From: cpebenito@tresys.com (Christopher J. PeBenito)
To: refpolicy@oss.tresys.com
Subject: [refpolicy] [PATCH] Fix misspelling
Date: Mon, 9 Jun 2014 11:01:46 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <5395CC5A.7000504@tresys.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1402041865-1085-1-git-send-email-andronicus.spiros@gmail.com>
On 06/06/2014 04:04 AM, Elia Pinto wrote:
> From: Elia Pinto <gitter.spiros@gmail.com>
>
> Fix misspelling using http://github.com/lyda/misspell-check
>
> Signed-off-by: Elia Pinto <gitter.spiros@gmail.com>
> ---
> policy/modules/kernel/files.te | 2 +-
> policy/modules/kernel/storage.if | 14 +++++++-------
> policy/modules/system/miscfiles.if | 2 +-
> policy/modules/system/udev.te | 2 +-
> policy/modules/system/userdomain.if | 4 ++--
> 5 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/policy/modules/kernel/files.te b/policy/modules/kernel/files.te
> index cdc1801..852bd46 100644
> --- a/policy/modules/kernel/files.te
> +++ b/policy/modules/kernel/files.te
> @@ -71,7 +71,7 @@ typealias etc_t alias snmpd_etc_t;
> #
> type etc_runtime_t;
> files_type(etc_runtime_t)
> -#Temporarily in policy until FC5 dissappears
> +#Temporarily in policy until FC5 disappears
> typealias etc_runtime_t alias firstboot_rw_t;
Merged, though I ended up removing this alias.
> diff --git a/policy/modules/kernel/storage.if b/policy/modules/kernel/storage.if
> index 64c4cd0..5c1be6b 100644
> --- a/policy/modules/kernel/storage.if
> +++ b/policy/modules/kernel/storage.if
> @@ -82,7 +82,7 @@ interface(`storage_dontaudit_setattr_fixed_disk_dev',`
> ########################################
> ## <summary>
> ## Allow the caller to directly read from a fixed disk.
> -## This is extremly dangerous as it can bypass the
> +## This is extremely dangerous as it can bypass the
> ## SELinux protections for filesystem objects, and
> ## should only be used by trusted domains.
> ## </summary>
> @@ -128,7 +128,7 @@ interface(`storage_dontaudit_read_fixed_disk',`
> ########################################
> ## <summary>
> ## Allow the caller to directly write to a fixed disk.
> -## This is extremly dangerous as it can bypass the
> +## This is extremely dangerous as it can bypass the
> ## SELinux protections for filesystem objects, and
> ## should only be used by trusted domains.
> ## </summary>
> @@ -173,7 +173,7 @@ interface(`storage_dontaudit_write_fixed_disk',`
> ########################################
> ## <summary>
> ## Allow the caller to directly read and write to a fixed disk.
> -## This is extremly dangerous as it can bypass the
> +## This is extremely dangerous as it can bypass the
> ## SELinux protections for filesystem objects, and
> ## should only be used by trusted domains.
> ## </summary>
> @@ -432,7 +432,7 @@ interface(`storage_setattr_scsi_generic_dev',`
> ## <summary>
> ## Allow the caller to directly read, in a
> ## generic fashion, from any SCSI device.
> -## This is extremly dangerous as it can bypass the
> +## This is extremely dangerous as it can bypass the
> ## SELinux protections for filesystem objects, and
> ## should only be used by trusted domains.
> ## </summary>
> @@ -457,7 +457,7 @@ interface(`storage_read_scsi_generic',`
> ## <summary>
> ## Allow the caller to directly write, in a
> ## generic fashion, from any SCSI device.
> -## This is extremly dangerous as it can bypass the
> +## This is extremely dangerous as it can bypass the
> ## SELinux protections for filesystem objects, and
> ## should only be used by trusted domains.
> ## </summary>
> @@ -638,7 +638,7 @@ interface(`storage_dontaudit_setattr_removable_dev',`
> ## <summary>
> ## Allow the caller to directly read from
> ## a removable device.
> -## This is extremly dangerous as it can bypass the
> +## This is extremely dangerous as it can bypass the
> ## SELinux protections for filesystem objects, and
> ## should only be used by trusted domains.
> ## </summary>
> @@ -679,7 +679,7 @@ interface(`storage_dontaudit_raw_read_removable_device',`
> ## <summary>
> ## Allow the caller to directly write to
> ## a removable device.
> -## This is extremly dangerous as it can bypass the
> +## This is extremely dangerous as it can bypass the
> ## SELinux protections for filesystem objects, and
> ## should only be used by trusted domains.
> ## </summary>
> diff --git a/policy/modules/system/miscfiles.if b/policy/modules/system/miscfiles.if
> index fc28bc3..acb637d 100644
> --- a/policy/modules/system/miscfiles.if
> +++ b/policy/modules/system/miscfiles.if
> @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
> -## <summary>Miscelaneous files.</summary>
> +## <summary>Miscellaneous files.</summary>
>
> ########################################
> ## <summary>
> diff --git a/policy/modules/system/udev.te b/policy/modules/system/udev.te
> index 35ea2c3..f4545f5 100644
> --- a/policy/modules/system/udev.te
> +++ b/policy/modules/system/udev.te
> @@ -193,7 +193,7 @@ ifdef(`distro_debian',`
>
> ifdef(`distro_gentoo',`
> # during boot, init scripts use /dev/.rcsysinit
> - # existance to determine if we are in early booting
> + # existence to determine if we are in early booting
> init_getattr_script_status_files(udev_t)
> ')
>
> diff --git a/policy/modules/system/userdomain.if b/policy/modules/system/userdomain.if
> index f7c74c3..de7d96a 100644
> --- a/policy/modules/system/userdomain.if
> +++ b/policy/modules/system/userdomain.if
> @@ -1521,7 +1521,7 @@ interface(`userdom_search_user_home_dirs',`
> ## <desc>
> ## <p>
> ## Do not audit attempts to search user home directories.
> -## This will supress SELinux denial messages when the specified
> +## This will suppress SELinux denial messages when the specified
> ## domain is denied the permission to search these directories.
> ## </p>
> ## </desc>
> @@ -3200,7 +3200,7 @@ interface(`userdom_use_unpriv_users_fds',`
> ## <desc>
> ## <p>
> ## Do not audit attempts to inherit the file descriptors
> -## from unprivileged user domains. This will supress
> +## from unprivileged user domains. This will suppress
> ## SELinux denial messages when the specified domain is denied
> ## the permission to inherit these file descriptors.
> ## </p>
>
--
Chris PeBenito
Tresys Technology, LLC
www.tresys.com | oss.tresys.com
prev parent reply other threads:[~2014-06-09 15:01 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 2+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2014-06-06 8:04 [refpolicy] [PATCH] Fix misspelling Elia Pinto
2014-06-09 15:01 ` Christopher J. PeBenito [this message]
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