From: Steve Grubb <sgrubb@redhat.com>
To: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>, Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Cc: linux-audit@redhat.com
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v2 0/9] Add LSM access controls and auditing to io_uring
Date: Mon, 04 Oct 2021 10:59:33 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <5506863.DvuYhMxLoT@x2> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAHC9VhQcWFrpV6GY5kB4TP-bChwE_-KOpsoF8g4uBmZkFezY5g@mail.gmail.com>
On Monday, October 4, 2021 9:27:33 AM EDT Paul Moore wrote:
> On Mon, Oct 4, 2021 at 8:40 AM Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com> wrote:
> > On 2021-10-03 19:21, Paul Moore wrote:
> > > On Sat, Oct 2, 2021 at 9:16 AM Steve Grubb <sgrubb@redhat.com> wrote:
> > > > On Thursday, September 9, 2021 8:58:58 PM EDT Richard Guy Briggs
wrote:
> > > > > > I spent some time this morning/afternoon playing with the
> > > > > > io_uring
> > > > > > audit filtering capability and with your audit userspace
> > > > > > ghau-iouring-filtering.v1.0 branch it appears to work correctly.
> > > > > > Yes,
> > > > > > the userspace tooling isn't quite 100% yet (e.g. `auditctl -l`
> > > > > > doesn't
> > > > > > map the io_uring ops correctly), but I know you mentioned you
> > > > > > have a
> > > > > > number of fixes/improvements still as a work-in-progress there so
> > > > > > I'm
> > > > > > not too concerned. The important part is that the kernel pieces
> > > > > > look
> > > > > > to be working correctly.
> > > > >
> > > > > Ok, I have squashed and pushed the audit userspace support for
> > > > > iouring:
> > > > >
> > > > > https://github.com/rgbriggs/audit-userspace/commit/e8bd8d2ea8adcaa7
> > > > > 58024cb
> > > > > 9b8fa93895ae35eea
> > > > > https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-userspace/compare/master...rgb
> > > > > riggs:g
> > > > >
> > > > > hak-iouring-filtering.v2.1 There are test rpms for f35 here:
> > > > > http://people.redhat.com/~rbriggs/ghak-iouring/git-e8bd8d2-> > > > > fc35/
> > > > >
> > > > > userspace v2 changelog:
> > > > > - check for watch before adding perm
> > > > > - update manpage to include filesystem filter
> > > > > - update support for the uring filter list: doc, -U op, op names
> > > > > - add support for the AUDIT_URINGOP record type
> > > > > - add uringop support to ausearch
> > > > > - add uringop support to aureport
> > > > > - lots of bug fixes
> > > > >
> > > > > "auditctl -a uring,always -S ..." will now throw an error and
> > > > > require "-U" instead.
> > > >
> > > > OK, now that the bug fix release is out of the way, let's start
> > > > merging this into user space. I think we should start with the code
> > > > that let's auditd write the record correctly and then the auditctl
> > > > piece that inserts the rule into the kernel. Those should be easy to
> > > > merge.
> > > >
> > > > I see one section of code that mirrors all of the operations in
> > > > ioring.h. I thought that Paul only wanted to audit some of the
> > > > operations and not all of them. Did that change? Are we really going
> > > > to allow auditing reads on ioring?> >
> > > Only certain io_uring operations are audited, you can see the patch
> > > here in the selinux/next tree (look for the io_op_defs struct changes
> > > and the "audit_skip" field):
> > >
> > > https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux.git/com
> > > mit/?h=next&id=5bd2182d58e9d9c6279b7a8a2f9b41add0e7f9cb>
> > I understood that was the default, but that it could be changed by
> > userspace configuration? Now that I say this, I realize there is no API
> > to do so, but that could be added without breaking anything.
>
> The approach implemented in the patch currently living in selinux/next
> was a carefully arranged compromise with the io_uring devs (see all of
> the on-list discussions); it is unlikely to change.
Right. That's what I remember. So, I think that we should comment out the
items in the ioring lookup table that are not auditable so that we can
provide a meaningful warning to users of auditctl.
