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From: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
To: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>,
	Linux Kernel Developers List <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	joern@logfs.org, macro@linux-mips.org, ralf@linux-mips.org,
	dave.taht@gmail.com, blogic@openwrt.org, andrewmcgr@gmail.com,
	smueller@chronox.de, geert@linux-m68k.org, tg@mirbsd.de
Subject: Re: [PATCH, RFC 10/12] random: cap the rate which the /dev/urandom pool gets reseeded
Date: Sun, 22 Sep 2013 17:26:14 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <523F8AA6.7040406@zytor.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20130922232337.GD7321@thunk.org>

On 09/22/2013 04:23 PM, Theodore Ts'o wrote:
> On Sun, Sep 22, 2013 at 03:45:11PM -0700, H. Peter Anvin wrote:
>> I understand the motivation, but I question basing it in a fixed amount of time.
> 
> We already have a threshold based on the amount of the entropy in the
> input pool.  I could increase that threshold, but then instead of
> having the entropy hover between say, 192 and 128, it would hover
> between say, 576 and 512.  What that means in practice is that there
> will be a higher baseline, but we will still end up reseeding every 10
> seconds or so (that being approximately how much entropy I've seen
> flowing into the input pool on my laptop system --- 64 bits every 10
> seconds or so).
> 
> By basing it on a time-based threshold, it means that the input pool
> can build up faster such that over time, such that entropy pool ends
> up hovering around 3400 bits.
> 

So make it a threshold around 2048-3072 bits.  A.k.a. "if the input pool
is filling up fast enough, take advantage of it."

> What is your concern is about having it being time-based --- or more
> accurately, being partially time-based, since we also keep the entorpy
> count based threshold?  I'll note that the Fortuna Random Number
> Generator, devised by Bruce Schneier and Niels Ferguson also uses as
> part of its design a time-based reseed limit.

Just that it is unnecessary in a scenario when entropy is plentiful.

	-hpa



  reply	other threads:[~2013-09-23  0:27 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 25+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2013-09-22 20:38 [PATCH, RFC 00/12] random driver changes Theodore Ts'o
2013-09-22 20:38 ` [PATCH, RFC 01/12] random: run random_int_secret_init() run after all late_initcalls Theodore Ts'o
2013-09-22 20:38 ` [PATCH, RFC 02/12] random: Statically compute poolbitshift, poolbytes, poolbits Theodore Ts'o
2013-09-22 20:38 ` [PATCH, RFC 03/12] random: Allow fractional bits to be tracked Theodore Ts'o
2013-09-23  4:01   ` Theodore Ts'o
2013-09-23  4:03     ` H. Peter Anvin
2013-09-22 20:38 ` [PATCH, RFC 04/12] random: Account for entropy loss due to overwrites Theodore Ts'o
2013-09-22 20:38 ` [PATCH, RFC 05/12] random: fix the tracepoint for get_random_bytes(_arch) Theodore Ts'o
2013-09-22 20:38 ` [PATCH, RFC 06/12] random: optimize spinlock use in add_device_randomness() Theodore Ts'o
2013-09-22 20:38 ` [PATCH, RFC 07/12] random: allow architectures to optionally define random_get_entropy() Theodore Ts'o
2013-09-23 10:38   ` Stephan Mueller
2013-09-23 11:05     ` Theodore Ts'o
2013-09-22 20:38 ` [PATCH, RFC 08/12] random: mix in architectural randomness earlier in extract_buf() Theodore Ts'o
2013-09-23  4:11   ` H. Peter Anvin
2013-09-23  4:33     ` Theodore Ts'o
2013-09-22 20:38 ` [PATCH, RFC 09/12] random: optimize the entropy_store structure Theodore Ts'o
2013-09-22 20:38 ` [PATCH, RFC 10/12] random: cap the rate which the /dev/urandom pool gets reseeded Theodore Ts'o
2013-09-22 21:21   ` H. Peter Anvin
2013-09-22 21:40     ` Theodore Ts'o
2013-09-22 22:45       ` H. Peter Anvin
2013-09-22 23:23         ` Theodore Ts'o
2013-09-23  0:26           ` H. Peter Anvin [this message]
2013-09-22 20:38 ` [PATCH, RFC 11/12] random: speed up the fast_mix function by a factor of four Theodore Ts'o
2013-09-22 20:38 ` [PATCH, RFC 12/12] random: adjust the generator polynomials in the mixing function slightly Theodore Ts'o
2013-09-25 10:51   ` Jörg-Volker Peetz

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