From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from mail.saout.de ([127.0.0.1]) by localhost (mail.saout.de [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id GGIfrmAYoTcM for ; Fri, 17 Jan 2014 13:44:01 +0100 (CET) Received: from mail01.freesources.org (mx01.freesources.org [80.237.252.132]) (using TLSv1 with cipher AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mail.saout.de (Postfix) with ESMTPS for ; Fri, 17 Jan 2014 13:44:00 +0100 (CET) Received: from cb-hafen-75-68.rz.uni-frankfurt.de ([141.2.75.68]) by mail01.freesources.org with esmtpsa (TLS1.0:DHE_RSA_AES_256_CBC_SHA1:32) (Exim 4.72) (envelope-from ) id 1W48m9-0007AG-Cz for dm-crypt@saout.de; Fri, 17 Jan 2014 12:43:59 +0000 Message-ID: <52D9257E.6000906@freesources.org> Date: Fri, 17 Jan 2014 13:43:42 +0100 From: Jonas Meurer MIME-Version: 1.0 References: <638F1A81-8F17-4E18-8993-7F848EA84F08@offensive-security.com> <20140114043042.GA15870@tansi.org> <52D6EF1B.4020206@gmail.com> <52D7AB5E.8020302@redhat.com> <52D833F1.5010205@gmail.com> <20140116201837.GA16656@citd.de> In-Reply-To: <20140116201837.GA16656@citd.de> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Subject: Re: [dm-crypt] nuke password to delete luks header List-Id: List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , To: dm-crypt@saout.de Am 16.01.2014 21:18, schrieb Matthias Schniedermeyer: > On 16.01.2014 20:33, Milan Broz wrote: >> >> But I cannot say that all possible situations comes under this qualification. >> Maybe it can help someone in dangerous situation to not leak some important data >> which later help others. Dunno. >> >> Still it doesn't mean it is worth to be implemented but let's think >> at least twice here please. > > Meanwhile increasing the risk of everybody else, because once that > feature is a documented part of the system everybody will assume that > everybody will use it. Good look defending against a "Destruction of > Evidence" accusation, in case that happens in a situation with a LEO. > > Same as the hidden volume "feature" of Truecypt which everybody will > assume you use, because it's such a swell feature. (Plausible > deniabilty? Yeah sure ) > > > In short: > The documented existence of such a feature is a risk by itself. Same logic applied, even the existence of this discussion is a risk by itself. It proves that people might use a patched cryptsetup with added nuke feature already. Kind regards, jonas