From: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
To: Rafal Krypa <r.krypa@samsung.com>
Cc: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>,
"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 2/2 v2] Smack: allow multiple labels in onlycap
Date: Tue, 02 Jun 2015 12:01:26 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <556DFD86.9080006@schaufler-ca.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1433237028-8336-1-git-send-email-r.krypa@samsung.com>
On 6/2/2015 2:23 AM, Rafal Krypa wrote:
> Smack onlycap allows limiting of CAP_MAC_ADMIN and CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE to
> processes running with the configured label. But having single privileged
> label is not enough in some real use cases. On a complex system like Tizen,
> there maybe few programs that need to configure Smack policy in run-time
> and running them all with a single label is not always practical.
> This patch extends onlycap feature for multiple labels. They are configured
> in the same smackfs "onlycap" interface, separated by spaces.
>
> Signed-off-by: Rafal Krypa <r.krypa@samsung.com>
Applied to https://github.com/cschaufler/smack-next.git#smack-for-4.2-stacked
> ---
> Documentation/security/Smack.txt | 6 +-
> security/smack/smack.h | 25 +++---
> security/smack/smack_access.c | 41 ++++++++++
> security/smack/smackfs.c | 163 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------
> 4 files changed, 163 insertions(+), 72 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/Documentation/security/Smack.txt b/Documentation/security/Smack.txt
> index abc82f8..de5e1ae 100644
> --- a/Documentation/security/Smack.txt
> +++ b/Documentation/security/Smack.txt
> @@ -206,11 +206,11 @@ netlabel
> label. The format accepted on write is:
> "%d.%d.%d.%d label" or "%d.%d.%d.%d/%d label".
> onlycap
> - This contains the label processes must have for CAP_MAC_ADMIN
> + This contains labels processes must have for CAP_MAC_ADMIN
> and CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE to be effective. If this file is empty
> these capabilities are effective at for processes with any
> - label. The value is set by writing the desired label to the
> - file or cleared by writing "-" to the file.
> + label. The values are set by writing the desired labels, separated
> + by spaces, to the file or cleared by writing "-" to the file.
> ptrace
> This is used to define the current ptrace policy
> 0 - default: this is the policy that relies on Smack access rules.
> diff --git a/security/smack/smack.h b/security/smack/smack.h
> index b8c1a86..244e035 100644
> --- a/security/smack/smack.h
> +++ b/security/smack/smack.h
> @@ -138,6 +138,11 @@ struct smk_port_label {
> struct smack_known *smk_out; /* outgoing label */
> };
>
> +struct smack_onlycap {
> + struct list_head list;
> + struct smack_known *smk_label;
> +};
> +
> /*
> * Mount options
> */
> @@ -249,6 +254,7 @@ int smk_netlbl_mls(int, char *, struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *, int);
> struct smack_known *smk_import_entry(const char *, int);
> void smk_insert_entry(struct smack_known *skp);
> struct smack_known *smk_find_entry(const char *);
> +int smack_privileged(int cap);
>
> /*
> * Shared data.
> @@ -257,7 +263,6 @@ extern int smack_enabled;
> extern int smack_cipso_direct;
> extern int smack_cipso_mapped;
> extern struct smack_known *smack_net_ambient;
> -extern struct smack_known *smack_onlycap;
> extern struct smack_known *smack_syslog_label;
> #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_BRINGUP
> extern struct smack_known *smack_unconfined;
> @@ -276,6 +281,9 @@ extern struct mutex smack_known_lock;
> extern struct list_head smack_known_list;
> extern struct list_head smk_netlbladdr_list;
>
> +extern struct mutex smack_onlycap_lock;
> +extern struct list_head smack_onlycap_list;
> +
> #define SMACK_HASH_SLOTS 16
> extern struct hlist_head smack_known_hash[SMACK_HASH_SLOTS];
>
> @@ -332,21 +340,6 @@ static inline struct smack_known *smk_of_current(void)
> }
>
> /*
> - * Is the task privileged and allowed to be privileged
> - * by the onlycap rule.
> - */
> -static inline int smack_privileged(int cap)
> -{
> - struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_current();
> -
> - if (!capable(cap))
> - return 0;
> - if (smack_onlycap == NULL || smack_onlycap == skp)
> - return 1;
> - return 0;
> -}
> -
> -/*
> * logging functions
> */
> #define SMACK_AUDIT_DENIED 0x1
> diff --git a/security/smack/smack_access.c b/security/smack/smack_access.c
> index 408e20b..00f6b38 100644
> --- a/security/smack/smack_access.c
> +++ b/security/smack/smack_access.c
> @@ -617,3 +617,44 @@ struct smack_known *smack_from_secid(const u32 secid)
> rcu_read_unlock();
> return &smack_known_invalid;
> }
> +
> +/*
> + * Unless a process is running with one of these labels
> + * even having CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE isn't enough to grant
> + * privilege to violate MAC policy. If no labels are
> + * designated (the empty list case) capabilities apply to
> + * everyone.
