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From: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
To: Huaitong Han <huaitong.han@intel.com>, gleb@kernel.org
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org, guangrong.xiao@linux.intel.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH V5 6/9] KVM, pkeys: add pkeys support for permission_fault logic
Date: Mon, 21 Mar 2016 11:55:33 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <56EFD325.7010903@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1458554760-4374-7-git-send-email-huaitong.han@intel.com>



On 21/03/2016 11:05, Huaitong Han wrote:
>  static inline u8 permission_fault(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_mmu *mmu,
> -				  unsigned pte_access, unsigned pfec)
> +				  unsigned pte_access, unsigned pte_pkey,
> +				  unsigned pfec)
>  {
>  	int cpl = kvm_x86_ops->get_cpl(vcpu);
>  	unsigned long rflags = kvm_x86_ops->get_rflags(vcpu);
> +	unsigned long smap = (cpl - 3) & (rflags & X86_EFLAGS_AC);
> +	int index = (pfec >> 1) +
> +		    (smap >> (X86_EFLAGS_AC_BIT - PFERR_RSVD_BIT + 1));
> +
> +	if (unlikely(mmu->pkru_mask)) {
> +		u32 pkru_bits, offset;
> +
> +		WARN_ON(pfec & (PFERR_PK_MASK | PFERR_RSVD_MASK));
> +
> +		/*
> +		* PKRU defines 32 bits, there are 16 domains and 2
> +		* attribute bits per domain in pkru, pkey is the
> +		* index to a defined domain, so the value of
> +		* pkey * 2 is offset of a defined domain.
> +		*/
> +		pkru_bits = (kvm_read_pkru(vcpu) >> (pte_pkey * 2)) & 3;
> +		/* replace PFEC.RSVD with ACC_USER_MASK. */
> +		offset = pfec | ((pte_access & PT_USER_MASK) <<
> +			(PFERR_RSVD_BIT - PT_USER_SHIFT));
> +
> +		pkru_bits &= mmu->pkru_mask >> (offset & ~1);
> +		pfec |= -pkru_bits & PFERR_PK_MASK;
> +	}
>  
>  	/*
>  	 * If CPL < 3, SMAP prevention are disabled if EFLAGS.AC = 1.
> @@ -167,14 +192,12 @@ static inline u8 permission_fault(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_mmu *mmu,
>  	 * but it will be one in index if SMAP checks are being overridden.
>  	 * It is important to keep this branchless.
>  	 */
> -	unsigned long smap = (cpl - 3) & (rflags & X86_EFLAGS_AC);
> -	int index = (pfec >> 1) +
> -		    (smap >> (X86_EFLAGS_AC_BIT - PFERR_RSVD_BIT + 1));
>  
>  	WARN_ON(pfec & PFERR_RSVD_MASK);
>  
>  	pfec |= PFERR_PRESENT_MASK;
> -	return -((mmu->permissions[index] >> pte_access) & 1) & pfec;
> +	return -(((pfec >> PFERR_PK_BIT) |
> +		 (mmu->permissions[index] >> pte_access)) & 1) & pfec;
>  }
>  
>  void kvm_mmu_invalidate_zap_all_pages(struct kvm *kvm);

Slightly cleaner:

1) keep WARN_ON together
2) keep smap comment close to smap variable
3) build expression for final return a piece at a time

Does it look good?

Thanks,

Paolo

@@ -149,7 +150,8 @@ static inline bool is_write_protection(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
  * if the access faults.
  */
 static inline u8 permission_fault(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_mmu *mmu,
-				  unsigned pte_access, unsigned pfec)
+				  unsigned pte_access, unsigned pte_pkey,
+				  unsigned pfec)
 {
 	int cpl = kvm_x86_ops->get_cpl(vcpu);
 	unsigned long rflags = kvm_x86_ops->get_rflags(vcpu);
@@ -170,11 +172,32 @@ static inline u8 permission_fault(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_mmu *mmu,
 	unsigned long smap = (cpl - 3) & (rflags & X86_EFLAGS_AC);
 	int index = (pfec >> 1) +
 		    (smap >> (X86_EFLAGS_AC_BIT - PFERR_RSVD_BIT + 1));
+	bool fault = (mmu->permissions[index] >> pte_access) & 1;
 
-	WARN_ON(pfec & PFERR_RSVD_MASK);
-
+	WARN_ON(pfec & (PFERR_PK_MASK | PFERR_RSVD_MASK));
 	pfec |= PFERR_PRESENT_MASK;
-	return -((mmu->permissions[index] >> pte_access) & 1) & pfec;
+
+	if (unlikely(mmu->pkru_mask)) {
+		u32 pkru_bits, offset;
+
+		/*
+		* PKRU defines 32 bits, there are 16 domains and 2
+		* attribute bits per domain in pkru, pkey is the
+		* index to a defined domain, so the value of
+		* pkey * 2 is offset of a defined domain.
+		*/
+		pkru_bits = (kvm_read_pkru(vcpu) >> (pte_pkey * 2)) & 3;
+
+		/* clear present bit, replace PFEC.RSVD with ACC_USER_MASK. */
+		offset = pfec - 1 +
+			((pte_access & PT_USER_MASK) << (PFERR_RSVD_BIT - PT_USER_SHIFT));
+
+		pkru_bits &= mmu->pkru_mask >> offset;
+		pfec |= -pkru_bits & PFERR_PK_MASK;
+		fault |= (pkru_bits != 0);
+	}
+
+	return -(uint32_t)fault & pfec;
 }
 
 void kvm_mmu_invalidate_zap_all_pages(struct kvm *kvm);

  reply	other threads:[~2016-03-21 10:55 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 19+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2016-03-21 10:05 [PATCH V5 0/9] KVM, pkeys: add memory protection-key support Huaitong Han
2016-03-21 10:05 ` [PATCH V5 1/9] KVM, pkeys: disable pkeys for guests in non-paging mode Huaitong Han
2016-03-21 10:05 ` [PATCH V5 2/9] KVM, pkeys: add pkeys support for xsave state Huaitong Han
2016-03-21 10:05 ` [PATCH V5 3/9] x86: pkey: introduce write_pkru() for KVM Huaitong Han
2016-03-21 10:05 ` [PATCH V5 4/9] KVM, pkeys: save/restore PKRU when guest/host switches Huaitong Han
2016-03-21 10:28   ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-03-21 10:37     ` Han, Huaitong
2016-03-21 10:05 ` [PATCH V5 5/9] KVM, pkeys: introduce pkru_mask to cache conditions Huaitong Han
2016-03-21 17:43   ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-03-21 10:05 ` [PATCH V5 6/9] KVM, pkeys: add pkeys support for permission_fault logic Huaitong Han
2016-03-21 10:55   ` Paolo Bonzini [this message]
2016-03-21 12:41     ` Han, Huaitong
2016-03-21 10:05 ` [PATCH V5 7/9] KVM, pkeys: expose CPUID/CR4 to guest Huaitong Han
2016-03-21 11:36   ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-03-21 11:56     ` Han, Huaitong
2016-03-21 12:08       ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-03-21 10:05 ` [PATCH V5 8/9] KVM, pkeys: disable PKU feature without ept Huaitong Han
2016-03-21 11:01   ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-03-21 10:06 ` [PATCH V5 9/9] Revert "KVM: MMU: precompute page fault error code" Huaitong Han

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