From: Konstantin Khlebnikov <khlebnikov@yandex-team.ru>
To: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>,
"Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill@shutemov.name>,
Konstantin Khlebnikov <koct9i@gmail.com>
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
"Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Subject: Re: [PATCH RFC] mm: protect suid binaries against rowhammer with copy-on-read mappings
Date: Thu, 19 Mar 2015 16:24:39 +0300 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <550ACE17.9040600@yandex-team.ru> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <550AC958.9010502@suse.cz>
On 19.03.2015 16:04, Vlastimil Babka wrote:
> On 03/18/2015 12:41 PM, Konstantin Khlebnikov wrote:
>> On 18.03.2015 12:57, Kirill A. Shutemov wrote:
>>>
>>> I don't think it worth it. The only right way to fix the problem is ECC
>>> memory.
>>>
>>
>> ECC seems good protection until somebody figure out how to break it too.
>
> I doubt that kind of attitude can get us very far. If we can't trust the
> hardware, we lose sooner or later.
>
Obviously ECC was designed for protecting against cosmic rays which
flips several bits. If attacker modifies whole cacheline he can chose
value which have the same ECC. I hope next generation of DRAM (or PRAM)
wouldn't be affected.
Software solution is possible: we can put untrusted applications into
special ghetto memory zone. This is relatively easy for virtual
machines. And it seems might work for normal tasks too (page-cache
pages should be doubled or handled in the way similar to copy-on-read
from that patch).
--
Konstantin
--
To unsubscribe, send a message with 'unsubscribe linux-mm' in
the body to majordomo@kvack.org. For more info on Linux MM,
see: http://www.linux-mm.org/ .
Don't email: <a href=mailto:"dont@kvack.org"> email@kvack.org </a>
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Konstantin Khlebnikov <khlebnikov@yandex-team.ru>
To: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>,
"Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill@shutemov.name>,
Konstantin Khlebnikov <koct9i@gmail.com>
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
"Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Subject: Re: [PATCH RFC] mm: protect suid binaries against rowhammer with copy-on-read mappings
Date: Thu, 19 Mar 2015 16:24:39 +0300 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <550ACE17.9040600@yandex-team.ru> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <550AC958.9010502@suse.cz>
On 19.03.2015 16:04, Vlastimil Babka wrote:
> On 03/18/2015 12:41 PM, Konstantin Khlebnikov wrote:
>> On 18.03.2015 12:57, Kirill A. Shutemov wrote:
>>>
>>> I don't think it worth it. The only right way to fix the problem is ECC
>>> memory.
>>>
>>
>> ECC seems good protection until somebody figure out how to break it too.
>
> I doubt that kind of attitude can get us very far. If we can't trust the
> hardware, we lose sooner or later.
>
Obviously ECC was designed for protecting against cosmic rays which
flips several bits. If attacker modifies whole cacheline he can chose
value which have the same ECC. I hope next generation of DRAM (or PRAM)
wouldn't be affected.
Software solution is possible: we can put untrusted applications into
special ghetto memory zone. This is relatively easy for virtual
machines. And it seems might work for normal tasks too (page-cache
pages should be doubled or handled in the way similar to copy-on-read
from that patch).
--
Konstantin
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2015-03-19 13:24 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 16+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2015-03-18 8:30 [PATCH RFC] mm: protect suid binaries against rowhammer with copy-on-read mappings Konstantin Khlebnikov
2015-03-18 8:30 ` Konstantin Khlebnikov
2015-03-18 9:57 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2015-03-18 9:57 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2015-03-18 11:41 ` Konstantin Khlebnikov
2015-03-18 11:41 ` Konstantin Khlebnikov
2015-03-19 13:04 ` Vlastimil Babka
2015-03-19 13:04 ` Vlastimil Babka
2015-03-19 13:24 ` Konstantin Khlebnikov [this message]
2015-03-19 13:24 ` Konstantin Khlebnikov
2015-03-18 14:11 ` Dave Hansen
2015-03-18 14:11 ` Dave Hansen
2015-03-18 15:08 ` Konstantin Khlebnikov
2015-03-18 15:08 ` Konstantin Khlebnikov
2015-03-18 15:45 ` Dave Hansen
2015-03-18 15:45 ` Dave Hansen
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=550ACE17.9040600@yandex-team.ru \
--to=khlebnikov@yandex-team.ru \
--cc=akpm@linux-foundation.org \
--cc=kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com \
--cc=kirill@shutemov.name \
--cc=koct9i@gmail.com \
--cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-mm@kvack.org \
--cc=luto@amacapital.net \
--cc=torvalds@linux-foundation.org \
--cc=vbabka@suse.cz \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is an external index of several public inboxes,
see mirroring instructions on how to clone and mirror
all data and code used by this external index.