Trustzone: DSB before/after SMC

[slash.tmp@free.fr (Mason)]

On 27/10/2015 15:37, Mark Rutland wrote:
> On Tue, Oct 27, 2015 at 03:05:46PM +0100, Mason wrote:
>> On 27/10/2015 14:43, Mark Rutland wrote:
>>
>>> On Tue, Oct 27, 2015 at 02:31:38PM +0100, Mason wrote:
>>>
>>>> I have a few questions about SMC. (I'm using Cortex-A9)
>>>>
>>>> Platforms that use SMC often/always execute DSB beforehand.
>>>
>>> Please give an example. We don't do this for PSCI, for instance.
>>
>> arch/arm/mach-exynos/exynos-smc.S
>> arch/arm/mach-highbank/smc.S
>> arch/arm/mach-omap2/omap-smc.S
> 
> From a quick look, it's not obvious to me why those DSBs are present. It
> would be best to ask the original authors; it may simply be that this
> was never necessary and has simply been copied.
> 
> In particular, the DSB; DMB; SMC sequence in omap_smc2 makes no sense to
> me, given that a DSB provides a superset of the guarantees of a DMB. If
> the DSB is necessary I don't see that the DMB would also be necessary.

I agree the DSB; DMB; SMC sequence looks fishy.

It also shows up there:
http://genode.org/documentation/articles/trustzone

>> A few that don't execute DSB before SMC:
>> arch/arm/mach-bcm/bcm_kona_smc.c
>> arch/arm/mach-keystone/smc.S
>>
>>>> 1a) Is DSB required before SMC?
>>>> 1b) Is DSB required  after SMC?
>>>> 2a) Is DSB required before returning to non-secure OS?
>>>> 2b) Is DSB required  after returning to non-secure OS?
>>>
>>> It depends on what you're trying to achieve, and the design of both the
>>> secure and non-secure OS code.
>>
>> In my case, I just want to write the L2_CONTROL register.
> 
> Is that a register in the L2, or in the CPU? Which L2/CPU?

Sorry for being so sloppy.
L2C-310 reg1_control (offset 0x100) connected to Cortex-A9 MPCore.

> There may be a constraint that the memory system needs to be quiescent
> or something to that effect. Without more information I cannot say what
> specifically you need to do.
> 
>>> A DSB is certainly not always required before nor after an SMC.
>>
>> That makes sense. But a colleague mentioned that the secure OS may
>> be using different MMU mappings. In that case, it might be required
>> to wait for all in-flight accesses to resolve?
> 
> Are you referring to differing VAs or differing attributes?
> 
> For ARMv6 and above the former does not matter; the caches behaves as if
> they are PIPT.
> 
> The latter may require the use of barriers and/or cache maintenance if
> the secure and non-secure OSs are communicating through shared memory.
> That's somewhat independent of the SMC itself.

AFAICT, the two OSes only communicate through registers.

I think DSB is unnecessary. But I'm not confident enough to remove it.
(It might not matter, since that function is called very rarely.)

Regards.