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From: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
To: Lukasz Pawelczyk <l.pawelczyk@partner.samsung.com>,
	James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: r.krypa@samsung.com, t.swierczek@samsung.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH 2/3] Smack: unify all ptrace accesses in the smack
Date: Fri, 11 Apr 2014 14:51:11 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <534863CF.5040303@schaufler-ca.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1394554026-23924-3-git-send-email-l.pawelczyk@partner.samsung.com>

On 3/11/2014 9:07 AM, Lukasz Pawelczyk wrote:
> The decision whether we can trace a process is made in the following
> functions:
> 	smack_ptrace_traceme()
> 	smack_ptrace_access_check()
> 	smack_bprm_set_creds() (in case the proces is traced)
>
> This patch unifies all those decisions by introducing one function that
> checks whether ptrace is allowed: smk_ptrace_rule_check().
>
> This makes possible to actually trace with TRACEME where first the
> TRACEME itself must be allowed and then exec() on a traced process.
>
> Additional bugs fixed:
> - The decision is made according to the mode parameter that is now correctly
>   translated from PTRACE_MODE_* to MAY_* instead of being treated 1:1.
>   PTRACE_MODE_READ requires MAY_READ.
>   PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH requires MAY_READWRITE.
> - Add a smack audit log in case of exec() refused by bprm_set_creds().
> - Honor the PTRACE_MODE_NOAUDIT flag and don't put smack audit info
>   in case this flag is set.
>
> Signed-off-by: Lukasz Pawelczyk <l.pawelczyk@partner.samsung.com>
> Signed-off-by: Rafal Krypa <r.krypa@samsung.com>

Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>

Applied to git://git.gitorious.org/smack-next/kernel.git smack-for-3.16

> ---
>  security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 84 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------
>  1 file changed, 71 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
> index 48d61f6..3da13fd 100644
> --- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
> +++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
> @@ -157,6 +157,54 @@ static int smk_copy_rules(struct list_head *nhead, struct list_head *ohead,
>  	return rc;
>  }
>  
> +/**
> + * smk_ptrace_mode - helper function for converting PTRACE_MODE_* into MAY_*
> + * @mode - input mode in form of PTRACE_MODE_*
> + *
> + * Returns a converted MAY_* mode usable by smack rules
> + */
> +static inline unsigned int smk_ptrace_mode(unsigned int mode)
> +{
> +	switch (mode) {
> +	case PTRACE_MODE_READ:
> +		return MAY_READ;
> +	case PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH:
> +		return MAY_READWRITE;
> +	}
> +
> +	return 0;
> +}
> +
> +/**
> + * smk_ptrace_rule_check - helper for ptrace access
> + * @tracer: tracer process
> + * @tracee_label: label of the process that's about to be traced
> + * @mode: ptrace attachment mode (PTRACE_MODE_*)
> + * @func: name of the function that called us, used for audit
> + *
> + * Returns 0 on access granted, -error on error
> + */
> +static int smk_ptrace_rule_check(struct task_struct *tracer, char *tracee_label,
> +				 unsigned int mode, const char *func)
> +{
> +	int rc;
> +	struct smk_audit_info ad, *saip = NULL;
> +	struct task_smack *tsp;
> +	struct smack_known *skp;
> +
> +	if ((mode & PTRACE_MODE_NOAUDIT) == 0) {
> +		smk_ad_init(&ad, func, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK);
> +		smk_ad_setfield_u_tsk(&ad, tracer);
> +		saip = &ad;
> +	}
> +
> +	tsp = task_security(tracer);
> +	skp = smk_of_task(tsp);
> +
> +	rc = smk_tskacc(tsp, tracee_label, smk_ptrace_mode(mode), saip);
> +	return rc;
> +}
> +
>  /*
>   * LSM hooks.
>   * We he, that is fun!
> @@ -165,16 +213,15 @@ static int smk_copy_rules(struct list_head *nhead, struct list_head *ohead,
>  /**
>   * smack_ptrace_access_check - Smack approval on PTRACE_ATTACH
>   * @ctp: child task pointer
> - * @mode: ptrace attachment mode
> + * @mode: ptrace attachment mode (PTRACE_MODE_*)
>   *
>   * Returns 0 if access is OK, an error code otherwise
>   *
> - * Do the capability checks, and require read and write.
> + * Do the capability checks.
>   */
>  static int smack_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *ctp, unsigned int mode)
>  {
>  	int rc;
> -	struct smk_audit_info ad;
>  	struct smack_known *skp;
>  
>  	rc = cap_ptrace_access_check(ctp, mode);
> @@ -182,10 +229,8 @@ static int smack_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *ctp, unsigned int mode)
>  		return rc;
>  
>  	skp = smk_of_task(task_security(ctp));
> -	smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK);
> -	smk_ad_setfield_u_tsk(&ad, ctp);
>  
> -	rc = smk_curacc(skp->smk_known, mode, &ad);
> +	rc = smk_ptrace_rule_check(current, skp->smk_known, mode, __func__);
>  	return rc;
>  }
>  
> @@ -195,12 +240,11 @@ static int smack_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *ctp, unsigned int mode)
>   *
>   * Returns 0 if access is OK, an error code otherwise
>   *
> - * Do the capability checks, and require read and write.
> + * Do the capability checks, and require PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH.
>   */
>  static int smack_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *ptp)
>  {
>  	int rc;
> -	struct smk_audit_info ad;
>  	struct smack_known *skp;
>  
>  	rc = cap_ptrace_traceme(ptp);
> @@ -208,10 +252,9 @@ static int smack_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *ptp)
>  		return rc;
>  
>  	skp = smk_of_task(current_security());
> -	smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK);
> -	smk_ad_setfield_u_tsk(&ad, ptp);
>  
> -	rc = smk_tskacc(ptp, skp->smk_known, MAY_READWRITE, &ad);
> +	rc = smk_ptrace_rule_check(ptp, skp->smk_known,
> +				   PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH, __func__);
>  	return rc;
>  }
>  
> @@ -453,7 +496,7 @@ static int smack_sb_statfs(struct dentry *dentry)
>   * smack_bprm_set_creds - set creds for exec
>   * @bprm: the exec information
>   *
> - * Returns 0 if it gets a blob, -ENOMEM otherwise
> + * Returns 0 if it gets a blob, -EPERM if exec forbidden and -ENOMEM otherwise
>   */
>  static int smack_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
>  {
> @@ -473,7 +516,22 @@ static int smack_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
>  	if (isp->smk_task == NULL || isp->smk_task == bsp->smk_task)
>  		return 0;
>  
> -	if (bprm->unsafe)
> +	if (bprm->unsafe & (LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE | LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP)) {
> +		struct task_struct *tracer;
> +		rc = 0;
> +
> +		rcu_read_lock();
> +		tracer = ptrace_parent(current);
> +		if (likely(tracer != NULL))
> +			rc = smk_ptrace_rule_check(tracer,
> +						   isp->smk_task->smk_known,
> +						   PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH,
> +						   __func__);
> +		rcu_read_unlock();
> +
> +		if (rc != 0)
> +			return rc;
> +	} else if (bprm->unsafe)
>  		return -EPERM;
>  
>  	bsp->smk_task = isp->smk_task;


  reply	other threads:[~2014-04-11 21:50 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 7+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2014-03-11 16:07 [PATCH 0/3] Proposed changes to ptrace in smack Lukasz Pawelczyk
2014-03-11 16:07 ` [PATCH 1/3] Smack: fix the subject/object order in smack_ptrace_traceme() Lukasz Pawelczyk
2014-04-11 21:50   ` Casey Schaufler
2014-03-11 16:07 ` [PATCH 2/3] Smack: unify all ptrace accesses in the smack Lukasz Pawelczyk
2014-04-11 21:51   ` Casey Schaufler [this message]
2014-03-11 16:07 ` [PATCH 3/3] Smack: adds smackfs/ptrace interface Lukasz Pawelczyk
2014-04-11 21:50   ` Casey Schaufler

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