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From: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
To: Jan Beulich <JBeulich@suse.com>
Cc: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>,
	keir@xen.org,
	Aravind Gopalakrishnan <aravind.gopalakrishnan@amd.com>,
	xen-devel@lists.xen.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH V2] x86, amd_ucode: Safeguard against #GP
Date: Mon, 02 Jun 2014 10:13:07 -0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <538C8673.60900@oracle.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <538C44560200007800016B08@mail.emea.novell.com>

On 06/02/2014 03:31 AM, Jan Beulich wrote:
>>>> On 30.05.14 at 18:21, <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> wrote:
>> The unhandled #GP fault certainly should be wrapped with wrmsr_safe(),
>> and an error/warning presented to the user.  In the case that a bad
>> ucode is discovered, it should be discarded and the server allowed to
>> boot.  It is substantially more useful for the server to come up and say
>> "I couldn't load that bit of microcode you wanted me to", than to sit in
>> a reboot loop because you made a typo in the bootloader config, and have
>> to get someone in the datacenter to poke the physical server.
> But this isn't due to a typo somewhere, but due to a corrupted
> microcode blob.

Right, but the argument that we don't want to be stuck in the reboot 
loop still holds.

> Besides that no matter which BKDG I look at, I can't seem to find any
> indication of there being room for a #GP here if the MSR itself is
> implemented. While I don't question its presence in reality, I'd prefer
> if this was documented properly for a patch to recover from it to go
> in.

Unfortunately the whole microcode patching procedure is, to put it 
mildly, not well documented, particularly the #GP part. We had an email 
exchange with an AMD HW architect and he confirmed that corrupted patch 
results in #GP.

-boris

  reply	other threads:[~2014-06-02 14:13 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 10+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2014-05-27 18:24 [PATCH V2] x86, amd_ucode: Safeguard against #GP Aravind Gopalakrishnan
2014-05-27 23:47 ` Andrew Cooper
2014-05-28 15:16   ` Aravind Gopalakrishnan
2014-05-28 17:56     ` boris ostrovsky
2014-05-30 16:01       ` Aravind Gopalakrishnan
2014-05-30 16:21         ` Andrew Cooper
2014-05-30 16:46           ` Aravind Gopalakrishnan
2014-06-02  7:31           ` Jan Beulich
2014-06-02 14:13             ` Boris Ostrovsky [this message]
2014-05-28  7:22 ` Jan Beulich

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