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From: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
To: paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com
Cc: Miles Lane <miles.lane@gmail.com>,
	LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	apparmor@lists.ubuntu.com
Subject: Re: Linus Git (3.11.0+) - security/apparmor/include/policy.h:363 suspicious rcu_dereference_check() usage!
Date: Thu, 12 Sep 2013 18:40:36 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <52326D14.40006@canonical.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20130912173450.GU3966@linux.vnet.ibm.com>

On 09/12/2013 10:34 AM, Paul E. McKenney wrote:
> On Wed, Sep 11, 2013 at 11:39:31PM -0400, Miles Lane wrote:
>> [   29.804534] [ INFO: suspicious RCU usage. ]
>> [   29.804539] 3.11.0+ #5 Not tainted
>> [   29.804541] -------------------------------
>> [   29.804545] security/apparmor/include/policy.h:363 suspicious
>> rcu_dereference_check() usage!
> 
> Adding the AppArmor maintainer and list on CC, looks like one for them.
> 
yep, I'm looking into it thanks for the heads up

> 							Thanx, Paul
> 
>> [   29.804548]
>> [   29.804548] other info that might help us debug this:
>> [   29.804548]
>> [   29.804553]
>> [   29.804553] rcu_scheduler_active = 1, debug_locks = 1
>> [   29.804558] 2 locks held by apparmor_parser/1268:
>> [   29.804560]  #0:  (sb_writers#9){.+.+.+}, at: [<ffffffff81120a4c>]
>> file_start_write+0x27/0x29
>> [   29.804576]  #1:  (&ns->lock){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffff811f5d88>]
>> aa_replace_profiles+0x166/0x57c
>> [   29.804589]
>> [   29.804589] stack backtrace:
>> [   29.804595] CPU: 0 PID: 1268 Comm: apparmor_parser Not tainted 3.11.0+ #5
>> [   29.804599] Hardware name: ASUSTeK Computer Inc.         UL50VT
>>          /UL50VT    , BIOS 217     03/01/2010
>> [   29.804602]  0000000000000000 ffff8800b95a1d90 ffffffff8144eb9b
>> ffff8800b94db540
>> [   29.804611]  ffff8800b95a1dc0 ffffffff81087439 ffff880138cc3a18
>> ffff880138cc3a18
>> [   29.804619]  ffff8800b9464a90 ffff880138cc3a38 ffff8800b95a1df0
>> ffffffff811f5084
>> [   29.804628] Call Trace:
>> [   29.804636]  [<ffffffff8144eb9b>] dump_stack+0x4e/0x82
>> [   29.804642]  [<ffffffff81087439>] lockdep_rcu_suspicious+0xfc/0x105
>> [   29.804649]  [<ffffffff811f5084>] __aa_update_replacedby+0x53/0x7f
>> [   29.804655]  [<ffffffff811f5408>] __replace_profile+0x11f/0x1ed
>> [   29.804661]  [<ffffffff811f6032>] aa_replace_profiles+0x410/0x57c
>> [   29.804668]  [<ffffffff811f16d4>] profile_replace+0x35/0x4c
>> [   29.804674]  [<ffffffff81120fa3>] vfs_write+0xad/0x113
>> [   29.804680]  [<ffffffff81121609>] SyS_write+0x44/0x7a
>> [   29.804687]  [<ffffffff8145bfd2>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
>> [   29.804691]
>> [   29.804694] ===============================
>> [   29.804697] [ INFO: suspicious RCU usage. ]
>> [   29.804700] 3.11.0+ #5 Not tainted
>> [   29.804703] -------------------------------
>> [   29.804706] security/apparmor/policy.c:566 suspicious
>> rcu_dereference_check() usage!
>> [   29.804709]
>> [   29.804709] other info that might help us debug this:
>> [   29.804709]
>> [   29.804714]
>> [   29.804714] rcu_scheduler_active = 1, debug_locks = 1
>> [   29.804718] 2 locks held by apparmor_parser/1268:
>> [   29.804721]  #0:  (sb_writers#9){.+.+.+}, at: [<ffffffff81120a4c>]
>> file_start_write+0x27/0x29
>> [   29.804733]  #1:  (&ns->lock){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffff811f5d88>]
>> aa_replace_profiles+0x166/0x57c
>> [   29.804744]
>> [   29.804744] stack backtrace:
>> [   29.804750] CPU: 0 PID: 1268 Comm: apparmor_parser Not tainted 3.11.0+ #5
>> [   29.804753] Hardware name: ASUSTeK Computer Inc.         UL50VT
>>          /UL50VT    , BIOS 217     03/01/2010
>> [   29.804756]  0000000000000000 ffff8800b95a1d80 ffffffff8144eb9b
>> ffff8800b94db540
>> [   29.804764]  ffff8800b95a1db0 ffffffff81087439 ffff8800b95b02b0
>> 0000000000000000
>> [   29.804772]  ffff8800b9efba08 ffff880138cc3a38 ffff8800b95a1dd0
>> ffffffff811f4f94
>> [   29.804779] Call Trace:
>> [   29.804786]  [<ffffffff8144eb9b>] dump_stack+0x4e/0x82
>> [   29.804791]  [<ffffffff81087439>] lockdep_rcu_suspicious+0xfc/0x105
>> [   29.804798]  [<ffffffff811f4f94>] aa_free_replacedby_kref+0x4d/0x62
>> [   29.804804]  [<ffffffff811f4f47>] ? aa_put_namespace+0x17/0x17
>> [   29.804810]  [<ffffffff811f4f0b>] kref_put+0x36/0x40
>> [   29.804816]  [<ffffffff811f5423>] __replace_profile+0x13a/0x1ed
>> [   29.804822]  [<ffffffff811f6032>] aa_replace_profiles+0x410/0x57c
>> [   29.804829]  [<ffffffff811f16d4>] profile_replace+0x35/0x4c
>> [   29.804835]  [<ffffffff81120fa3>] vfs_write+0xad/0x113
>> [   29.804840]  [<ffffffff81121609>] SyS_write+0x44/0x7a
>> [   29.804847]  [<ffffffff8145bfd2>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
>> --
>> To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in
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>>
> 


      reply	other threads:[~2013-09-13  1:40 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 3+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2013-09-12  3:39 Linus Git (3.11.0+) - security/apparmor/include/policy.h:363 suspicious rcu_dereference_check() usage! Miles Lane
2013-09-12 17:34 ` Paul E. McKenney
2013-09-13  1:40   ` John Johansen [this message]

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