From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from vwp7940.webpack.hosteurope.de ([178.77.87.119]:46026 "EHLO vwp7940.webpack.hosteurope.de" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1754546AbbLLBe5 (ORCPT ); Fri, 11 Dec 2015 20:34:57 -0500 Message-ID: <566B79BC.30104@anonym.com> Date: Sat, 12 Dec 2015 02:34:52 +0100 From: "S.J." MIME-Version: 1.0 To: Btrfs BTRFS Subject: Re: attacking btrfs filesystems via UUID collisions? References: <20151204120529.37E47D5A28@emkei.cz> <20151204130758.GR8775@carfax.org.uk> <1449286104.18841.14.camel@scientia.net> <1449366680.3183.37.camel@scientia.net> <56644785.4090702@gmx.com> <1449639588.7835.2.camel@scientia.net> <5668A1CB.1020007@anonym.com> <1449872498.31388.74.camel@fo> In-Reply-To: Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8; format=flowed Sender: linux-btrfs-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: A bit more about the dd-is-bad-topic: IMHO it doesn't matter at all. a) For this specific problem here, fixing a security problem automatically fixes the risk of data corruption because careless cloning+mounting (without UUID adjustments) too. So, if the user likes to use dd with its disadvantages, like waiting hours to copy lots of free space, and bad practice, etc.etc., why should it concern the Btrfs developers and/or us here? b) At wider scope; while Btrfs is more complex than Xfs etc., currently there is no other reason why things could go bad when dd'ing something. As long as this holds, is there really a place in the official Btrfs documentation for telling the users "dd is bad [practice]"? ...