Re: [PATCH][RESEND 3] hwrng: add randomness to system from rng sources

[Austin S Hemmelgarn <ahferroin7@gmail.com>]

On 2014-03-16 18:56, H. Peter Anvin wrote:
> On 03/03/2014 03:51 PM, Kees Cook wrote:
>> When bringing a new RNG source online, it seems like it would make sense
>> to use some of its bytes to make the system entropy pool more random,
>> as done with all sorts of other devices that contain per-device or
>> per-boot differences.
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
> 
> I would like to raise again the concept of at least optionally using a
> kernel thread, rather than a user-space daemon, to feed hwrng output to
> the kernel pools.  The main service rngd provides is FIPS tests, but
> those FIPS tests were withdrawn as a standard over 10 years ago and are
> known to be extremely weak, at the very best a minimal sanity check.
> Furthermore, they are completely useless against the output of any RNG
> which contains a cryptographic whitener, which is the vast majority of
> commercial sources -- this is especially so since rngd doesn't expect to
> have to do any data reduction for output coming from hwrng.
> 
> Furthermore, if more than one hwrng device is available, rngd will only
> be able to read one of them because of the way /dev/hwrng is implemented
> in the kernel.
> 
> For contrast, the kernel could do data reduction just fine by only
> crediting the entropy coming out of each hwrng driver with a fractional
> amount.
> 
> That does *not* mean that there aren't random number generators which
> require significant computation better done in user space.  For example,
> an audio noise daemon or a lava lamp camera which requires video processing.
> 
> 	-hpa

I definitely second this proposal, not only does it get rid of the
overhead of the FIPS tests (which can be quite significant on embedded
systems), it also removes a significant percentage of the context
switches that rngd needs to make.  This should provide some way of
disabling this behavior, probably either making it a module, or
providing a command-line/sysfs option to disable it.  In fact, it should
probably default to being disabled (at least at first) and require the
user to explicitly opt-in to using it (I know people who run simulations
who use the output from /dev/hwrng directly for the simulation software
exclusively, and /dev/[u]random for everything else).