From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Received: from goalie.tycho.ncsc.mil (goalie [144.51.242.250]) by tarius.tycho.ncsc.mil (8.14.4/8.14.4) with ESMTP id s4R7jPbC021025 for ; Tue, 27 May 2014 03:45:25 -0400 Received: by mail-pb0-f47.google.com with SMTP id rp16so8835485pbb.34 for ; Tue, 27 May 2014 00:45:25 -0700 (PDT) Received: from [192.168.1.2] ([59.89.19.217]) by mx.google.com with ESMTPSA id yl9sm69583265pac.25.2014.05.27.00.45.23 for (version=TLSv1 cipher=ECDHE-RSA-RC4-SHA bits=128/128); Tue, 27 May 2014 00:45:24 -0700 (PDT) Message-ID: <538441F4.3010104@gmail.com> Date: Tue, 27 May 2014 13:12:44 +0530 From: dE MIME-Version: 1.0 To: selinux@tycho.nsa.gov Subject: Re: user_t more restrictive than sshd_t (e.g.)? References: <537EE13B.7090603@gmail.com> In-Reply-To: <537EE13B.7090603@gmail.com> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1; format=flowed List-Id: "Security-Enhanced Linux \(SELinux\) mailing list" List-Post: List-Help: On 05/23/14 11:18, dE wrote: > As we know, the user_r does not allow many processes to have high > privilege types (system_t for e.g. which's tailored for a single > program named X), if such a process is executed, it'll have a type of > user_t. > > However system_t specifies restrictions on the program exactly as per > X's specifications -- it wont allow the program to do anything outside > what's it supposed to do. > > But that's not the same for user_t -- this type is generic and there > are many things that user_t allows which system_t does not. > > This may form a security vector; a vulnerable program which should run > as system_t but is not run cause user_r does not allow that type, this > allows the program to do many things which it's not designed to do; so > basically this bypasses SELinux restrictions as put on by system_t. > > So, is there any way to prevent this form happening -- or can we > specify in the policy what type to run the program as when it's run by > a user with role user_r or any other user which is not allowed system_t? > > As an e.g. we may see systemctl. Is this concern real?