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From: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
To: "Tian, Kevin" <kevin.tian@intel.com>,
	Xen-devel <xen-devel@lists.xen.org>
Cc: "Zhang, Yang Z" <yang.z.zhang@intel.com>,
	Jan Beulich <JBeulich@suse.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2] x86/intel: Protect set_cpuidmask() against #GP faults
Date: Fri, 08 Aug 2014 22:38:41 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <53E54361.9040603@citrix.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <AADFC41AFE54684AB9EE6CBC0274A5D12602AE42@SHSMSX101.ccr.corp.intel.com>

On 08/08/2014 21:57, Tian, Kevin wrote:
>> From: Andrew Cooper [mailto:andrew.cooper3@citrix.com]
>> Sent: Wednesday, June 18, 2014 7:59 AM
>>
>> Virtual environments such as Xen HVM containers and VirtualBox do not
>> necessarily provide support for feature masking MSRs.
> could you elaborate how above environment leads to #GP fault?

The exact crash was a user trying XenServer.$NEXT in VirtualBox, on a
SandyBridge system.  For very very bad reasons, XenServer has an
unconditional cpuid_mask_xsave_eax=0 on its boot command line.  (It was
put in as a crutch at the last moment in an old release several years
ago, as the toolstack only knew features as a set of bits it XORs
together to check compatibility.  Naturally, the work to do a proper fix
got deferred in preference for newer customer-visible features.  Once I
have gotten migrationv2 finished, I will be fixing it all from the
ground up.)

The code below decides by model number alone that MSR 0x134 is usable,
and uses it.  Both Xen HVM VMs and VirtualBox hand back an unconditional
#GP fault for attempting to use the masking registers.  The primary
point of this patch is to use _safe() variants, as model number alone is
not sufficient to guarentee the presence of the MSRs.

>
>> As their presence is detected by model numbers alone, and their use
>> predicated
>> on command line parameters, use the safe() variants of {wr,rd}msr() to avoid
>> dying with an early #GP fault.
>>
>> While playing in this function, make some further improvements.
>>
>> * Rename the masking MSR names for consistency, and name the CPU models
>> for
>>   the benefit of humans reading the code.
>> * Correct the CPU selection as specified in the flexmigration document.  All
>>   steppings of 0x17 and 0x1a are stated to have masking MSRs.
> Thanks for catching this.
>
>> * Provide log messages indicating the masks applied, or lack of masking
>>   capabilities.
>> * Call set_cpuidmask() unconditionally so faulting-capable hardware still gets
>>   a log message indicating to the user why their command line arguments are
>>   not taking effect.
> I don't think it a good idea to call set_cpuidmask() unconditionally. Though you may
> argue mask/faulting are exclusively implemented, but from code p.o.v I'd like to
> see faulting over mask here, otherwise it just causes confusion when reading the
> code. Indication to user is easy... you can just add an option check when faulting
> is present.

Is it safe to assume that "faulting available" necessitates "masking
unavailable"?  Neither are architecturally committed features. 
(Frankly, fautling is the correct solution and it would be nice to see
it architecturally committed.)

