From: Eric Sandeen <sandeen@redhat.com>
To: xfs-oss <xfs@oss.sgi.com>
Subject: [PATCH] xfs: limit superblock corruption errors to probable corruption
Date: Tue, 28 Jan 2014 23:11:39 -0600 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <52E88D8B.90208@redhat.com> (raw)
Today, if
xfs_sb_read_verify
xfs_sb_verify
xfs_mount_validate_sb
detects superblock corruption, it'll be extremely noisy, dumping
2 stacks, 2 hexdumps, etc.
This is because we call XFS_CORRUPTION_ERROR in xfs_mount_validate_sb
as well as in xfs_sb_read_verify.
Also, *any* errors in xfs_mount_validate_sb which are not corruption
per se; things like too-big-blocksize, bad version, bad magic, v1 dirs,
rw-incompat etc - things which do not return EFSCORRUPTED - will
still do the whole XFS_CORRUPTION_ERROR spew when xfs_sb_read_verify
sees any error at all. And it suggests to the user that they
should run xfs_repair, even if the root cause of the mount failure
is a simple incompatibility.
I'll submit that the probably-not-corrupted errors don't warrant
this much noise, so this patch removes the high-level
XFS_CORRUPTION_ERROR which was firing for every error return
except EWRONGFS.
It also adds one to the path which detects a failed checksum.
The idea is, if it's really _corruption_ we can call
XFS_CORRUPTION_ERROR at the point of detection. More benign
incompatibilities can do a little printk & fail the mount without
so much drama.
Signed-off-by: Eric Sandeen <sandeen@redhat.com>
---
I could see an argument where we might still want the hexdump
for things like bad magic - ok, just what *was* the magic? But
I think we do need to reserve the oops-mimicing-backtraces for
the most severe problems. Discuss. ;)
diff --git a/fs/xfs/xfs_sb.c b/fs/xfs/xfs_sb.c
index 511cce9..b575317 100644
--- a/fs/xfs/xfs_sb.c
+++ b/fs/xfs/xfs_sb.c
@@ -617,6 +617,8 @@ xfs_sb_read_verify(
/* Only fail bad secondaries on a known V5 filesystem */
if (bp->b_bn != XFS_SB_DADDR &&
xfs_sb_version_hascrc(&mp->m_sb)) {
+ XFS_CORRUPTION_ERROR(__func__, XFS_ERRLEVEL_LOW,
+ mp, bp->b_addr);
error = EFSCORRUPTED;
goto out_error;
}
@@ -625,12 +627,8 @@ xfs_sb_read_verify(
error = xfs_sb_verify(bp, true);
out_error:
- if (error) {
- if (error != EWRONGFS)
- XFS_CORRUPTION_ERROR(__func__, XFS_ERRLEVEL_LOW,
- mp, bp->b_addr);
+ if (error)
xfs_buf_ioerror(bp, error);
- }
}
/*
_______________________________________________
xfs mailing list
xfs@oss.sgi.com
http://oss.sgi.com/mailman/listinfo/xfs
next reply other threads:[~2014-01-29 5:11 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 6+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2014-01-29 5:11 Eric Sandeen [this message]
2014-01-30 20:26 ` [PATCH] xfs: limit superblock corruption errors to probable corruption Brian Foster
2014-01-30 20:30 ` Eric Sandeen
2014-01-30 20:54 ` Brian Foster
2014-02-06 6:43 ` Dave Chinner
2014-02-07 4:23 ` Eric Sandeen
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=52E88D8B.90208@redhat.com \
--to=sandeen@redhat.com \
--cc=xfs@oss.sgi.com \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is an external index of several public inboxes,
see mirroring instructions on how to clone and mirror
all data and code used by this external index.