All of lore.kernel.org
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
To: Tamas Lengyel <tamas.lengyel@zentific.com>
Cc: kevin.tian@intel.com, Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>,
	Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@eu.citrix.com>,
	Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>,
	eddie.dong@intel.com, Aravind.Gopalakrishnan@amd.com,
	Jun Nakajima <jun.nakajima@intel.com>,
	"xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org" <xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org>,
	Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>,
	suravee.suthikulpanit@amd.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 1/2] x86/mem_event: Deliver gla fault EPT violation information
Date: Fri, 08 Aug 2014 00:05:18 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <53E4062E.3060400@citrix.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAErYnsj-FmKZdRr+rjughQR=BZQFsmVL=nXhUJsE6s9mTHa8Aw@mail.gmail.com>

On 08/08/2014 00:03, Tamas Lengyel wrote:
> On Fri, Aug 8, 2014 at 12:58 AM, Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
> wrote:
>
>> On 07/08/2014 22:53, Tamas Lengyel wrote:
>>> On Thu, Aug 7, 2014 at 11:39 PM, Boris Ostrovsky <
>> boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com
>>>> wrote:
>>>> On 08/07/2014 03:47 PM, Tamas K Lengyel wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> On Intel EPT the exit qualification generated by a violation also
>>>>> includes a bit (EPT_GLA_FAULT) which describes the following
>> information:
>>>>> Set if the access causing the EPT violation is to a guest-physical
>>>>> address that is the translation of a linear address. Clear if the
>> access
>>>>> causing the EPT violation is to a paging-structure entry as part of a
>> page
>>>>> walk or the update of an accessed or dirty bit.
>>>>>
>>>>> For more information see Table 27-7 in the Intel SDM.
>>>>>
>>>>> This patch extends the mem_event system to deliver this extra
>>>>> information, which could be useful for determining the cause of a
>> violation.
>>>>> v2: Split gla_fault into fault_in_gpt and fault_gla to be more
>> compatible
>>>>> with the AMD implementation.
>>>>>
>>>>> Signed-off-by: Tamas K Lengyel <tamas.lengyel@zentific.com>
>>>>> ---
>>>>>   xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c         |  8 ++++++--
>>>>>   xen/arch/x86/hvm/svm/svm.c     |  2 +-
>>>>>   xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c     | 23 ++++++++++++++++++++++-
>>>>>   xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m.c          |  5 ++++-
>>>>>   xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/hvm.h  |  5 ++++-
>>>>>   xen/include/asm-x86/p2m.h      |  3 ++-
>>>>>   xen/include/public/mem_event.h |  4 +++-
>>>>>   7 files changed, 42 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
>>>>>
>>>>> diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c
>>>>> index e834406..d7b5e2b 100644
>>>>> --- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c
>>>>> +++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c
>>>>> @@ -2725,6 +2725,8 @@ void hvm_inject_page_fault(int errcode, unsigned
>>>>> long cr2)
>>>>>   int hvm_hap_nested_page_fault(paddr_t gpa,
>>>>>                                 bool_t gla_valid,
>>>>>                                 unsigned long gla,
>>>>> +                              bool_t fault_in_gpt,
>>>>> +                              bool_t fault_gla,
>>>>>                                 bool_t access_r,
>>>>>                                 bool_t access_w,
>>>>>                                 bool_t access_x)
>>>>> @@ -2832,8 +2834,10 @@ int hvm_hap_nested_page_fault(paddr_t gpa,
>>>>>             if ( violation )
>>>>>           {
>>>>> -            if ( p2m_mem_access_check(gpa, gla_valid, gla, access_r,
>>>>> -                                        access_w, access_x, &req_ptr)
>> )
>>>>> +            if ( p2m_mem_access_check(gpa, gla_valid, gla,
>>>>> +                                        fault_in_gpt, fault_gla,
>>>>> +                                        access_r, access_w, access_x,
>>>>> +                                        &req_ptr) )
>>>>>               {
>>>>>                   fall_through = 1;
>>>>>               } else {
>>>>> diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/svm/svm.c b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/svm/svm.c
>>>>> index 76616ac..9e35e7a 100644
>>>>> --- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/svm/svm.c
>>>>> +++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/svm/svm.c
>>>>> @@ -1403,7 +1403,7 @@ static void svm_do_nested_pgfault(struct vcpu *v,
>>>>>       p2m_access_t p2ma;
>>>>>       struct p2m_domain *p2m = NULL;
>>>>>   -    ret = hvm_hap_nested_page_fault(gpa, 0, ~0ul,
>>>>> +    ret = hvm_hap_nested_page_fault(gpa, 0, ~0ul, 0, 0,
>>>>>
>>>> Why not pass the actual bits that the HW provides?
>>>>
>>> The actual bits could be passed but it makes no difference at this point
>>> since the AMD side isn't setup to work with mem_event. When it is
>>> integrated, those bits could and should be passed accordingly.
>>>
>>> Tamas
>> There is a lot more than mem_event which might want these bits from AMD.
>>
>> If the bits are easily available at this point, you should fill them in.
>>
>> ~Andrew
>>
> I checked and there are no typedefs for these bits in the headers. Also,
> the EXITINFO1 passed here is truncated to 32-bits and that would need to be
> fixed.. so there are more then one issue that would have to be addressed
> for this. I think it would justify a separate patch of its own when it is
> actually needed.
>
> Tamas
>

That seems fair enough (although the final call is up to the AMD
maintainers).

~Andrew

  reply	other threads:[~2014-08-07 23:05 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 14+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2014-08-07 19:47 [PATCH v2 1/2] x86/mem_event: Deliver gla fault EPT violation information Tamas K Lengyel
2014-08-07 19:47 ` [PATCH v2 2/2] tools/xen-access: Print gla valid/fault information Tamas K Lengyel
2014-08-07 21:39 ` [PATCH v2 1/2] x86/mem_event: Deliver gla fault EPT violation information Boris Ostrovsky
2014-08-07 21:53   ` Tamas Lengyel
2014-08-07 22:58     ` Andrew Cooper
2014-08-07 23:03       ` Tamas Lengyel
2014-08-07 23:05         ` Andrew Cooper [this message]
2014-08-08 14:22         ` Boris Ostrovsky
2014-08-08 14:58           ` Jan Beulich
2014-08-08 17:47           ` Tamas Lengyel
2014-08-07 22:00 ` Andrew Cooper
2014-08-07 22:19   ` Tamas Lengyel
2014-08-07 22:54     ` Andrew Cooper
2014-08-07 22:53 ` Tian, Kevin

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=53E4062E.3060400@citrix.com \
    --to=andrew.cooper3@citrix.com \
    --cc=Aravind.Gopalakrishnan@amd.com \
    --cc=boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com \
    --cc=eddie.dong@intel.com \
    --cc=ian.campbell@citrix.com \
    --cc=ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com \
    --cc=jun.nakajima@intel.com \
    --cc=kevin.tian@intel.com \
    --cc=stefano.stabellini@eu.citrix.com \
    --cc=suravee.suthikulpanit@amd.com \
    --cc=tamas.lengyel@zentific.com \
    --cc=xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is an external index of several public inboxes,
see mirroring instructions on how to clone and mirror
all data and code used by this external index.