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From: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
To: Torsten Duwe <duwe@lst.de>
Cc: tytso@mit.edu, ingo.tuchscherer@de.ibm.com,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	Hans-Georg Markgraf <MGRF@de.ibm.com>,
	Gerald Schaefer <gerald.schaefer@de.ibm.com>,
	Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>,
	Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>,
	Joe Perches <joe@perches.com>
Subject: Re: [Resend PATCH 2/2] s390: provide hardware randomness from zcrypt card to /dev/random
Date: Thu, 12 Sep 2013 13:37:53 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <52322621.3040908@zytor.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <alpine.LNX.2.00.1309121139000.3818@linux.site>

On 09/12/2013 02:41 AM, Torsten Duwe wrote:
> 
> Running completely virtualised, system Z severely lacks good true random sources.
> Gathering entropy in a virtual environment is difficult. To compensate, there is
> specialised crypto hardware which includes a source for hardware randomness;
> the zcrypt driver is able to access this random source. This patch adds a kernel
> thread that feeds the random bits via the interface created with the previous patch.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Torsten Duwe <duwe@lst.de>

>From what I can gather from the patch this is too heavyweight (need
locks and so on) to use as arch_get_random*().  There has been a lot of
discussion about the pros and cons of allowing the kernel to bypass
rngd, but I would think that any such plumbing -- once it gets past the
fully synchronous low latency properties of arch_get_random*() -- really
should be implemented as an option in the existing hwrng device
infrastructure.

In other words, start by implementing a hwrng device.  That will work
right now with rngd running.  Then we can consider if we want to allow
bypass of rngd for certain hwrng devices -- which may include zcrypt,
virtio_rng and so on.

	-hpa



  reply	other threads:[~2013-09-12 20:38 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 7+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2013-09-12  9:41 [Resend PATCH 2/2] s390: provide hardware randomness from zcrypt card to /dev/random Torsten Duwe
2013-09-12 20:37 ` H. Peter Anvin [this message]
2013-09-19  8:47   ` Torsten Duwe
2013-09-19 13:03     ` H. Peter Anvin
2013-09-19 13:05     ` H. Peter Anvin
2014-03-17 16:48       ` [PATCH 00/03]: khwrngd (Was: s390: provide hardware randomness from zcrypt card to /dev/random) Torsten Duwe
2014-03-17 16:50         ` [Patch 01/03]: provide an injection point for pure hardware randomness Torsten Duwe

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