~Andrew

>
>> References:
>> http://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/virtualization/virtualization-technol
>> ogy-flexmigration-application-note.html
>> http://software.intel.com/en-us/articles/intel-architecture-and-processor-iden
>> tification-with-cpuid-model-and-family-numbers
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
>> CC: Jan Beulich <JBeulich@suse.com>
>> CC: Yang Zhang <yang.z.zhang@intel.com>
>> CC: Kevin Tian <kevin.tian@intel.com>
>>
>> ---
>> v2: Correct msr_val manipulation for msr_xsave
>>
>> Can anyone shed light as to which CPU model 0x1f is?  It is specified in the
>> flexmigrate document, and was present in the old code, but I can't find any
>> further information online.
> 0x1f is a Nehalem model (See SDM vol3. 35.5). I'll check whether a concrete
> name is available.
>
>> ---
>>  xen/arch/x86/cpu/intel.c        |  150
>> +++++++++++++++++++++++++--------------
>>  xen/include/asm-x86/msr-index.h |   13 ++--
>>  2 files changed, 102 insertions(+), 61 deletions(-)
>>
>> diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/cpu/intel.c b/xen/arch/x86/cpu/intel.c
>> index e178b5c..36b06a6 100644
>> --- a/xen/arch/x86/cpu/intel.c
>> +++ b/xen/arch/x86/cpu/intel.c
>> @@ -51,68 +51,109 @@ void set_cpuid_faulting(bool_t enable)
>>   */
>>  static void __devinit set_cpuidmask(const struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
>>  {
>> -	u32 eax, edx;
>> -	const char *extra = "";
>> +	static unsigned int msr_basic, msr_ext, msr_xsave;
>> +	static enum { not_parsed, no_mask, set_mask } status;
>> +	u64 msr_val;
>> +
>> +	if (status == no_mask)
>> +		return;
>> +
>> +	if (status == set_mask)
>> +		goto setmask;
>> +
>> +	ASSERT((status == not_parsed) && (c == &boot_cpu_data));
>> +	status = no_mask;
>>
>>  	if (!~(opt_cpuid_mask_ecx & opt_cpuid_mask_edx &
>>  	       opt_cpuid_mask_ext_ecx & opt_cpuid_mask_ext_edx &
>> -               opt_cpuid_mask_xsave_eax))
>> +	       opt_cpuid_mask_xsave_eax))
>>  		return;
>>
>> -	/* Only family 6 supports this feature  */
>> -	switch ((c->x86 == 6) * c->x86_model) {
>> -	case 0x17:
>> -		if ((c->x86_mask & 0x0f) < 4)
>> -			break;
>> -		/* fall through */
>> -	case 0x1d:
>> -		wrmsr(MSR_INTEL_CPUID_FEATURE_MASK,
>> -		      opt_cpuid_mask_ecx,
>> -		      opt_cpuid_mask_edx);
>> -		if (~(opt_cpuid_mask_ext_ecx & opt_cpuid_mask_ext_edx))
>> -			extra = "extended ";
>> -		else if (~opt_cpuid_mask_xsave_eax)
>> -			extra = "xsave ";
>> -		else
>> -			return;
>> +	/* Only family 6 supports this feature. */
>> +	if (c->x86 != 6) {
>> +		printk("No CPUID feature masking support available\n");
>> +		return;
>> +	}
>> +
>> +	switch (c->x86_model) {
>> +	case 0x17: /* Yorkfield, Wolfdale, Penryn, Harpertown(DP) */
>> +	case 0x1d: /* Dunnington(MP) */
>> +		msr_basic = MSR_INTEL_MASK_V1_CPUID1;
>>  		break;
>> -/*
>> - * CPU supports this feature if the processor signature meets the following:
>> - * (CPUID.(EAX=01h):EAX) > 000106A2h, or
>> - * (CPUID.(EAX=01h):EAX) == 000106Exh, 0002065xh, 000206Cxh, 000206Exh,
>> or 000206Fxh
>> - *
>> - */
>> -	case 0x1a:
>> -		if ((c->x86_mask & 0x0f) <= 2)
>> -			break;
>> -		/* fall through */
>> -	case 0x1e: case 0x1f:
>> -	case 0x25: case 0x2c: case 0x2e: case 0x2f:
>> -		wrmsr(MSR_INTEL_CPUID1_FEATURE_MASK,
>> -		      opt_cpuid_mask_ecx,
>> -		      opt_cpuid_mask_edx);
>> -		wrmsr(MSR_INTEL_CPUID80000001_FEATURE_MASK,
>> -		      opt_cpuid_mask_ext_ecx,
>> -		      opt_cpuid_mask_ext_edx);
>> -		if (!~opt_cpuid_mask_xsave_eax)
>> -			return;
>> -		extra = "xsave ";
>> +
>> +	case 0x1a: /* Bloomfield, Nehalem-EP */
>> +	case 0x1e: /* Clarksfield, Lynnfield, Jasper Forest */
>> +	case 0x1f: /* ??? */
>> +	case 0x25: /* Arrandale, Clarksdale */
>> +	case 0x2c: /* Gulftown, Westmere-EP */
>> +	case 0x2e: /* Nehalem-EX */
>> +	case 0x2f: /* Westmere-EX */
>> +		msr_basic = MSR_INTEL_MASK_V2_CPUID1;
>> +		msr_ext   = MSR_INTEL_MASK_V2_CPUID80000001;
>> +		break;
>> +
>> +	case 0x2a: /* SandyBridge */
>> +	case 0x2d: /* SandyBridge-E, SandyBridge-EN, SandyBridge-EP */
>> +		msr_basic = MSR_INTEL_MASK_V3_CPUID1;
>> +		msr_ext   = MSR_INTEL_MASK_V3_CPUID80000001;
>> +		msr_xsave = MSR_INTEL_MASK_V3_CPUIDD_01;
>>  		break;
>> -	case 0x2a: case 0x2d:
