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From: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
To: Tracy Reed <treed@ultraviolet.org>
Cc: selinux@tycho.nsa.gov
Subject: Re: MCS error
Date: Fri, 20 Feb 2015 12:33:09 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <54E76FD5.1080905@tycho.nsa.gov> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <54E769FA.8010801@tycho.nsa.gov>

On 02/20/2015 12:08 PM, Stephen Smalley wrote:
> On 02/20/2015 11:56 AM, Tracy Reed wrote:
>> On Fri, Feb 20, 2015 at 05:38:55AM PST, Stephen Smalley spake thusly:
>>> Can you show the actual constraints on RHEL6?  seinfo --constrain
>>> output, or grab the .src.rpm and pull out the mcs file.
>>
>> Here is the seinfo --constrain output from RHEL6. Thanks for having a look!
> 
> Sigh. Not preserved in attribute form in that version.  Ok, I grabbed
> selinux-policy-3.7.19-231.el6.src.rpm and extracted the mcs file from
> it; it has:
> 
> mlsconstrain file { read ioctl lock execute execute_no_trans }
>         (( h1 dom h2 ) or ( t1 == mcsreadall ) or
>         (( t1 != mcsuntrustedproc ) and (t2 == domain)));
> 
> which means:
> 
> "Only allow read (or the other listed permissions) if the process high
> level dominates the file high level or the process type has the
> mcsreadall attribute or the process type does not have the
> mcsuntrustedproc attribute and the object type has the domain attribute
> (i.e. the object is a /proc/pid file)."
> 
> So I'm guessing user_t has mcsreadall?  What does seinfo -tuser_t -x |
> grep mcs show?

Also, can you confirm that the system is enforcing?  getenforce?

  reply	other threads:[~2015-02-20 17:33 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 27+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2015-02-19  1:48 MCS error Tracy Reed
2015-02-19 13:23 ` Stephen Smalley
2015-02-19 15:40   ` Dominick Grift
2015-02-19 19:33     ` Tracy Reed
2015-02-19 19:46       ` Stephen Smalley
2015-02-19 20:17         ` Tracy Reed
2015-02-19 20:27           ` Stephen Smalley
2015-02-19 21:14           ` Dominick Grift
2015-02-19 20:48       ` Dominick Grift
2015-02-19 21:26         ` Thomas Hurd
2015-02-20  0:34         ` Tracy Reed
2015-02-20  2:02           ` Tracy Reed
2015-02-20  7:33             ` Dominick Grift
2015-02-20 23:27               ` Tracy Reed
2015-02-20 23:38                 ` Joshua Brindle
2015-02-21 13:07                 ` Dominick Grift
2015-02-20 17:44             ` Stephen Smalley
2015-02-20 13:38           ` Stephen Smalley
2015-02-20 16:56             ` Tracy Reed
2015-02-20 17:08               ` Stephen Smalley
2015-02-20 17:33                 ` Stephen Smalley [this message]
2015-02-20 22:10                   ` Tracy Reed
2015-02-23 14:43                     ` Stephen Smalley
2015-02-20 22:07                 ` Tracy Reed
2015-02-19 16:19 ` Stephen Smalley
2015-02-19 19:58   ` Tracy Reed
2015-02-19 20:24     ` Stephen Smalley

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