> + */
> +LIST_HEAD(smack_onlycap_list);
> +DEFINE_MUTEX(smack_onlycap_lock);
> +
> +/*
> + * Is the task privileged and allowed to be privileged
> + * by the onlycap rule.
> + *
> + * Returns 1 if the task is allowed to be privileged, 0 if it's not.
> + */
> +int smack_privileged(int cap)
> +{
> + struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_current();
> + struct smack_onlycap *sop;
> +
> + if (!capable(cap))
> + return 0;
> +
> + rcu_read_lock();
> + if (list_empty(&smack_onlycap_list)) {
> + rcu_read_unlock();
> + return 1;
> + }
> +
> + list_for_each_entry_rcu(sop, &smack_onlycap_list, list) {
> + if (sop->smk_label == skp) {
> + rcu_read_unlock();
> + return 1;
> + }
> + }
> + rcu_read_unlock();
> +
> + return 0;
> +}
> diff --git a/security/smack/smackfs.c b/security/smack/smackfs.c
> index e40dc48..f1c22a8 100644
> --- a/security/smack/smackfs.c
> +++ b/security/smack/smackfs.c
> @@ -87,16 +87,6 @@ int smack_cipso_direct = SMACK_CIPSO_DIRECT_DEFAULT;
> */
> int smack_cipso_mapped = SMACK_CIPSO_MAPPED_DEFAULT;
>
> -/*
> - * Unless a process is running with this label even
> - * having CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE isn't enough to grant
> - * privilege to violate MAC policy. If no label is
> - * designated (the NULL case) capabilities apply to
> - * everyone. It is expected that the hat (^) label
> - * will be used if any label is used.
> - */
> -struct smack_known *smack_onlycap;
> -
> #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_BRINGUP
> /*
> * Allow one label to be unconfined. This is for
> @@ -1636,34 +1626,79 @@ static const struct file_operations smk_ambient_ops = {
> .llseek = default_llseek,
> };
>
> -/**
> - * smk_read_onlycap - read() for smackfs/onlycap
> - * @filp: file pointer, not actually used
> - * @buf: where to put the result
> - * @cn: maximum to send along
> - * @ppos: where to start
> - *
> - * Returns number of bytes read or error code, as appropriate
> +/*
> + * Seq_file operations for /smack/onlycap
> */
> -static ssize_t smk_read_onlycap(struct file *filp, char __user *buf,
> - size_t cn, loff_t *ppos)
> +static void *onlycap_seq_start(struct seq_file *s, loff_t *pos)
> {
> - char *smack = "";
> - ssize_t rc = -EINVAL;
> - int asize;
> + return smk_seq_start(s, pos, &smack_onlycap_list);
> +}
>
> - if (*ppos != 0)
> - return 0;
> +static void *onlycap_seq_next(struct seq_file *s, void *v, loff_t *pos)
> +{
> + return smk_seq_next(s, v, pos, &smack_onlycap_list);
> +}
>
> - if (smack_onlycap != NULL)
> - smack = smack_onlycap->smk_known;
> +static int onlycap_seq_show(struct seq_file *s, void *v)
> +{
> + struct list_head *list = v;
> + struct smack_onlycap *sop =
> + list_entry_rcu(list, struct smack_onlycap, list);
>
> - asize = strlen(smack) + 1;
> + seq_puts(s, sop->smk_label->smk_known);
> + seq_putc(s, ' ');
>
> - if (cn >= asize)
> - rc = simple_read_from_buffer(buf, cn, ppos, smack, asize);
> + return 0;
> +}
>
> - return rc;
> +static const struct seq_operations onlycap_seq_ops = {
> + .start = onlycap_seq_start,
> + .next = onlycap_seq_next,
> + .show = onlycap_seq_show,
> + .stop = smk_seq_stop,
> +};
> +
> +static int smk_open_onlycap(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
> +{
> + return seq_open(file, &onlycap_seq_ops);
> +}
> +
> +/**
> + * smk_list_swap_rcu - swap public list with a private one in RCU-safe way
> + * The caller must hold appropriate mutex to prevent concurrent modifications
> + * to the public list.
> + * Private list is assumed to be not accessible to other threads yet.
