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From: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@linux.intel.com>
To: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>,
	George Spelvin <linux@horizon.com>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, mingo@kernel.org, price@mit.edu
Subject: Re: drivers/char/random.c: more ruminations
Date: Wed, 11 Jun 2014 18:03:44 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <5398FC70.8050204@linux.intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20140611131140.GD23110@thunk.org>

On 06/11/2014 06:11 AM, Theodore Ts'o wrote:
> On Tue, Jun 10, 2014 at 11:58:06PM -0400, George Spelvin wrote:
>> You can forbid underflows, but the code doesn't forbid overflows.
>>
>> 1. Assume the entropy count starts at 512 bytes (input pool full)
>> 2. Random writer mixes in 20 bytes of entropy into the input pool.
>> 2a. Input pool entropy is, however, capped at 512 bytes.
>> 3. Random extractor extracts 32 bytes of entropy from the pool.
>>    Succeeds because 32 < 512.  Pool is left with 480 bytes of
>>    entropy.
>> 3a. Random extractor decrements pool entropy estimate to 480 bytes.
>>     This is accurate.
>> 4. Random writer credits pool with 20 bytes of entropy.
>> 5. Input pool entropy is now 480 bytes, estimate is 500 bytes.
> 
> Good point, that's a potential problem, although messing up the
> accounting betewen 480 and 500 bytes is not nearly as bad as messing
> up 0 and 20.
> 
> It's not something where if the changes required massive changes, that
> I'd necessarily feel the need to backport them to stable.  It's a
> certificational weakness, but it's a not disaster.
> 

Actually, with the new accounting code it will be even less serious,
because mixing into a nearly full pool is discounted heavily -- because
it is not like filling a queue; the mixing function will
probabilistically overwrite existing pool entropy.

So it is still a race condition, and still wrong, but it is a lot less
wrong.

	-hpa


  parent reply	other threads:[~2014-06-12  1:03 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 57+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2014-06-09  0:05 [RFC PATCH] drivers/char/random.c: Is reducing locking range like this safe? George Spelvin
2014-06-09  1:35 ` Theodore Ts'o
2014-06-09  2:10   ` George Spelvin
2014-06-09  2:18     ` George Spelvin
2014-06-09  4:03       ` George Spelvin
2014-06-09  9:23         ` George Spelvin
2014-06-09 13:34         ` Theodore Ts'o
2014-06-09 15:04           ` George Spelvin
2014-06-09 15:50             ` Theodore Ts'o
2014-06-09 16:11               ` George Spelvin
2014-06-10  0:20               ` drivers/char/random.c: more ruminations George Spelvin
2014-06-10  1:20                 ` Theodore Ts'o
2014-06-10  3:10                   ` George Spelvin
2014-06-10 15:25                     ` Theodore Ts'o
2014-06-10 20:40                       ` George Spelvin
2014-06-10 21:20                         ` Theodore Ts'o
2014-06-11  0:10                           ` George Spelvin
2014-06-11  2:08                             ` Theodore Ts'o
2014-06-11  3:58                               ` George Spelvin
2014-06-11 13:11                                 ` Theodore Ts'o
2014-06-12  0:42                                   ` George Spelvin
2014-06-12  1:03                                   ` H. Peter Anvin [this message]
2014-06-11  4:34                               ` George Spelvin
2014-06-11 13:09                                 ` Theodore Ts'o
2014-06-11  2:21                             ` Theodore Ts'o
2014-06-09 13:17   ` drivers/char/random.c: More futzing about George Spelvin
2014-06-11 16:38     ` Theodore Ts'o
2014-06-11 16:48       ` H. Peter Anvin
2014-06-11 19:25         ` Theodore Ts'o
2014-06-11 20:41           ` H. Peter Anvin
2014-06-12  0:44             ` H. Peter Anvin
2014-06-12  1:51               ` George Spelvin
2014-06-12  0:32       ` George Spelvin
2014-06-12  3:22         ` Theodore Ts'o
2014-06-12  4:13           ` random: Benchamrking fast_mix2 George Spelvin
2014-06-12 11:18             ` George Spelvin
2014-06-12 20:17               ` Theodore Ts'o
2014-06-12 20:46               ` Theodore Ts'o
2014-06-13  0:23                 ` George Spelvin
2014-06-13 15:52                   ` Theodore Ts'o
2014-06-14  2:10                     ` George Spelvin
2014-06-14  3:06                       ` Theodore Ts'o
2014-06-14  5:25                         ` George Spelvin
2014-06-14  6:24                           ` Theodore Ts'o
2014-06-14  8:03                             ` George Spelvin
2014-06-14 11:14                               ` George Spelvin
2014-06-14 15:13                                 ` George Spelvin
2014-06-14 16:33                                   ` Theodore Ts'o
2014-06-15  0:23                                     ` George Spelvin
2014-06-15  1:17                                       ` Theodore Ts'o
2014-06-15  6:58                                         ` George Spelvin
2014-06-15 13:01                                           ` Theodore Ts'o
2014-06-14  6:27                           ` Theodore Ts'o
2014-06-14  4:55                     ` [RFC] random: is the IRQF_TIMER test working as intended? George Spelvin
2014-06-14  6:43                       ` Theodore Ts'o
2014-06-14  7:23                         ` George Spelvin
2014-06-12  3:43       ` drivers/char/random.c: More futzing about George Spelvin

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