Re: [refpolicy] user_t more restrictive than sshd_t (e.g.)?

[dE <de.techno@gmail.com>]

On 05/27/14 19:05, Christopher J. PeBenito wrote:
> On 05/27/2014 09:32 AM, Christopher J. PeBenito wrote:
>> On 05/27/2014 03:42 AM, dE wrote:
>>> On 05/23/14 11:18, dE wrote:
>>>> As we know, the user_r does not allow many processes to have high privilege types (system_t for e.g. which's tailored for a single program named X), if such a process is executed, it'll have a type of user_t.
>>>>
>>>> However system_t specifies restrictions on the program exactly as per X's specifications -- it wont allow the program to do anything outside what's it supposed to do.
>>>>
>>>> But that's not the same for user_t -- this type is generic and there are many things that user_t allows which system_t does not.
>>>>
>>>> This may form a security vector; a vulnerable program which should run as system_t but is not run cause user_r does not allow that type, this allows the program to do many things which it's not designed to do; so basically this bypasses SELinux restrictions as put on by system_t.
>>>>
>>>> So, is there any way to prevent this form happening -- or can we specify in the policy what type to run the program as when it's run by a user with role user_r or any other user which is not allowed system_t?
> If there is an exec() that causes a domain/role transition to an invalid context, the exec() will fail.  The program won't run.
>
>

Thanks for forwarding the response.

Unfortunately I've been going thorough more related confusion, so I'm 
sorting them out.