From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from mail-wm0-x22b.google.com (mail-wm0-x22b.google.com [IPv6:2a00:1450:400c:c09::22b]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 (128/128 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mail.server123.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS for ; Fri, 5 Feb 2016 16:44:05 +0100 (CET) Received: by mail-wm0-x22b.google.com with SMTP id p63so32107986wmp.1 for ; Fri, 05 Feb 2016 07:44:04 -0800 (PST) Received: from [192.168.2.28] (218.83.broadband9.iol.cz. [90.176.83.218]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id i5sm16408011wja.23.2016.02.05.07.44.03 for (version=TLS1_2 cipher=ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 bits=128/128); Fri, 05 Feb 2016 07:44:03 -0800 (PST) References: <56B20C05.7080307@gmail.com> <1454603376.4241.5.camel@debian.org> <20160204171753.GA20874@tansi.org> <1454653850.3573.2.camel@debian.org> <20160205110232.GD29709@tansi.org> <1454678001.21086.24.camel@debian.org> <20160205133123.GA31320@tansi.org> <1454684474.21086.30.camel@debian.org> <20160205152440.GC32199@tansi.org> From: Milan Broz Message-ID: <56B4C342.1080505@gmail.com> Date: Fri, 5 Feb 2016 16:44:02 +0100 MIME-Version: 1.0 In-Reply-To: <20160205152440.GC32199@tansi.org> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=windows-1252 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Subject: Re: [dm-crypt] The future of disk encryption with LUKS2 List-Id: List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , To: dm-crypt@saout.de On 02/05/2016 04:24 PM, Arno Wagner wrote: > On Fri, Feb 05, 2016 at 16:01:14 CET, Yves-Alexis Perez wrote: >> On ven., 2016-02-05 at 14:31 +0100, Arno Wagner wrote: >>> No. You are trying to solve the wrong problem. First, disk >>> encryption with 1:1 mapping will never give you integrity >>> protection and the other variants kill performance. >> >> I perfectly understand that, thank you. Again, I'm *well aware* of the need to >> store integrity patterns somewhere. I'm *not* asking for 1:1 mapping. >> >> Can I sincerely ask that you not consider at first (and second, and third) >> that I didn't think first about what I was asking on the list? > > Then why are you asking about integrity protection on a list > dedicated to a block-layer encryption system? That does not make > any sense. If you state things that do not make sense then I > will point that out, because there is a real possibility that > your reasoning process (I am not implying there was none) was > flawed. I think it is perfectly fine to ask there (please do not forget we are still closely cooperating with storage guys). And by the way, we have a experimental plan to test authenticated encryption on this level (obviously part of that is to solve additional metadata space). (Even if it is not usable in the end I would like to try that.) The reply/revert attack possibility without support of specific hw will be still there but I would say even if we can provide method how to detect random corruption of sectors it could be useful. Milan