-Steve
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2021-10-04 15:05 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 76+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2021-08-11 20:48 [RFC PATCH v2 0/9] Add LSM access controls and auditing to io_uring Paul Moore
2021-08-11 20:48 ` Paul Moore
2021-08-11 20:48 ` [RFC PATCH v2 1/9] audit: prepare audit_context for use in calling contexts beyond syscalls Paul Moore
2021-08-11 20:48 ` Paul Moore
2021-08-11 20:48 ` [RFC PATCH v2 2/9] audit,io_uring,io-wq: add some basic audit support to io_uring Paul Moore
2021-08-11 20:48 ` [RFC PATCH v2 2/9] audit, io_uring, io-wq: " Paul Moore
2021-08-11 20:48 ` [RFC PATCH v2 3/9] audit: dev/test patch to force io_uring auditing Paul Moore
2021-08-11 20:48 ` Paul Moore
2021-08-11 20:48 ` [RFC PATCH v2 4/9] audit: add filtering for io_uring records Paul Moore
2021-08-11 20:48 ` Paul Moore
2021-08-11 20:48 ` [RFC PATCH v2 5/9] fs: add anon_inode_getfile_secure() similar to anon_inode_getfd_secure() Paul Moore
2021-08-11 20:48 ` Paul Moore
2021-08-12 9:32 ` Mickaël Salaün
2021-08-12 9:32 ` Mickaël Salaün
2021-08-12 14:32 ` Paul Moore
2021-08-12 14:32 ` Paul Moore
2021-08-12 15:35 ` Mickaël Salaün
2021-08-12 15:35 ` Mickaël Salaün
2021-08-11 20:48 ` [RFC PATCH v2 6/9] io_uring: convert io_uring to the secure anon inode interface Paul Moore
2021-08-11 20:48 ` Paul Moore
2021-08-11 20:48 ` [RFC PATCH v2 7/9] lsm,io_uring: add LSM hooks to io_uring Paul Moore
2021-08-11 20:48 ` Paul Moore
2021-08-11 20:49 ` [RFC PATCH v2 8/9] selinux: add support for the io_uring access controls Paul Moore
2021-08-11 20:49 ` Paul Moore
2021-08-11 20:49 ` [RFC PATCH v2 9/9] Smack: Brutalist io_uring support with debug Paul Moore
2021-08-11 20:49 ` Paul Moore
2021-08-31 14:44 ` Paul Moore
2021-08-31 14:44 ` Paul Moore
2021-08-31 15:03 ` Casey Schaufler
2021-08-31 15:03 ` Casey Schaufler
2021-08-31 16:43 ` Paul Moore
2021-08-31 16:43 ` Paul Moore
2021-08-24 20:57 ` [RFC PATCH v2 0/9] Add LSM access controls and auditing to io_uring Richard Guy Briggs
2021-08-24 20:57 ` Richard Guy Briggs
2021-08-24 22:27 ` Paul Moore
2021-08-24 22:27 ` Paul Moore
2021-08-25 1:36 ` Richard Guy Briggs
2021-08-25 1:36 ` Richard Guy Briggs
2021-08-26 1:16 ` Richard Guy Briggs
2021-08-26 1:16 ` Richard Guy Briggs
2021-08-26 1:34 ` Paul Moore
2021-08-26 1:34 ` Paul Moore
2021-08-26 16:32 ` Richard Guy Briggs
2021-08-26 16:32 ` Richard Guy Briggs
2021-08-26 19:14 ` Paul Moore
2021-08-26 19:14 ` Paul Moore
2021-08-27 13:35 ` Richard Guy Briggs
2021-08-27 13:35 ` Richard Guy Briggs
2021-08-27 19:49 ` Paul Moore
2021-08-27 19:49 ` Paul Moore
2021-08-28 15:03 ` Richard Guy Briggs
2021-08-28 15:03 ` Richard Guy Briggs
2021-08-29 15:18 ` Paul Moore
2021-08-29 15:18 ` Paul Moore
2021-09-01 19:21 ` Paul Moore
2021-09-01 19:21 ` Paul Moore
2021-09-10 0:58 ` Richard Guy Briggs
2021-09-10 0:58 ` Richard Guy Briggs
2021-09-13 19:23 ` Paul Moore
2021-09-13 19:23 ` Paul Moore
2021-09-14 1:50 ` Paul Moore
2021-09-14 1:50 ` Paul Moore
2021-09-14 2:49 ` Paul Moore
2021-09-14 2:49 ` Paul Moore
2021-09-15 12:29 ` Richard Guy Briggs
2021-09-15 12:29 ` Richard Guy Briggs
2021-09-15 13:02 ` Steve Grubb
2021-09-15 13:02 ` Steve Grubb
2021-09-15 14:12 ` Paul Moore
2021-09-15 14:12 ` Paul Moore
2021-10-02 13:16 ` Steve Grubb
2021-10-03 23:21 ` Paul Moore
2021-10-04 12:39 ` Richard Guy Briggs
2021-10-04 13:27 ` Paul Moore
2021-10-04 14:59 ` Steve Grubb [this message]
2021-10-28 20:07 ` Richard Guy Briggs
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