From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 From: Hal Rosenstock Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v2 00/13] SELinux support for Infiniband RDMA Date: Wed, 13 Apr 2016 01:07:01 -0400 Message-ID: <570DD3F5.2060302@dev.mellanox.co.il> References: <1459985638-37233-1-git-send-email-danielj@mellanox.com> <20160411201155.GC371@obsidianresearch.com> <20160411221210.GA5861@obsidianresearch.com> <20160411231250.GB5861@obsidianresearch.com> <20160412000621.GD5861@obsidianresearch.com> <570C85F7.5010101@dev.mellanox.co.il> <1828884A29C6694DAF28B7E6B8A82373AB040ABA@ORSMSX109.amr.corp.intel.com> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=windows-1252 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Return-path: In-Reply-To: <1828884A29C6694DAF28B7E6B8A82373AB040ABA@ORSMSX109.amr.corp.intel.com> Sender: owner-linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org To: "Hefty, Sean" , Jason Gunthorpe , Daniel Jurgens Cc: "selinux@tycho.nsa.gov" , "linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org" , "linux-rdma@vger.kernel.org" , Yevgeny Petrilin List-Id: linux-rdma@vger.kernel.org On 4/12/2016 1:06 PM, Hefty, Sean wrote: >> Wouldn't QP1 require different access control than QP0 due to SA clients >> on every end node ? > > QP1 still allows modification of the fabric (e.g. multicast join) or an DoS attack against the SA. does > Though the latter probably requires restricting how a UD QP may be used. Former (multicast modifications of fabric) also requires restricting arbitrary UD QPs as well as QP1 as SA access is QPn (n > 0) <-> QP1.