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From: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
To: Jann Horn <jann@thejh.net>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	Kees Cook <keescook@google.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
	James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>,
	"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>,
	Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
	Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
	"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
	Joe Perches <joe@perches.com>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-api@vger.kernel.org,
	security@kernel.org, Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/2] security: let security modules use PTRACE_MODE_* with bitmasks
Date: Mon, 7 Dec 2015 13:51:50 -0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <5665FF76.5090701@schaufler-ca.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1449523512-29200-2-git-send-email-jann@thejh.net>

On 12/7/2015 1:25 PM, Jann Horn wrote:
> It looks like smack and yama weren't aware that the ptrace mode
> can have flags ORed into it - PTRACE_MODE_NOAUDIT until now, but
> only for /proc/$pid/stat, and with the PTRACE_MODE_*CREDS patch,
> all modes have flags ORed into them.
>
> Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jann@thejh.net>

Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>

> ---
>   security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 8 +++-----
>   security/yama/yama_lsm.c   | 4 ++--
>   2 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
> index ff81026..7c57c7f 100644
> --- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
> +++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
> @@ -398,12 +398,10 @@ static int smk_copy_relabel(struct list_head *nhead, struct list_head *ohead,
>    */
>   static inline unsigned int smk_ptrace_mode(unsigned int mode)
>   {
> -	switch (mode) {
> -	case PTRACE_MODE_READ:
> -		return MAY_READ;
> -	case PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH:
> +	if (mode & PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH)
>   		return MAY_READWRITE;
> -	}
> +	if (mode & PTRACE_MODE_READ)
> +		return MAY_READ;
>   
>   	return 0;
>   }
> diff --git a/security/yama/yama_lsm.c b/security/yama/yama_lsm.c
> index d3c19c9..cb6ed10 100644
> --- a/security/yama/yama_lsm.c
> +++ b/security/yama/yama_lsm.c
> @@ -281,7 +281,7 @@ static int yama_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child,
>   	int rc = 0;
>   
>   	/* require ptrace target be a child of ptracer on attach */
> -	if (mode == PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH) {
> +	if (mode & PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH) {
>   		switch (ptrace_scope) {
>   		case YAMA_SCOPE_DISABLED:
>   			/* No additional restrictions. */
> @@ -307,7 +307,7 @@ static int yama_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child,
>   		}
>   	}
>   
> -	if (rc) {
> +	if (rc && (mode & PTRACE_MODE_NOAUDIT) == 0) {
>   		printk_ratelimited(KERN_NOTICE
>   			"ptrace of pid %d was attempted by: %s (pid %d)\n",
>   			child->pid, current->comm, current->pid);

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WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
To: Jann Horn <jann@thejh.net>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	Kees Cook <keescook@google.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
	James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>,
	"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>,
	Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
	Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
	"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
	Joe Perches <joe@perches.com>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-api@vger.kernel.org,
	security@kernel.org, Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/2] security: let security modules use PTRACE_MODE_* with bitmasks
Date: Mon, 7 Dec 2015 13:51:50 -0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <5665FF76.5090701@schaufler-ca.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1449523512-29200-2-git-send-email-jann@thejh.net>

On 12/7/2015 1:25 PM, Jann Horn wrote:
> It looks like smack and yama weren't aware that the ptrace mode
> can have flags ORed into it - PTRACE_MODE_NOAUDIT until now, but
> only for /proc/$pid/stat, and with the PTRACE_MODE_*CREDS patch,
> all modes have flags ORed into them.
>
> Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jann@thejh.net>

Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>

> ---
>   security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 8 +++-----
>   security/yama/yama_lsm.c   | 4 ++--
>   2 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
> index ff81026..7c57c7f 100644
> --- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
> +++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
> @@ -398,12 +398,10 @@ static int smk_copy_relabel(struct list_head *nhead, struct list_head *ohead,
>    */
>   static inline unsigned int smk_ptrace_mode(unsigned int mode)
>   {
> -	switch (mode) {
> -	case PTRACE_MODE_READ:
> -		return MAY_READ;
> -	case PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH:
> +	if (mode & PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH)
>   		return MAY_READWRITE;
> -	}
> +	if (mode & PTRACE_MODE_READ)
> +		return MAY_READ;
>   
>   	return 0;
>   }
> diff --git a/security/yama/yama_lsm.c b/security/yama/yama_lsm.c
> index d3c19c9..cb6ed10 100644
> --- a/security/yama/yama_lsm.c
> +++ b/security/yama/yama_lsm.c
> @@ -281,7 +281,7 @@ static int yama_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child,
>   	int rc = 0;
>   
>   	/* require ptrace target be a child of ptracer on attach */
> -	if (mode == PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH) {
> +	if (mode & PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH) {
>   		switch (ptrace_scope) {
>   		case YAMA_SCOPE_DISABLED:
>   			/* No additional restrictions. */
> @@ -307,7 +307,7 @@ static int yama_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child,
>   		}
>   	}
>   
> -	if (rc) {
> +	if (rc && (mode & PTRACE_MODE_NOAUDIT) == 0) {
>   		printk_ratelimited(KERN_NOTICE
>   			"ptrace of pid %d was attempted by: %s (pid %d)\n",
>   			child->pid, current->comm, current->pid);


  parent reply	other threads:[~2015-12-07 21:51 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 29+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2015-11-08 12:08 [PATCH] ptrace: use fsuid, fsgid, effective creds for fs access checks Jann Horn
2015-11-08 12:08 ` Jann Horn
2015-11-09 20:55 ` Andrew Morton
2015-11-09 20:55   ` Andrew Morton
2015-11-09 21:06   ` Willy Tarreau
2015-11-09 21:06     ` Willy Tarreau
     [not found]   ` <20151109125554.43e6a711e59d1b8bf99cdeb1-de/tnXTf+JLsfHDXvbKv3WD2FQJk+8+b@public.gmane.org>
2015-11-09 21:12     ` Jann Horn
2015-11-09 21:12       ` Jann Horn
2015-11-09 21:19       ` Andrew Morton
2015-11-09 21:19         ` Andrew Morton
     [not found]         ` <20151109131902.db961a5fe7b7fcbeb14f72fc-de/tnXTf+JLsfHDXvbKv3WD2FQJk+8+b@public.gmane.org>
2015-12-06  2:04           ` Jann Horn
2015-12-06  2:04             ` Jann Horn
2015-12-06  2:04             ` Jann Horn
2015-12-07 20:32             ` Kees Cook
2015-12-07 20:32               ` Kees Cook
     [not found]               ` <CAGXu5jJKOnWWSuLO5zWZ9=7Nhv0hWvJ0wEVJ3n+URY7-q_BCJw-JsoAwUIsXosN+BqQ9rBEUg@public.gmane.org>
2015-12-07 20:38                 ` Jann Horn
2015-12-07 20:38                   ` Jann Horn
2015-12-07 21:25                   ` Jann Horn
2015-12-07 21:25                     ` Jann Horn
2015-12-07 21:25                     ` [PATCH 1/2] security: let security modules use PTRACE_MODE_* with bitmasks Jann Horn
2015-12-07 21:25                       ` Jann Horn
2015-12-07 21:30                       ` Kees Cook
2015-12-07 21:30                         ` Kees Cook
2015-12-07 21:51                       ` Casey Schaufler [this message]
2015-12-07 21:51                         ` Casey Schaufler
2015-12-07 21:25                     ` [PATCH 2/2] ptrace: use fsuid, fsgid, effective creds for fs access checks Jann Horn
2015-12-07 21:25                       ` Jann Horn
2015-12-07 21:27                       ` Kees Cook
2015-12-07 21:27                         ` Kees Cook

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