From: Stas Sergeev <stsp@list.ru>
To: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: "linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
X86 ML <x86@kernel.org>, Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>,
Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>, Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>,
Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>,
Stas Sergeev <stsp@users.sourceforge.net>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] [Cleanup] x86: signal: unify the sigaltstack check with other arches
Date: Thu, 14 Apr 2016 01:11:02 +0300 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <570EC3F6.9000407@list.ru> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CALCETrWSr86vBo=Va-t687A1zEszZJZjG350+-2GCOhM-kLuSA@mail.gmail.com>
10.03.2016 03:02, Andy Lutomirski пишет:
> On Tue, Mar 8, 2016 at 8:20 AM, Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> wrote:
>> * Stas Sergeev <stsp@list.ru> wrote:
>>
>>> 25.02.2016 11:25, Ingo Molnar пишет:
>>>> * Stas Sergeev <stsp@list.ru> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> Currently x86's get_sigframe() checks for "current->sas_ss_size"
>>>>> to determine whether there is a need to switch to sigaltstack.
>>>>> The common practice used by all other arches is to check for
>>>>> sas_ss_flags(sp) == 0
>>>>>
>>>>> This patch makes the code consistent with other arches.
>>>>> The slight complexity of the patch is added by the optimization on
>>>>> !sigstack check that was requested by Andy Lutomirski: sas_ss_flags(sp)==0
>>>>> already implies that we are not on a sigstack, so the code is shuffled
>>>>> to avoid the duplicate checking.
>>>> So this changelog is missing an analysis about what effect this change will have
>>>> on applications. Can any type of user-space code see a change in behavior? If yes,
>>>> what will happen and is that effect desirable?
>>> This is a clean-up, and as such, there is no visible effect.
>>> If there is - it is a bug.
>>> The purpose of this patch is only to unify the x86 code with
>>> what all the other arches do. It was initially the part of the
>>> rejected series, but now it is just a clean-up.
>> Ok, so AFAICS the relevant change is:
>>
>> - if (current->sas_ss_size)
>> - sp = current->sas_ss_sp + current->sas_ss_size;
>> + if (sas_ss_flags(sp) == 0)
>> + sp = current->sas_ss_sp + current->sas_ss_size;
>>
>> and since sas_ss_flags() is defined as:
>>
>> static inline int sas_ss_flags(unsigned long sp)
>> {
>> if (!current->sas_ss_size)
>> return SS_DISABLE;
>>
>> return on_sig_stack(sp) ? SS_ONSTACK : 0;
>> }
>>
>> sas_ss_flags() returns 0 iff current->sas_ss_size && !on_sig_stack().
>>
>> But we already have on_sig_stack(sp) calculated. Why not write that as:
>>
>> + if (current->sas_ss_size && !onsigstack)
>> + sp = current->sas_ss_sp + current->sas_ss_size;
>>
>> and since we check '!onsigstack' in both branches, we might as well factor it out
>> into a single condition ... and arrive to the exact code that we began with.
> ISTM it's silly for us to be unconditionally computing onsigstack.
> We're doing it because we need it later for this:
>
> /*
> * If we are on the alternate signal stack and would overflow it, don't.
> * Return an always-bogus address instead so we will die with SIGSEGV.
> */
> if (onsigstack && !likely(on_sig_stack(sp)))
> return (void __user *)-1L;
>
> This seems basically useless to me. Sure, it's nice to send SIGSEGV
> if we overflow due to signal delivery. But we're almost as likely to
> overflow in the signal handler as we are to overflow during delivery,
> and we don't even try to catch that.
>
> Anyway, I think we should make two changes to the sig_on_stack thing:
>
> 1. If SS_AUTODISARM, then we're not on the stack, regardless of what sp says.
>
> 2. If !user_64bit_mode(regs) && (regs->ss & 0x4), then we're not on
> the signal stack. This will happen if we're running on an LDT stack
> and we coincidentally have the ESP part of SS:ESP matching the signal
> stack.
>
> In general, the existing design is crap and it should always have
> worked the way that Stas is proposing with SS_AUTODISARM.
Andy, so can I use your Acked-by to this patch?
I think 2 is an entirely separate problem and can be implemented
later. Do you have any objections to the patch in its current form?
Do you think that 1 should be implemented, or can we agree that
it is not possible/unsafe? Please, state your optinion explicitly, because
I am completely puzzled with why this patch cannot be applied.
prev parent reply other threads:[~2016-04-13 21:47 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 9+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2016-02-21 23:01 [PATCH] [Cleanup] x86: signal: unify the sigaltstack check with other arches Stas Sergeev
2016-02-25 8:25 ` Ingo Molnar
2016-02-25 12:14 ` Stas Sergeev
2016-03-08 16:20 ` Ingo Molnar
2016-03-08 16:55 ` Stas Sergeev
2016-03-10 0:02 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-03-10 10:26 ` Ingo Molnar
2016-03-10 12:08 ` Stas Sergeev
2016-04-13 22:11 ` Stas Sergeev [this message]
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