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From: Hugh Bragg <hughbragg@dodo.com.au>
To: dm-crypt@saout.de
Subject: Re: [dm-crypt] concurrency
Date: Mon, 28 Mar 2016 03:56:10 +1000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <56F81EBA.9020700@dodo.com.au> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20160327165226.GB16068@yeono.kjorling.se>



On 28/03/2016 2:52 AM, Michael Kjörling wrote:
> On 27 Mar 2016 00:50 +1000, from hughbragg@dodo.com.au (Hugh Bragg):
>> Should I be able to use Luks concurrently on a shared filesystem from
>> different computers?
>> Attempts so far have failed with writes not being seen from the other
>> computer until both computers remount the filesystem or reboot.
> As a thought experiment, try removing LUKS from the equation. For the
> purposes of what you seem to be asking, LUKS is just a part of the
> physical storage layer.
>
> Instead of [unencrypted physical storage device + LUKS container]
> providing the feature "encrypted storage of user-selected data",
> consider the case [self-encrypting physical storage device] which
> provides the same feature "encrypted storage of user-selected data"
> but this time without involving LUKS or dm-crypt.
>
> _Would you expect what you have in mind to work after making that
> single change?_
Yes, in the case of virtualbox storage, if the disk was self encrypting
it would work.
Sounds interesting. Are there any opensource tools that can do this? I
was expecting lvm on luks on a virtual disk to do this, but it failed.
For network shares, this wouldn't be any good. I wouldn't want to store
the key on the cloud server.
> If not, then there is no reason to expect it to suddenly start working
> when you introduce an additional component (LUKS) into the _physical_
> storage stack. And as far as the file system is concerned, LUKS very
> much _is_ a part of the physical storage stack. (There would be
> nothing _architecturally_ weird with a HBA that itself runs LUKS and
> exposes the decrypted container while writing the encrypted data to
> the actual physical storage device. It would come with some fairly
> serious design challenges if one wants to make it secure, however.)
>

      reply	other threads:[~2016-03-27 17:57 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 10+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2016-03-26 14:50 [dm-crypt] concurrency Hugh Bragg
2016-03-26 20:06 ` Arno Wagner
2016-03-27  0:53   ` Hugh Bragg
2016-03-27  4:33     ` Arno Wagner
2016-03-27  8:31       ` Hugh Bragg
2016-03-27 15:49         ` Arno Wagner
2016-03-27 16:30           ` Hugh Bragg
2016-03-27  7:51     ` Milan Broz
2016-03-27 16:52 ` Michael Kjörling
2016-03-27 17:56   ` Hugh Bragg [this message]

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