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From: takahiro.akashi@linaro.org (AKASHI Takahiro)
To: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
Subject: [PATCH v5 1/3] arm64: ptrace: reload a syscall number after ptrace operations
Date: Thu, 24 Jul 2014 14:57:11 +0900	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <53D0A037.2060308@linaro.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <53D08358.4020902@amacapital.net>

On 07/24/2014 12:54 PM, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> On 07/22/2014 02:14 AM, AKASHI Takahiro wrote:
>> Arm64 holds a syscall number in w8(x8) register. Ptrace tracer may change
>> its value either to:
>>    * any valid syscall number to alter a system call, or
>>    * -1 to skip a system call
>>
>> This patch implements this behavior by reloading that value into syscallno
>> in struct pt_regs after tracehook_report_syscall_entry() or
>> secure_computing(). In case of '-1', a return value of system call can also
>> be changed by the tracer setting the value to x0 register, and so
>> sys_ni_nosyscall() should not be called.
>>
>> See also:
>>      42309ab4, ARM: 8087/1: ptrace: reload syscall number after
>>           secure_computing() check
>>
>> Signed-off-by: AKASHI Takahiro <takahiro.akashi@linaro.org>
>> ---
>>   arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S  |    2 ++
>>   arch/arm64/kernel/ptrace.c |   13 +++++++++++++
>>   2 files changed, 15 insertions(+)
>>
>> diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S b/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S
>> index 5141e79..de8bdbc 100644
>> --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S
>> +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S
>> @@ -628,6 +628,8 @@ ENDPROC(el0_svc)
>>   __sys_trace:
>>       mov    x0, sp
>>       bl    syscall_trace_enter
>> +    cmp    w0, #-1                // skip syscall?
>> +    b.eq    ret_to_user
>
> Does this mean that skipped syscalls will cause exit tracing to be skipped?

Yes. (and I guess yes on arm, too)

 > If so, then you risk (at least) introducing
> a nice user-triggerable OOPS if audit is enabled.

Can you please elaborate this?
Since I didn't find any definition of audit's behavior when syscall is
rewritten to -1, I thought it is reasonable to skip "exit tracing" of
"skipped" syscall.
(otherwise, "fake" seems to be more appropriate :)

-Takahiro AKASHI

> This bug existed for *years* on x86_32, and it amazes me that no one
> ever triggered it by accident. (Grr, audit.)
>
> --Andy

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: AKASHI Takahiro <takahiro.akashi@linaro.org>
To: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>,
	wad@chromium.org, catalin.marinas@arm.com, will.deacon@arm.com,
	keescook@chromium.org
Cc: dsaxena@linaro.org, linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org,
	linaro-kernel@lists.linaro.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v5 1/3] arm64: ptrace: reload a syscall number after ptrace operations
Date: Thu, 24 Jul 2014 14:57:11 +0900	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <53D0A037.2060308@linaro.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <53D08358.4020902@amacapital.net>

On 07/24/2014 12:54 PM, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> On 07/22/2014 02:14 AM, AKASHI Takahiro wrote:
>> Arm64 holds a syscall number in w8(x8) register. Ptrace tracer may change
>> its value either to:
>>    * any valid syscall number to alter a system call, or
>>    * -1 to skip a system call
>>
>> This patch implements this behavior by reloading that value into syscallno
>> in struct pt_regs after tracehook_report_syscall_entry() or
>> secure_computing(). In case of '-1', a return value of system call can also
>> be changed by the tracer setting the value to x0 register, and so
>> sys_ni_nosyscall() should not be called.
>>
>> See also:
>>      42309ab4, ARM: 8087/1: ptrace: reload syscall number after
>>           secure_computing() check
>>
>> Signed-off-by: AKASHI Takahiro <takahiro.akashi@linaro.org>
>> ---
>>   arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S  |    2 ++
>>   arch/arm64/kernel/ptrace.c |   13 +++++++++++++
>>   2 files changed, 15 insertions(+)
>>
>> diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S b/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S
>> index 5141e79..de8bdbc 100644
>> --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S
>> +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S
>> @@ -628,6 +628,8 @@ ENDPROC(el0_svc)
>>   __sys_trace:
>>       mov    x0, sp
>>       bl    syscall_trace_enter
>> +    cmp    w0, #-1                // skip syscall?
>> +    b.eq    ret_to_user
>
> Does this mean that skipped syscalls will cause exit tracing to be skipped?

Yes. (and I guess yes on arm, too)

 > If so, then you risk (at least) introducing
> a nice user-triggerable OOPS if audit is enabled.