> + *
> + * @public: public list
> + * @private: private list
> + */
> +static void smk_list_swap_rcu(struct list_head *public,
> + struct list_head *private)
> +{
> + struct list_head *first, *last;
> +
> + if (list_empty(public)) {
> + list_splice_init_rcu(private, public, synchronize_rcu);
> + } else {
> + /* Remember public list before replacing it */
> + first = public->next;
> + last = public->prev;
> +
> + /* Publish private list in place of public in RCU-safe way */
> + private->prev->next = public;
> + private->next->prev = public;
> + rcu_assign_pointer(public->next, private->next);
> + public->prev = private->prev;
> +
> + synchronize_rcu();
> +
> + /* When all readers are done with the old public list,
> + * attach it in place of private */
> + private->next = first;
> + private->prev = last;
> + first->prev = private;
> + last->next = private;
> + }
> }
>
> /**
> @@ -1679,28 +1714,47 @@ static ssize_t smk_write_onlycap(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
> size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
> {
> char *data;
> - struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_task(current->cred->security);
> + char *data_parse;
> + char *tok;
> + struct smack_known *skp;
> + struct smack_onlycap *sop;
> + struct smack_onlycap *sop2;
> + LIST_HEAD(list_tmp);
> int rc = count;
>
> if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
> return -EPERM;
>
> - /*
> - * This can be done using smk_access() but is done
> - * explicitly for clarity. The smk_access() implementation
> - * would use smk_access(smack_onlycap, MAY_WRITE)
> - */
> - if (smack_onlycap != NULL && smack_onlycap != skp)
> - return -EPERM;
> -
> data = kzalloc(count + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
> if (data == NULL)
> return -ENOMEM;
>
> if (copy_from_user(data, buf, count) != 0) {
> - rc = -EFAULT;
> - goto freeout;
> + kfree(data);
> + return -EFAULT;
> + }
> +
> + data_parse = data;
> + while ((tok = strsep(&data_parse, " ")) != NULL) {
> + if (!*tok)
> + continue;
> +
> + skp = smk_import_entry(tok, 0);
> + if (IS_ERR(skp)) {
> + rc = PTR_ERR(skp);
> + break;
> + }
> +
> + sop = kzalloc(sizeof(*sop), GFP_KERNEL);
> + if (sop == NULL) {
> + rc = -ENOMEM;
> + break;
> + }
> +
> + sop->smk_label = skp;
> + list_add_rcu(&sop->list, &list_tmp);
> }
> + kfree(data);
>
> /*
> * Clear the smack_onlycap on invalid label errors. This means
> @@ -1710,26 +1764,29 @@ static ssize_t smk_write_onlycap(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
> * so "-usecapabilities" will also work.
> *
> * But do so only on invalid label, not on system errors.
> + * The invalid label must be first to count as clearing attempt.
> */
> - skp = smk_import_entry(data, count);
> - if (PTR_ERR(skp) == -EINVAL)
> - skp = NULL;
> - else if (IS_ERR(skp)) {
> - rc = PTR_ERR(skp);
> - goto freeout;
> + if (rc == -EINVAL && list_empty(&list_tmp))
> + rc = count;
> +
> + if (rc >= 0) {
> + mutex_lock(&smack_onlycap_lock);
> + smk_list_swap_rcu(&smack_onlycap_list, &list_tmp);
> + mutex_unlock(&smack_onlycap_lock);
> }
>
> - smack_onlycap = skp;
> + list_for_each_entry_safe(sop, sop2, &list_tmp, list)
> + kfree(sop);
>
> -freeout:
> - kfree(data);
> return rc;
> }
>
> static const struct file_operations smk_onlycap_ops = {
> - .read = smk_read_onlycap,
> + .open = smk_open_onlycap,
> + .read = seq_read,
> .write = smk_write_onlycap,
> - .llseek = default_llseek,
> + .llseek = seq_lseek,
> + .release = seq_release,
> };
>
> #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_BRINGUP
prev parent reply other threads:[~2015-06-02 19:01 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 7+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2015-05-21 16:24 [PATCH 0/2] Smack: allow multiple labels in onlycap Rafal Krypa
2015-05-21 16:24 ` [PATCH 1/2] Smack: fix seq operations in smackfs Rafal Krypa
2015-06-02 18:59 ` Casey Schaufler
2015-05-21 16:24 ` [PATCH 2/2] Smack: allow multiple labels in onlycap Rafal Krypa
2015-05-26 1:04 ` Casey Schaufler
2015-06-02 9:23 ` [PATCH 2/2 v2] " Rafal Krypa
2015-06-02 19:01 ` Casey Schaufler [this message]
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