From: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
To: Julien Grall <julien.grall@citrix.com>,
Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>, Tim Deegan <tim@xen.org>
Cc: xen-devel <xen-devel@lists.xen.org>,
Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>,
Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@eu.citrix.com>
Subject: Re: Fwd: Question regarding the behavior of guest_physmap_remove_page on x86
Date: Tue, 17 Nov 2015 18:47:19 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <564B7637.3040804@citrix.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <564B6D4D.8080004@citrix.com>
On 17/11/15 18:09, Julien Grall wrote:
> (Resending with this time xen-devel in CC)
>
> Hi,
>
> On ARM, it's possible to fail when removing a page from the P2M. It's
> happening if we are trying to shatter a superpage and we don't have
> memory to allocate the table. Therefore the mapping won't be removed
> from the P2M.
>
> However on ARM (and until recently on x86 [1]), the function
> guest_physmap_remove_page is not supposed to return an error. So we
> would free the page even if we fail to remove the page. This will end up
> to re-use the page by someone else even though the mapping is still
> present in the P2M.
>
> I looked to the x86 version and I'm not sure how the function is
> behaving. Maybe an x86 maintainers could give me insight here.
>
> I'm thinking to fix the problem by checking the return of
> guest_physmap_remove_page to avoid the page being reallocate to someone
> else (see for instance guest_remove_page in xen/common/memory.c). Is it
> a sensible way to fix it?
x86 can just as easily fail because of a failure to shatter a superpage.
Despite the below changeset, none of the callee's were updated to
actually act upon the error.
As a result, the same issue affects x86, in principle.
Does ARM have a shadow pool? On x86, we arrange that the shadow pool
(should be) large enough so that we never actually encounter an
out-of-memory when shattering a superpage.
I also observe that there is a latent bug with iommu_unmap_page() (which
is part of guest_physmap_remove_page()) as (almost) nothing checks its
return value. Currently all (x86) callpaths either return success, or
crash the domain.
Looking at other codepaths, other possible errors (other than -ENOMEM
from shattering) are:
if ( unlikely(p2m_is_foreign(p2mt)) )
{
/* pvh fixme: foreign types are only supported on ept at present */
gdprintk(XENLOG_WARNING, "Unimplemented foreign p2m type.\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
or:
if ( !(p2m_entry = p2m_find_entry(*table, gfn_remainder, gfn,
shift, max)) )
return -ENOENT;
All this code looks quite rotten through, and is in some serious need of
some error handling hygiene.
I would not be surprised if some correctness issues are lurking in here.
~Andrew
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2015-11-17 18:47 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 3+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
[not found] <564B6C56.8080501@citrix.com>
2015-11-17 18:09 ` Fwd: Question regarding the behavior of guest_physmap_remove_page on x86 Julien Grall
2015-11-17 18:47 ` Andrew Cooper [this message]
2015-11-18 16:16 ` Julien Grall
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