Can you please elaborate this?
Since I didn't find any definition of audit's behavior when syscall is
rewritten to -1, I thought it is reasonable to skip "exit tracing" of
"skipped" syscall.
(otherwise, "fake" seems to be more appropriate :)

-Takahiro AKASHI

> This bug existed for *years* on x86_32, and it amazes me that no one
> ever triggered it by accident. (Grr, audit.)
>
> --Andy

  reply	other threads:[~2014-07-24  5:57 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 72+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2014-07-22  9:14 [PATCH v5 0/3] arm64: Add seccomp support AKASHI Takahiro
2014-07-22  9:14 ` AKASHI Takahiro
2014-07-22  9:14 ` [PATCH v5 1/3] arm64: ptrace: reload a syscall number after ptrace operations AKASHI Takahiro
2014-07-22  9:14   ` AKASHI Takahiro
2014-07-22 20:15   ` Kees Cook
2014-07-22 20:15     ` Kees Cook
2014-07-23  7:03     ` AKASHI Takahiro
2014-07-23  7:03       ` AKASHI Takahiro
2014-07-23  8:25       ` Will Deacon
2014-07-23  8:25         ` Will Deacon
2014-07-23  9:09         ` AKASHI Takahiro
2014-07-23  9:09           ` AKASHI Takahiro
2014-07-23 15:13       ` Kees Cook
2014-07-23 15:13         ` Kees Cook
2014-07-24  3:54   ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-07-24  3:54     ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-07-24  5:57     ` AKASHI Takahiro [this message]
2014-07-24  5:57       ` AKASHI Takahiro
2014-07-24 15:01       ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-07-24 15:01         ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-07-25 10:36         ` AKASHI Takahiro
2014-07-25 10:36           ` AKASHI Takahiro
2014-07-25 11:03           ` Will Deacon
2014-07-25 11:03             ` Will Deacon
2014-07-29  6:49             ` AKASHI Takahiro
2014-07-29  6:49               ` AKASHI Takahiro
2014-07-29 13:26               ` Will Deacon
2014-07-29 13:26                 ` Will Deacon
2014-07-22  9:14 ` [PATCH v5 2/3] asm-generic: Add generic seccomp.h for secure computing mode 1 AKASHI Takahiro
2014-07-22  9:14   ` AKASHI Takahiro
2014-07-24  3:40   ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-07-24  3:40     ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-07-24  4:41     ` Kees Cook
2014-07-24  4:41       ` Kees Cook
2014-07-24  5:17       ` AKASHI Takahiro
2014-07-24  5:17         ` AKASHI Takahiro
2014-07-24 14:57         ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-07-24 14:57           ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-07-25  8:52           ` AKASHI Takahiro
2014-07-25  8:52             ` AKASHI Takahiro
2014-07-22  9:14 ` [PATCH v5 3/3] arm64: Add seccomp support AKASHI Takahiro
2014-07-22  9:14   ` AKASHI Takahiro
2014-07-24  3:52   ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-07-24  3:52     ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-07-24  5:40     ` AKASHI Takahiro
2014-07-24  5:40       ` AKASHI Takahiro
2014-07-24 15:00       ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-07-24 15:00         ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-07-24 15:16         ` Catalin Marinas
2014-07-24 15:16           ` Catalin Marinas
2014-07-25  9:37         ` AKASHI Takahiro
2014-07-25  9:37           ` AKASHI Takahiro
2014-08-05 15:08           ` Kees Cook
2014-08-05 15:08             ` Kees Cook
2014-08-08  7:35             ` AKASHI Takahiro
2014-08-08  7:35               ` AKASHI Takahiro
2014-08-11  9:24               ` Will Deacon
2014-08-11  9:24                 ` Will Deacon
2014-08-12  6:57                 ` AKASHI Takahiro
2014-08-12  6:57                   ` AKASHI Takahiro
2014-08-12  9:40                   ` Will Deacon
2014-08-12  9:40                     ` Will Deacon
2014-08-12 11:17                     ` AKASHI Takahiro
2014-08-12 11:17                       ` AKASHI Takahiro
2014-08-15 14:33                       ` Will Deacon
2014-08-15 14:33                         ` Will Deacon
2014-07-22 20:16 ` [PATCH v5 0/3] " Kees Cook
2014-07-22 20:16   ` Kees Cook
2014-07-23  7:09   ` AKASHI Takahiro
2014-07-23  7:09     ` AKASHI Takahiro
2014-07-23 15:36     ` Kees Cook
2014-07-23 15:36       ` Kees Cook

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