From: Oliver Hartkopp <socketcan@hartkopp.net>
To: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de>, linux-can@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: BUG? candump -x and non CANFD frames
Date: Fri, 24 Jan 2014 17:20:03 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <52E292B3.8010009@hartkopp.net> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <52E2754C.9020204@pengutronix.de>
On 24.01.2014 15:14, Marc Kleine-Budde wrote:
> Hello,
>
> I'm running "candump -x any,0:0,#FFFFFFFF" on standard CAN hardware and
> I see this output:
>
> can0 RX - - 222 [7] 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
> can0 TX - E 111 [1] 00
>
> The "E" should not be there, as it only makes sense for CANFD frames, as
> it's derived from the "flags" member of the canfd_frame.
>
>> 68 struct can_frame {
>> 69 canid_t can_id; /* 32 bit CAN_ID + EFF/RTR/ERR flags */
>> 70 __u8 can_dlc; /* frame payload length in byte (0 .. CAN_MAX_DLEN) */
>> 71 __u8 data[CAN_MAX_DLEN] __attribute__((aligned(8)));
>> 72 };
>
>> 102 struct canfd_frame {
>> 103 canid_t can_id; /* 32 bit CAN_ID + EFF/RTR/ERR flags */
>> 104 __u8 len; /* frame payload length in byte */
>> 105 __u8 flags; /* additional flags for CAN FD */
>> 106 __u8 __res0; /* reserved / padding */
>> 107 __u8 __res1; /* reserved / padding */
>> 108 __u8 data[CANFD_MAX_DLEN] __attribute__((aligned(8)));
>> 109 };
>
> As the software is big and proprietary, I cannot look at the code, if
> the unused 3 bytes in the can_frame are filled with zeros or not. At
> first sight all TX'ed frames have the E flag set.
>
> What's the correct fix?
>
> Do we have to fix something in the kernel, is there a possible
> information leak of 3 bytes of kernel memory for TX'ed frames?
I don't assume this. TX frames are usually created by applications (and by
bcm.c and isotp.c which do it correctly).
> Or only a
> cross application information leakage?
Yep.
Someone is sending an uninitialized struct can_frame into the kernel which
comes back this way.
>
> Another possible solution is to only print the flags member if we
> actually have received CANFD frames.
Yes we could do this based on the maxdlen variable.
But this is just a cosmetic fix which IMO hides possible problems.
Therefore I would tend to leave it as-is which in fact helped to find this
uninitialized application issue.
Regards,
Oliver
prev parent reply other threads:[~2014-01-24 16:20 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 2+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2014-01-24 14:14 BUG? candump -x and non CANFD frames Marc Kleine-Budde
2014-01-24 16:20 ` Oliver Hartkopp [this message]
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