From: Julien Grall <julien.grall@linaro.org>
To: Suriyan Ramasami <suriyan.r@gmail.com>, xen-devel@lists.xen.org
Cc: ian.jackson@citrix.com, keir@xen.org, ian.campbell@citrix.com,
jbeulich@suse.com, tim@xen.org
Subject: Re: [XEN/ARM PATCH v2 1/1] Add support for Exynos secure firmware
Date: Fri, 12 Sep 2014 16:52:42 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <5413874A.5070001@linaro.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1410562915-16761-1-git-send-email-suriyan.r@gmail.com>
Hi Suriyan,
On 12/09/14 16:01, Suriyan Ramasami wrote:
> +static int __init exynos5_smp_init(void)
> +{
> + void __iomem *sysram;
> + u64 sysram_addr;
> + u64 size;
> + u64 sysram_offset;
> + int rc;
> +
> + rc = exynos_smp_init_getbasesizeoffset(&sysram_addr, &size, &sysram_offset);
The function name is odd. As you call the function only here, couldn't
you inline it?
> + if ( rc )
> + return rc;
> +
> + dprintk(XENLOG_INFO, "sysram_addr: %016llx size: %016llx offset: %016llx\n",
> + sysram_addr, size, sysram_offset);
> +
> + sysram = ioremap_nocache(sysram_addr, size);
> if ( !sysram )
> {
> dprintk(XENLOG_ERR, "Unable to map exynos5 MMIO\n");
> @@ -125,7 +158,7 @@ static int __init exynos5_smp_init(void)
>
> printk("Set SYSRAM to %"PRIpaddr" (%p)\n",
> __pa(init_secondary), init_secondary);
> - writel(__pa(init_secondary), sysram);
> + writel(__pa(init_secondary), sysram + sysram_offset);
>
> iounmap(sysram);
>
> @@ -135,7 +168,7 @@ static int __init exynos5_smp_init(void)
> static int exynos_cpu_power_state(void __iomem *power, int cpu)
> {
> return __raw_readl(power + EXYNOS_ARM_CORE_STATUS(cpu)) &
> - S5P_CORE_LOCAL_PWR_EN;
> + S5P_CORE_LOCAL_PWR_EN;
Why this change?
> }
>
> static void exynos_cpu_power_up(void __iomem *power, int cpu)
> @@ -171,8 +204,7 @@ static int exynos5_cpu_power_up(void __iomem *power, int cpu)
> return 0;
> }
>
> -static int exynos5_get_pmu_base_addr(u64 *power_base_addr) {
> - u64 size;
> +static int exynos5_get_pmu_baseandsize(u64 *power_base_addr, u64 *size) {
The Xen coding style is
static int foo(...)
{
> struct dt_device_node *node;
> int rc;
> static const struct dt_device_match exynos_dt_pmu_matches[] __initconst =
> @@ -190,7 +222,7 @@ static int exynos5_get_pmu_base_addr(u64 *power_base_addr) {
> return -ENXIO;
> }
>
> - rc = dt_device_get_address(node, 0, power_base_addr, &size);
> + rc = dt_device_get_address(node, 0, power_base_addr, size);
> if ( rc )
> {
> dprintk(XENLOG_ERR, "Error in \"samsung,exynos5XXX-pmu\"\n");
> @@ -198,23 +230,31 @@ static int exynos5_get_pmu_base_addr(u64 *power_base_addr) {
> }
>
> dprintk(XENLOG_DEBUG, "power_base_addr: %016llx size: %016llx\n",
> - *power_base_addr, size);
> + *power_base_addr, *size);
>
> return 0;
> }
>
> +static void exynos_smc(u32 cmd, u32 arg1, u32 arg2, u32 arg3)
> +{
> + asm(
> + "dsb;"
> + "smc #0;"
> + );
> +}
>+
The compiler may decide to inline the function. This will end up to the
command register not in register r0.
Give a look to __invoke_psci_fn_smc in xen/arch/arm/psci.c. It might be
worth to introduce an SMC helper.
> static int exynos5_cpu_up(int cpu)
> {
> u64 power_base_addr;
> + u64 size;
> void __iomem *power;
> int rc;
>
> - rc = exynos5_get_pmu_base_addr(&power_base_addr);
> + rc = exynos5_get_pmu_baseandsize(&power_base_addr, &size);
> if ( rc )
> return rc;
>
> - power = ioremap_nocache(power_base_addr +
> - EXYNOS_ARM_CORE0_CONFIG, PAGE_SIZE);
> + power = ioremap_nocache(power_base_addr, size);
> if ( !power )
> {
> dprintk(XENLOG_ERR, "Unable to map power MMIO\n");
> @@ -230,22 +270,23 @@ static int exynos5_cpu_up(int cpu)
>
> iounmap(power);
>
> + exynos_smc(SMC_CMD_CPU1BOOT, cpu, 0, 0);
> +
The call is not done unconditionally on Linux. It's only done when the
secure firmware is present.
> return cpu_up_send_sgi(cpu);
> }
>
> static void exynos5_reset(void)
> {
> u64 power_base_addr;
> + u64 size;
> void __iomem *pmu;
> int rc;
>
> - BUILD_BUG_ON(EXYNOS5_SWRESET >= PAGE_SIZE);
> -
> - rc = exynos5_get_pmu_base_addr(&power_base_addr);
> + rc = exynos5_get_pmu_baseandsize(&power_base_addr, &size);
> if ( rc )
> return;
>
> - pmu = ioremap_nocache(power_base_addr, PAGE_SIZE);
> + pmu = ioremap_nocache(power_base_addr, size);
> if ( !pmu )
> {
> dprintk(XENLOG_ERR, "Unable to map PMU\n");
> @@ -264,6 +305,7 @@ static const struct dt_device_match exynos5_blacklist_dev[] __initconst =
> * This is result to random freeze.
> */
> DT_MATCH_COMPATIBLE("samsung,exynos4210-mct"),
> + DT_MATCH_COMPATIBLE("samsung,secure-firmware"),
Can you add a comment explaining why we blacklist the secure firmware?
Regards,
--
Julien Grall
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2014-09-12 23:52 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 11+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2014-09-12 23:01 [XEN/ARM PATCH v2 1/1] Add support for Exynos secure firmware Suriyan Ramasami
2014-09-12 23:52 ` Julien Grall [this message]
2014-09-13 2:08 ` Suriyan Ramasami
2014-09-17 8:37 ` Tamas K Lengyel
2014-09-17 15:38 ` Suriyan Ramasami
2014-09-17 22:17 ` Suriyan Ramasami
2014-09-17 22:23 ` Julien Grall
2014-09-17 22:39 ` Suriyan Ramasami
2014-09-18 18:30 ` Ian Campbell
2014-09-18 18:44 ` Suriyan Ramasami
2014-09-18 19:06 ` Ian Campbell
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