From: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com>
To: Jan Beulich <JBeulich@suse.com>
Cc: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>,
xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org
Subject: Re: [PATCHv3 1/3] x86/fpu: improve check for XSAVE* not writing FIP/FDP fields
Date: Thu, 25 Feb 2016 12:18:56 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <56CEF130.4090302@citrix.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <56CEF45A02000078000D61C4@prv-mh.provo.novell.com>
On 25/02/16 11:32, Jan Beulich wrote:
>>>> On 25.02.16 at 11:58, <david.vrabel@citrix.com> wrote:
>> The hardware may not write the FIP/FDP fields with a XSAVE*
>> instruction. e.g., with XSAVEOPT/XSAVES if the state hasn't changed
>> or on AMD CPUs when a floating point exception is not pending. We
>> need to identify this case so we can correctly apply the check for
>> whether to save/restore FCS/FDS.
>>
>> By poisoning FIP in the saved state we can check if the hardware
>> writes to this field. The poison value is both: a) non-canonical; and
>> b) random with a vanishingly small probability of matching a value
>> written by the hardware (1 / (2^63) = 10^-19).
>
> The hardware by itself will always write a canonical value with
> the 64-bit save variants. The case to consider really is, as said
> before, that of software storing an arbitrary value there, and
> for that case I don't think a how ever small probability would
> make my concerns go away (or else I would have suggested
> this variation of your previous approach during v2 review).
Do you not appreciate how unlikely 10^-19 is?
Assuming a context switch every 1 ms the probability of a error in a
year is 3e-9.
The probability of a dinosaur killing asteroid strike in a year is about
2e-8.
I know which one I'd be worried about...
>> The poison value is fixed and thus knowable by a guest (or guest
>> userspace). This could allow the guest to cause Xen to incorrectly
>> detect that the field has not been written. But: a) this requires the
>> FIP register to be a full 64 bits internally which is not the case for
>> all current AMD and Intel CPUs; and b) this only allows the guest (or
>> a guest userspace process) to corrupt its own state (i.e., it cannot
>> affect the state of another guest or another user space process).
>>
>> This results in smaller code with fewer branches and is more
>> understandable.
>>
>> Signed-off-by: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com>
>
> Pending confirmation on FIP register width by at least Intel,
> Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
For Intel CPUs, FIP is 48-bits internally and newer CPUs have FPCSDS and
thus we will always use the 64-bit save.
For AMD, which only writes FIP and FDP if an exception is pending, if a
guest wanted to use FIP to store an arbitrary 64-bit value (in some
future CPU) it would have to manually set an exception as pending. Its
seems implausible that any software would actually do this.
David
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2016-02-25 12:19 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 17+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2016-02-25 10:58 [PATCHv3 0/3] x86: workaround inability to fully restore FPU state David Vrabel
2016-02-25 10:58 ` [PATCHv3 1/3] x86/fpu: improve check for XSAVE* not writing FIP/FDP fields David Vrabel
2016-02-25 11:32 ` Jan Beulich
2016-02-25 12:18 ` David Vrabel [this message]
2016-02-25 12:27 ` Jan Beulich
2016-02-25 12:49 ` David Vrabel
2016-02-25 13:16 ` Andrew Cooper
2016-02-25 14:27 ` Jan Beulich
2016-02-25 15:07 ` Andrew Cooper
2016-02-25 15:09 ` David Vrabel
2016-03-01 6:27 ` Tian, Kevin
2016-03-01 9:31 ` Jan Beulich
2016-02-25 10:58 ` [PATCHv3 2/3] x86/fpu: Add a per-domain field to set the width of FIP/FDP David Vrabel
2016-02-25 11:24 ` Jan Beulich
2016-02-25 11:38 ` David Vrabel
2016-02-25 11:55 ` Jan Beulich
2016-02-25 10:58 ` [PATCHv3 3/3] x86/hvm: add HVM_PARAM_X87_FIP_WIDTH David Vrabel
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