From: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
To: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Cc: Aravind Gopalakrishnan <Aravind.Gopalakrishnan@amd.com>,
Suravee Suthikulpanit <suravee.suthikulpanit@amd.com>,
Jan Beulich <JBeulich@suse.com>,
Xen-devel <xen-devel@lists.xen.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] x86/amd: Protect set_cpuidmask() against #GP faults
Date: Thu, 05 Jun 2014 09:27:03 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <53907027.3050605@oracle.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1401967206-27715-1-git-send-email-andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
On 06/05/2014 07:20 AM, Andrew Cooper wrote:
> Virtual environments such as Xen HVM containers and VirtualBox do not
> necessarily provide support for feature masking MSRs.
>
> As their presence is detected by model numbers alone, and their use predicated
> on command line parameters, use the safe() variants of {wr,rd}msr() to avoid
> dying with an early #GP fault.
>
> In fact, use the password variants in all cases because:
> a) they are safe to use even if not strictly required
> b) have a more useful function prototype for this purposes
>
> Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
> CC: Jan Beulich <JBeulich@suse.com>
> CC: Suravee Suthikulpanit <suravee.suthikulpanit@amd.com>
> CC: Aravind Gopalakrishnan <Aravind.Gopalakrishnan@amd.com>
> CC: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
> ---
Reviewed-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
> xen/arch/x86/cpu/amd.c | 41 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------------
> 1 file changed, 26 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/cpu/amd.c b/xen/arch/x86/cpu/amd.c
> index ea158cb..dc38d69 100644
> --- a/xen/arch/x86/cpu/amd.c
> +++ b/xen/arch/x86/cpu/amd.c
> @@ -151,7 +151,7 @@ static void __devinit set_cpuidmask(const struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
> static unsigned int extfeat_ecx, extfeat_edx;
> static unsigned int l7s0_eax, l7s0_ebx;
> static unsigned int thermal_ecx;
> - static bool_t skip_l7s0_eax_ebx, skip_thermal_ecx;
> + static bool_t skip_feat, skip_extfeat, skip_l7s0, skip_thermal;
> static enum { not_parsed, no_mask, set_mask } status;
> unsigned int eax, ebx, ecx, edx;
>
> @@ -220,7 +220,7 @@ static void __devinit set_cpuidmask(const struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
> printk("Writing CPUID leaf 7 subleaf 0 feature mask EAX:EBX -> %08Xh:%08Xh\n",
> l7s0_eax, l7s0_ebx);
> } else
> - skip_l7s0_eax_ebx = 1;
> + skip_l7s0 = 1;
>
> /* Only Fam15 has the respective MSR. */
> ecx = c->x86 == 0x15 && c->cpuid_level >= 6 ? cpuid_ecx(6) : 0;
> @@ -229,22 +229,33 @@ static void __devinit set_cpuidmask(const struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
> printk("Writing CPUID thermal/power feature mask ECX -> %08Xh\n",
> thermal_ecx);
> } else
> - skip_thermal_ecx = 1;
> + skip_thermal = 1;
>
> setmask:
> /* AMD processors prior to family 10h required a 32-bit password */
> - if (c->x86 >= 0x10) {
> - wrmsr(MSR_K8_FEATURE_MASK, feat_edx, feat_ecx);
> - wrmsr(MSR_K8_EXT_FEATURE_MASK, extfeat_edx, extfeat_ecx);
> - if (!skip_l7s0_eax_ebx)
> - wrmsr(MSR_AMD_L7S0_FEATURE_MASK, l7s0_ebx, l7s0_eax);
> - if (!skip_thermal_ecx) {
> - rdmsr(MSR_AMD_THRM_FEATURE_MASK, eax, edx);
> - wrmsr(MSR_AMD_THRM_FEATURE_MASK, thermal_ecx, edx);
> - }
> - } else {
> - wrmsr_amd(MSR_K8_FEATURE_MASK, feat_edx, feat_ecx);
> - wrmsr_amd(MSR_K8_EXT_FEATURE_MASK, extfeat_edx, extfeat_ecx);
> + if (!skip_feat &&
> + wrmsr_amd_safe(MSR_K8_FEATURE_MASK, feat_edx, feat_ecx)) {
> + skip_feat = 1;
> + printk("Failed to set CPUID feature mask\n");
> + }
> +
> + if (!skip_extfeat &&
> + wrmsr_amd_safe(MSR_K8_EXT_FEATURE_MASK, extfeat_edx, extfeat_ecx)) {
> + skip_extfeat = 1;
> + printk("Failed to set CPUID extended feature mask\n");
> + }
> +
> + if (!skip_l7s0 &&
> + wrmsr_amd_safe(MSR_AMD_L7S0_FEATURE_MASK, l7s0_ebx, l7s0_eax)) {
> + skip_l7s0 = 1;
> + printk("Failed to set CPUID leaf 7 subleaf 0 feature mask\n");
> + }
> +
> + if (!skip_thermal &&
> + (rdmsr_amd_safe(MSR_AMD_THRM_FEATURE_MASK, &eax, &edx) ||
> + wrmsr_amd_safe(MSR_AMD_THRM_FEATURE_MASK, thermal_ecx, edx))){
> + skip_thermal = 1;
> + printk("Failed to set CPUID thermal/power feature mask\n");
> }
> }
>
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2014-06-05 13:27 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 5+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2014-06-05 11:20 [PATCH] x86/amd: Protect set_cpuidmask() against #GP faults Andrew Cooper
2014-06-05 13:27 ` Boris Ostrovsky [this message]
2014-06-05 15:14 ` Jan Beulich
2014-06-05 15:23 ` [PATCH v2] " Andrew Cooper
2014-06-05 15:40 ` Aravind Gopalakrishnan
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