Re: skbuff truesize incorrect.

[Jim Baxter <jim_baxter@mentor.com>]

On 23/05/14 14:47, Eric Dumazet wrote:
> On Fri, 2014-05-23 at 12:13 +0100, Jim Baxter wrote:
> 
>> What are the side effects of changing the truesize, if the original
>> uncloned skb has the full truesize then isn't the potential memory usage
>> still counted for the avoidance of OOM?
> 
> Nope. This can be disastrous.
> 
> A malicious remote peer can crash your host by sending specially cooked
> TCP messages.
> 
> Send messages with one byte of payload, and out of order so that they
> cant be consumed by receiver, and cant be coalesced/collapsed.
> 
> If you claim the true size is sizeof(sk_buff) + 512, TCP stack will
> accumulate these messages in out of order queue, and will not bother
> with them, unless you hit sk_rcvbuf limit.
> 
> But in reality these messages uses sizeof(sk_buff) + 32768 bytes.
> 
> Divide your physical memory by 32768 : How many such messages will fit
> in memory before the host crashes ?
> 
> I've seen that kind of attacks in real cases.
> 
> Even the fast clones sk_buff mismatch can be noticed. Luckily a 10%
> error has no severe impact.
> 
> TCP stack uses fast clones, and current stack gives them a truesize of
> 2048 + sizeof(sk_buff), while it really should be 2048 +
> 2*sizeof(sk_buff)
> 
> Luckily, GSO/TSO tends to reduce the error, as skbs overhead is lower.
> 
> 

Thank you for clarifying, that is useful to know.