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From: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
To: "Tian, Kevin" <kevin.tian@intel.com>,
	Xen-devel <xen-devel@lists.xen.org>
Cc: "Zhang, Yang Z" <yang.z.zhang@intel.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] VTd/dmar: Tweak how the DMAR table is clobbered
Date: Fri, 10 Apr 2015 10:08:11 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <552792FB.7020908@citrix.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <AADFC41AFE54684AB9EE6CBC0274A5D126206112@SHSMSX101.ccr.corp.intel.com>

On 10/04/15 02:23, Tian, Kevin wrote:
>> From: Andrew Cooper [mailto:andrew.cooper3@citrix.com]
>> Sent: Thursday, April 09, 2015 3:45 AM
>>
>> Intead of clobbering DMAR -> XMAR and back, clobber to RMAD instead.
>> This
>> means that changing the signature does not alter the checksum, which allows
>> the clobbering/unclobbering to be peformed atomically and idempotently,
>> which
>> is an advantage on the kexec path which can reenter acpi_dmar_reinstate().
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
>> CC: Yang Zhang <yang.z.zhang@intel.com>
>> CC: Kevin Tian <kevin.tian@intel.com>
> Acked-by: Kevin Tian <kevin.tian@intel.com>
>
> and curious do you observe a real atomic issue in kexec or just catch this
> potential issue when reading code? :-)

I have run over it once in the past, but mainly it is one small thing on
a very long list of tweaks to make the crash path for reliable.

As indicated in the other thread, I think the best direction moving
forwards is to see about positively preventing dom0 having access,
rather than simply hiding the table, but that is a job for another time.

~Andrew

  reply	other threads:[~2015-04-10  9:08 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 9+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2015-04-08 19:44 [PATCH] VTd/dmar: Tweak how the DMAR table is clobbered Andrew Cooper
2015-04-09  8:51 ` David Vrabel
2015-04-09  9:48   ` Andrew Cooper
2015-04-10  1:23 ` Tian, Kevin
2015-04-10  9:08   ` Andrew Cooper [this message]
2015-04-14  7:50     ` Jan Beulich
2015-04-14  9:09       ` Andrew Cooper
2015-04-16 16:44         ` Tian, Kevin
2015-04-17  6:32           ` Jan Beulich

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