From: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
To: "Lengyel, Tamas" <tlengyel@novetta.com>,
Razvan Cojocaru <rcojocaru@bitdefender.com>
Cc: stefano.stabellini@citrix.com, keir@xen.org,
Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>,
Jan Beulich <JBeulich@suse.com>,
Xen-devel <xen-devel@lists.xen.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2] x86/vm_event: toggle singlestep from vm_event response
Date: Mon, 6 Jul 2015 18:17:47 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <559AB83B.4030907@citrix.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAD33N+6AuOxYttvutSy_d3iPh82wEtsJR7yara3BAS95m=F7fw@mail.gmail.com>
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On 06/07/15 18:08, Lengyel, Tamas wrote:
>
> Having said that (and with the understading that it is beyond the
> scope
> of this patch), a way to validate things like these is a good idea. I
> wonder if, in a future patch, we could not have ./configure detect
> these
> things and simply disable the relevant VM_EVENT_FLAG constants with
> #if(n)defs, for example. That way, you wouldn't be able to compile
> code
> that wouldn't work silently on platforms where that is the case.
>
>
> It would be something worth investigating, definitely.
It would be mad to conditionally compile out code based on the features
or lackthereof of the build machine.
For bits like this, there must be active negotiation between userspace
and the running hypervisor to see what it can support. Imagine if the
user disabled the monitor trap feature in the BIOS? Userspace cannot
possibly assume that because it is running on Intel, that the feature is
present and usable.
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2015-07-06 17:17 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 18+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2015-06-30 14:11 [PATCH v2] x86/vm_event: toggle singlestep from vm_event response Tamas K Lengyel
2015-06-30 14:18 ` Andrew Cooper
2015-06-30 14:40 ` Lengyel, Tamas
2015-07-06 15:26 ` Jan Beulich
2015-07-06 15:35 ` Lengyel, Tamas
2015-07-06 15:54 ` Jan Beulich
2015-07-06 16:26 ` Lengyel, Tamas
2015-07-06 17:03 ` Razvan Cojocaru
2015-07-06 17:08 ` Lengyel, Tamas
2015-07-06 17:17 ` Andrew Cooper [this message]
2015-07-06 17:29 ` Razvan Cojocaru
2015-07-06 17:36 ` Lengyel, Tamas
2015-07-06 17:45 ` Andrew Cooper
2015-07-06 17:44 ` Andrew Cooper
2015-07-07 6:20 ` Jan Beulich
2015-07-07 6:26 ` Razvan Cojocaru
2015-07-07 9:27 ` Jan Beulich
2015-07-07 11:56 ` Lengyel, Tamas
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