>> -		wrmsr(MSR_INTEL_CPUID1_FEATURE_MASK_V2,
>> -		      opt_cpuid_mask_ecx,
>> -		      opt_cpuid_mask_edx);
>> -		rdmsr(MSR_INTEL_CPUIDD_01_FEATURE_MASK, eax, edx);
>> -		wrmsr(MSR_INTEL_CPUIDD_01_FEATURE_MASK,
>> -		      opt_cpuid_mask_xsave_eax, edx);
>> -		wrmsr(MSR_INTEL_CPUID80000001_FEATURE_MASK_V2,
>> -		      opt_cpuid_mask_ext_ecx,
>> -		      opt_cpuid_mask_ext_edx);
>> -		return;
>>  	}
>>
>> -	printk(XENLOG_ERR "Cannot set CPU %sfeature mask on CPU#%d\n",
>> -	       extra, smp_processor_id());
>> +	status = set_mask;
>> +
>> +	if (~(opt_cpuid_mask_ecx & opt_cpuid_mask_edx)) {
>> +		if (msr_basic)
>> +			printk("Writing CPUID feature mask ecx:edx -> %08x:%08x\n",
>> +			       opt_cpuid_mask_ecx, opt_cpuid_mask_edx);
>> +		else
>> +			printk("No CPUID feature mask available\n");
>> +	}
>> +	else
>> +		msr_basic = 0;
>> +
>> +	if (~(opt_cpuid_mask_ext_ecx & opt_cpuid_mask_ext_edx)) {
>> +		if (msr_ext)
>> +			printk("Writing CPUID extended feature mask ecx:edx
>> -> %08x:%08x\n",
>> +			       opt_cpuid_mask_ext_ecx, opt_cpuid_mask_ext_edx);
>> +		else
>> +			printk("No CPUID extended feature mask available\n");
>> +	}
>> +	else
>> +		msr_ext = 0;
>> +
>> +	if (~opt_cpuid_mask_xsave_eax) {
>> +		if (msr_xsave)
>> +			printk("Writing CPUID xsave feature mask eax -> %08x\n",
>> +			       opt_cpuid_mask_xsave_eax);
>> +		else
>> +			printk("No CPUID xsave feature mask available\n");
>> +	}
>> +	else
>> +		msr_xsave = 0;
>> +
>> + setmask:
>> +	if (msr_basic &&
>> +	    wrmsr_safe(msr_basic,
>> +		       ((u64)opt_cpuid_mask_edx << 32) | opt_cpuid_mask_ecx)){
>> +		msr_basic = 0;
>> +		printk("Failed to set CPUID feature mask\n");
>> +	}
>> +
>> +	if (msr_ext &&
>> +	    wrmsr_safe(msr_ext,
>> +		       ((u64)opt_cpuid_mask_ext_edx << 32) |
>> opt_cpuid_mask_ext_ecx)){
>> +		msr_ext = 0;
>> +		printk("Failed to set CPUID extended feature mask\n");
>> +	}
>> +
>> +	if (msr_xsave &&
>> +	    (rdmsr_safe(msr_xsave, msr_val) ||
>> +	     wrmsr_safe(msr_xsave,
>> +			(msr_val & (~0ULL << 32)) | opt_cpuid_mask_xsave_eax))){
>> +		msr_xsave = 0;
>> +		printk("Failed to set CPUID xsave feature mask\n");
>> +	}
>>  }
>>
>>  void __devinit early_intel_workaround(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
>> @@ -220,8 +261,7 @@ static void __devinit init_intel(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
>>  		set_bit(X86_FEATURE_CPUID_FAULTING, c->x86_capability);
>>  	}
>>
>> -	if (!cpu_has_cpuid_faulting)
>> -		set_cpuidmask(c);
>> +	set_cpuidmask(c);
>>
>>  	/* Work around errata */
>>  	Intel_errata_workarounds(c);
>> diff --git a/xen/include/asm-x86/msr-index.h
>> b/xen/include/asm-x86/msr-index.h
>> index 70a8201..7d38bcb 100644
>> --- a/xen/include/asm-x86/msr-index.h
>> +++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/msr-index.h
>> @@ -469,13 +469,14 @@
>>  #define MSR_CORE_PERF_GLOBAL_OVF_CTRL	0x00000390
>>
>>  /* Intel cpuid spoofing MSRs */
>> -#define MSR_INTEL_CPUID_FEATURE_MASK	0x00000478
>> -#define MSR_INTEL_CPUID1_FEATURE_MASK	0x00000130
>> -#define MSR_INTEL_CPUID80000001_FEATURE_MASK 0x00000131
>> +#define MSR_INTEL_MASK_V1_CPUID1	0x00000478
>>
>> -#define MSR_INTEL_CPUID1_FEATURE_MASK_V2        0x00000132
>> -#define MSR_INTEL_CPUID80000001_FEATURE_MASK_V2 0x00000133
>> -#define MSR_INTEL_CPUIDD_01_FEATURE_MASK        0x00000134
>> +#define MSR_INTEL_MASK_V2_CPUID1	0x00000130
>> +#define MSR_INTEL_MASK_V2_CPUID80000001 0x00000131
>> +
>> +#define MSR_INTEL_MASK_V3_CPUID1	0x00000132
>> +#define MSR_INTEL_MASK_V3_CPUID80000001 0x00000133
>> +#define MSR_INTEL_MASK_V3_CPUIDD_01	0x00000134
>>
>>  /* Intel cpuid faulting MSRs */
>>  #define MSR_INTEL_PLATFORM_INFO		0x000000ce
>> --
>> 1.7.10.4

  reply	other threads:[~2014-08-08 21:38 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 7+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2014-06-18 14:59 [PATCH v2] x86/intel: Protect set_cpuidmask() against #GP faults Andrew Cooper
2014-08-07  8:09 ` Ping: " Jan Beulich
2014-08-07 17:37   ` Tian, Kevin
2014-08-08 20:57 ` Tian, Kevin
2014-08-08 21:38   ` Andrew Cooper [this message]
2014-08-08 21:53     ` Tian, Kevin
2014-08-08 22:19 ` Tian, Kevin

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