On 19-08-2026 09:58 am, Raag Jadav wrote:
On Tue, Aug 18, 2026 at 07:06:11PM +0530, Mallesh Koujalagi wrote:
event_string[] has a fixed size of WEDGE_STR_LEN (32) bytes.
The original scnprintf()-based loop required a manual pre-flight
bounds check.

Replace the manual bookkeeping with seq_buf, which tracks overflow
internally. seq_buf_printf() writes each "method," token into the
buffer.

On overflow, len retains the position of the last
successful write, so the trailing comma is stripped cleanly without
including any partial method name in the uevent payload.

Fixes: b7cf9f4ac1b8 ("drm: Introduce device wedged event")
This actually doesn't fix anything, it just adds a WARN() splat.
So I'm not sure if this is needed here.

In previous implementation multiple recovery methods may exceed WEDGE_STR_LEN (32) that

cause silently truncate a recovery method and emit a malformed uevent string containing a 

partial token, however using seq_buf makes overflow

explicit, when it occurs, emits a WARN and include complete recovery name

in the uevent string so IMO, it's fix. 


Signed-off-by: Mallesh Koujalagi <mallesh.koujalagi@intel.com>
Assuming this is tested and there are no regressions.

Reviewed-by: Raag Jadav <raag.jadav@intel.com>

Thanks Raag!

The changes are tested and no regressions were observed in my testing.


Thanks,

-/Mallesh