIHZob3N0X25ldCB0byBxZW11IGZvciBsaXY=?= =?UTF-8?B?ZSBtaWdyYXRlIGF2YWlsYWJsZe+8nw==?= Date: Tue, 3 Sep 2013 09:28:11 +0800 Message-ID: <52253B2B.6050909@huawei.com> References: <521C1DCF.5090202@huawei.com> <522174D7.6080903@huawei.com> <20130902075722.GZ15729@zion.uk.xensource.com> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8; format=flowed Content-Transfer-Encoding: QUOTED-PRINTABLE Cc: Anthony Liguori , "Michael S. Tsirkin" , , KVM list , , , "xen-devel@lists.xen.org" , , , , To: Wei Liu Return-path: In-Reply-To: <20130902075722.GZ15729@zion.uk.xensource.com> Sender: netdev-owner@vger.kernel.org List-Id: kvm.vger.kernel.org On 2013/9/2 15:57, Wei Liu wrote: > On Sat, Aug 31, 2013 at 12:45:11PM +0800, Qin Chuanyu wrote: >> On 2013/8/30 0:08, Anthony Liguori wrote: >>> Hi Qin, >> >>>> By change the memory copy and notify mechanism =EF=BC=8Ccurrently = virtio-net with >>>> vhost_net could run on Xen with good performance=E3=80=82 >>> >>> I think the key in doing this would be to implement a property >>> ioeventfd and irqfd interface in the driver domain kernel. Just >>> hacking vhost_net with Xen specific knowledge would be pretty nasty >>> IMHO. >>> >> Yes, I add a kernel module which persist virtio-net pio_addr and >> msix address as what kvm module did. Guest wake up vhost thread by >> adding a hook func in evtchn_interrupt. >> >>> Did you modify the front end driver to do grant table mapping or is >>> this all being done by mapping the domain's memory? >>> >> There is nothing changed in front end driver. Currently I use >> alloc_vm_area to get address space=EF=BC=8C and map the domain's mem= ory as >> what what qemu did. >> > > You mean you're using xc_map_foreign_range and friends in the backend= to > map guest memory? That's not very desirable as it violates Xen's > security model. It would not be too hard to pass grant references > instead of guest physical memory address IMHO. > In fact, I did what virtio-net have done in Qemu. I think security is a pseudo question because Dom0 is under control. Host could access memory of guest in KVM much easier than Xen, but I hadn't heard someone said KVM is un-secret. Regards Qin chuanyu